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The principle aim of this dissertation is to investigate the philosophical appliction of 
quantum information theory to interpretational issues regarding the theory of quantum 
mechanics.  Recently, quantum information theory has emerged as a potential source 
for such an interpretation.  The main question with which this dissertation will be 
concerned is whether or not an information-theoretic interpretation can serve as a 
conceptually acceptable interpretation of quantum mechanics.  It will be argued that 
some of the more obvious approaches – that quantum information theory shows us 
that ultimately the world is made of information, and quantum Bayesianism – fail as 
philosophical interpretations of quantum mechanics.  However, the information-
theoretic approach of Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson introduces Einstein’s distinction 
between principle theories and constructive theories, arguing that quantum mechanics 
is best understood as an information-theoretic principle theory.  While I argue that 
this particular approach fails, it does offer a viable new philosophical role for 
  
information theory.  Specifically, an investigation of interpretationally successful 
principle theories such as Newtonian mechanics, special relativity, and general 
relativity, shows that the particular principles employed are necessary a  constitutive 
elements of a framework which partially defines the basic explanatory concepts of 
space, time, and motion.  Without such constitutive principles as preconditions for 
empirical meaning, scientific progress is hampered.  It is argued that the philoso ical 
issues in quantum mechanics stem from an analogous conceptual crisis.  On the basis 
of this comparison, the best strategy for resolving these problems is to apply a similar 
sort of conceptual analysis to quantum mechanics so as to provide an appropriate set 
of constitutive principles clarifying the conceptual issues at stake.  It is further argued 
that quantum information theory is ideally placed as a novel conceptual framework 
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 To a very large extent, this manuscript mirrors the course of my actual 
thinking on these matters.  When I first arrived in graduate school I was not familiar 
with the subject of information theory, let alone quantum information theory.  
Therefore, not knowing the subject my dissertation, this seemed an intriguing area of 
research – new, exiting, promising.  Quantum information theory seemed to me to be 
philosophically promising because much of its successes draw from those aspects of 
quantum mechanics which had been puzzled over by physicists and philosophers 
since day one.  It did not question these oddities; it embraced them, and got results.  It 
was exiting because the approach in the foundations of physics, seemed to make the 
claim that physics, at least quantum physics, was “about information”.  I did not 
know what this meant, I am not sure I do still, but it is enticing.  It lends itself to at 
least two obvious interpretations.  One, classical mechanics is about particles, wav , 
and motion, and this seemed to have real ontological significance.  Classical 
mechanics is about describing the things out there in the world.  So if quantum 
mechanics was about information, then by analogy, information must have some sort 
of ontological significance.  Rather than a world made up of particles and waves, it is 
a world made up of information.  Very sci-fi.  Two, if quantum mechanics is about 
information, then it is about our knowledge.  So the theory of quantum mechanics 
tells us simply about what we know and that some of our most fundamental physics is 
inherently reflexive in some way. 
 Neither of these approaches felt particularly satisfactory to me.  The first 




mechanics.  It does not bring new justification for being an instrumentalist, nor does it 
make it any more realist.  So I spent some time analyzing why these approaches are 
not promising.  But then the question becomes, what good does quantum information 
do us regarding the fundamentals?  Is it simply an alternate mathematical stru ture 
which does not shed any new light on interpretational issues? 
 Here, Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (CBH, 2003) provide a third way, though it 
was only discussed briefly.  The idea was that information-theoretic prin i les could 
be provided from which the general features of quantum mechanics could be derived.  
This, in turn, could mean that there is a principle theory of quantum mechanics, just 
as there is for relativity theory.  But for me, this also raises questions: is, in fact, a 
principle theory, ipso facto, interpretationally preferable, and if so, why, and why 
does this now make quantum information theory important (there could be principle 
theories without quantum information-theoretic principles)?  This is where most of 
my investigation lies.  What makes a principle theory valuable?  And does that apply 
in the case of quantum mechanics?  And is quantum information theory the right 
approach? 
 I was skeptical that in virtue being a principle theory, there was automatically, 
so to speak, some interpretational groundwork done or swept aside.  Einstein did 
formulate relativity theory as a principle theory, but he also took thermodynamics to 
be a paradigm example of a principle theory.  The final verdict is perhaps not yet in, 
but it seems to be far from obvious that thermodynamics is a more fundamental 
theory than statistical mechanics, which many take to underlie thermodynamic 




 After trips to more distant territory such as Kant and logical positivism, I was 
better able to understand the role principle theories play in foundational physics and 
be more precise about what qualities make them foundational via historical examples.  
There are times and instances where principle theories can play this role, indeed, must 
play this role.  The next question then is: is now such a time and is quantum 
mechanics such an instance?  I conclude that yes, it is.  So is quantum information 
theory the place to get such principle from?  Perhaps.  There is nothing prima facie 
intrinsically special about quantum information theory; however, it is perhaps the 
only place which is in fact offering plausible constitutive principles.  Other avenues in 
quantum mechanics, I contend, unless drastically reformulated, cannot play the role 
which is necessary.  So I see myself as pursuing the quantum information-theoretic 
approach to see how it could work.  In the end, I think that it can if applied in the 
right manner.  In particular, the CBH approach hit on something important regarding 
quantum mechanics and the potential for approaching it as a principle theory using 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 The principle aim of this dissertation is to investigate the philosophical 
application of quantum information theory to interpretational issues regarding the 
theory of quantum mechanics.  Recently, quantum information theory has emerged as 
a potential source for such an interpretation.  The main question with which this 
dissertation will be concerned is whether or not an information-theoretic 
interpretation can serve as a conceptually acceptable interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.   
 Since its formalization in the 1920’s, quantum mechanics has been resistant to 
any sort of universally accepted “interpretation”.  One need only look to the current 
philosophical literature on quantum mechanics to verify this.  Moreover, such an 
interpretation has seemed necessary due to the particular nature of quantum 
mechanics and its results, which seem to contradict both classical physical theories 
and commonsense physical experience.  As a result, throughout the years, many 
interpretations of quantum mechanics have been formulated, all of which try to make 
sense of these quantum puzzles in various ways.  Part of the project is to analyzewh t 
counts as a successful interpretation of a physical theory. 
 Apart from quantum mechanics, the 20th century saw the advent of another 
successful theory, the theory of relativity.  While this theory brings with it star ling 
results from the standpoint of previous physical theories, it is generally acknowledged 




mechanics begs.  Quantum mechanics is at least as successful as relativity theory in 
terms of making accurate predictions about the physical world to which it applies.  
This begs for an answer to the question: what is essentially different about the theory 
of quantum mechanics which makes it so difficult to interpret?  Is it just that the 
world as revealed to us by quantum mechanics is so fundamentally different from 
experience and classical theory that it is beyond understanding in the usual ways? Or 
is there a structural or conceptual difference in the type of interpretation offered by 
relativity theory which separates it from those which have been offered for quantum 
mechanics? 
One possible approach to answering these questions has arisen from the field 
of quantum information theory.  Within recent decades, the field of quantum 
information theory has blossomed, with an array of researchers exploring the 
possibilities of this newly tapped resource.  Among the areas that have seen fruitful 
research are quantum cryptology, quantum computation, and quantum information 
theory.  Essentially, the promise of this field comes from the fact that it recognizes 
that quantum mechanics has several interesting features that can be exploited in the 
real world with remarkable results, such as quantum teleportation, the possibility of 
exponential increases in the speed of certain computations, and new communication 
protocols.  Until the 1990s, these features of quantum mechanics had not generally 
been of central focus for practicing physicists; only an outside literatur  mong 
philosophical circles paid them much attention, usually as problems to be solved, as 
opposed to features to be exploited.  Now, it appears that quantum information theory 




 For all the interest quantum information theory is currently generating, it still 
remains a fledgling field.  The theories that do exist are still relativey new and it 
would seem that many have yet to be discovered.  Nowhere is it more evident just 
how fresh this approach to quantum theory is than in the research into the 
foundational issues of quantum mechanics.  Here, there is a new push into the 
perennial problems of quantum mechanics from the standpoint of quantum 
information theory.  Advances in the understanding of quantum information tantalize 
with the promise of providing insight into what it is to be a quantum theory.  
However, approaches to the philosophical issues in quantum mechanics from this 
perspective are largely disparate and less than cohesive.  Just what might iean to 
provide an information-theoretic interpretive approach to quantum theory, or any 
physical theory for that matter? 
 The application of the concept of information to physical theories or to the 
physical world can be made quite specific and technical in one sense, but on the other 
hand, it remains an enigmatic concept.  In much of the literature on quantum 
information theory, and generally on information in physics such as thermodynamics, 
there is a tendency to link information and knowledge.  The ease with which the term 
“information” can be anthropomorphized accounts for much of its appeal when 
dealing with fundamental issues in physics.  As is the case with many of the 
foundational issues in physics, more abstract and complicated theories are interpr ted 
according to principles or concepts that are easier to intuit.  From a philosophical 
perspective, this is done because these more basic concepts offer a better 




information might be in the position of offering this kind of understanding for a 
quantum theory long in need of such interpretational clarity.  At first blush, the 
concept of information may seem to be promising.  However, a second look makes it 
apparent that matters are not so simple. 
 The central question of this dissertation is “Why quantum information 
theory?”  Philosophical interpretations of quantum mechanics through quantum 
information theory have gained traction in recent years.  But does this provide any 
genuinely new insight into the interpretational issues quantum mechanics presents?  
There are several types of approaches which utilize information theory to answer 
philosophical questions regarding quantum mechanics.  Answering the question 
above requires determining whether or not any of these approaches is successful.  I 
argue that none have been, and some approaches appear unlikely to bear fruit.  Does 
this mean that quantum information theory is an interesting theoretical diversion, but 
that it cannot play any interesting philosophical role?   
 After exploring various approaches, I find that quantum information theory 
does offer a promising framework for resolving the standard philosophical problems 
posed by quantum mechanics.  This dissertation will argue that, upon analysis, 
fundamental physical theories (e.g. space-time) play the role that they do bcause 
they define the conceptual framework of empirical meaning.  The establishment of an 
appropriate conceptual framework is necessary, and the type of analysis which 
precedes it generally arises out of crisis, when there are fundamentally conf icting 
concepts that require resolution.  There is substantial reason to think that quantum 




the coherent structure, through conceptual analysis, which defines an explanatory 
framework.  The potential benefit which information-theoretic approaches hold over 
other interpretations is analogous to trying to develop general relativity with the 
geometric structure of Minkowski spacetime and other non-Euclidean geometric 
models available, as opposed to trying to develop it from Lorentzian mechanics.  
Information theory opens up a broader framework in terms of the concepts available 
to the theorist, and it provides a new way to analyze the structure of quantum 
mechanics as it stands. 
 The next chapter introduces the notion of information theory, delineating what 
philosophical work it is suited to do, and what it is not.  This chapter also outlines 
some basic information-theoretic approaches to interpreting quantum mechanics t t 
have been proposed.  The view that information is somehow the fundamental “stuff” 
of the universe is considered and dismissed as incoherent.  This chapter also considers 
quantum Bayesianism, as represented in the work of Fuchs, who argues that the 
quantum state is a measure of subjective belief.  Instead of describing some aspect of 
the world, the quantum state represents our degrees of belief regarding the outcomes 
of measurements.  I find that, for foundational issues in quantum mechanics, this 
approach fails in virtue of its focus on the subjective nature of quantum information 
theory.  Essentially this approach results in a purely instrumental interpretation of 
quantum mechanics. 
 Chapter 3 takes a detailed look at another information-theoretic approach to 
quantum mechanics, originally proposed by Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (2003).  The 




shown to be equivalent to the general features of a quantum theory.  The 
interpretational significance of this approach is found to reside in the discovery of a 
principle theory version of quantum mechanics analogous to the principle theory 
approach of relativity theory.  However, in this particular case, it is found to be 
unsatisfactory.  Despite the theoretical utility and interest in their derivation, there is 
no reason to suppose that the information-theoretic principles are any more 
fundamental than the quantum mechanical physics to which they are equivalent.  
Accepting these principles requires accepting that measuring instruments ust 
ultimately remain “black boxes,” leading again to instrumentalism. 
 This chapter also discusses the distinction between principle theories and 
constructive theories, as suggested by Einstein.  The distinction is evaluated 
according to the function of these types of theories.  The best way to understand this 
distinction differs from what other authors have said in that it is based primarily on 
the explanatory roles fulfilled by each type of theory.  It is concluded that principle 
theories act functionally as framework theories, providing explanation for laws via 
unification. The explanatory role played by constructive theories is to provide causal-
mechanical explanation. 
 Tracing the analysis of philosophers from Kant to the logical positivists to 
recent works by DiSalle, Chapter 4 argues that certain types of theories – e.g. those 
involving space and time – require an added dimension of conceptual analysis.  These 
theories supply the necessary framework for all the physics that takes plc  within 
their scope by establishing the meaning of the empirical structure itself. When 




Newton to Einstein, of conceptual analysis which addresses inconsistencies and 
contradictions within current conceptual schemes, brought on by empirical discovery.  
Appropriate constitutive principles are developed such that they can redefine 
structural concepts for the framework of physics by reconciling previously 
incompatible frameworks.  Principle theories necessarily act as our most foundational 
physics by establishing the basis for meaningful physics. 
 Chapter 5 returns to an information-theoretic interpretation of quantum 
mechanics with this new conceptual background in place.  Bub and Pitowsky (2007) 
take the information-theoretic principle of no cloning and use it to develop an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics which shifts from a dynamics-based theory to 
the kinematic framework of Hilbert space, analogous to the shift in special relativity 
to the kinematic framework of Minkowski spacetime away from the dynamic theory 
of Lorentz.  This is presented as a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics just as 
special relativity is a realist theory of spacetime.  I argue that it is not the kinematic 
nature of special relativity which makes it a realist theory.  Realism is not the central 
question.  Instead we must look to the principle of no cloning to determine if it is 
constitutive in the right way regarding concepts of measurement and realism.  There
is no compelling case to be made that it is. 
 Chapter 6 applies what has been argued in the preceding chapters by 
speculating about where a resolution to the interpretational difficulties of quantum 
mechanics might lie and that quantum information theory is best placed to make such 
solutions possible. The standard philosophical concerns with quantum mechanics all 




quantum mechanics and the causal structure of relativity theory.  Quantum mechanics 
needs to be subject to conceptual analysis, and it needs to play the role of being a 
constitutive theory – that is, a theory not simply of empirical generalization, but one 
which defines the concepts which establish a causal structure and meaningful 
measurement within the physical world.  This may very well require conceptual 
resolution with relativity theory.  Progress in quantum information theory broadens 
the conceptual space as did advances in geometry prior to the founding of relativity 
theory, thereby presenting new conceptual frameworks in which to unite previously 




Chapter 2: Quantum Information 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 As outlined in the introduction, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
investigate the role that the concept of quantum information theory might or might 
not be capable of playing in the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics.  
The relatively recent advancements in quantum theory and its novel approach to 
investigating and, more importantly, utilizing various aspects of quantum phenomena 
have also sparked the interest of philosophers, for whom this new development 
potentially offers grounds for new insight into the intractable interpretation l ssues 
traditionally surrounding quantum mechanics. 
 In this chapter, I want, first, to establish more clearly what it is that we are 
talking about when we refer to information theory and quantum information theory.  I 
also want to outline some of the various approaches that have applied some notion of 
quantum information theory in attempts to answer foundational philosophical 
questions regarding quantum mechanics.  There are, I think, two ways of interpreting 
the role of information theory in quantum mechanics which suggest themselves 
immediately, and which have been pursued in various ways, sometimes in concert.  
Both follow from the general idea that ‘physics is about information.”  But what this 
means in unclear.  The first interpretation of this claim is that the application of 
information theory to quantum mechanics shows us that the world is made up of 




that basic constituent is information.  That is, this is a reductionist picture, where the 
basic stuff of the universe is information and so physics is ultimately about this s uff 
and its characteristics.  The other way to see physics as being about information, is 
not to view information as some kind of stuff or basic constituent, but to see physics 
as about our state of knowledge or belief, stemming from the link between knowledge 
and information.  Quantum information theory is the final vindication for those 
according to whom quantum mechanics was never a theory about the world, but one 
about our information, or knowledge, regarding it.  At the end of the day however, 
both of these are motivated by a misunderstanding about the concept of information 
and they are untenable positions. 
 In this chapter we will see that information theory as applied to physics and 
quantum mechanics involves a very technical notion of information.  In fact, this 
technical concept of information has only a partial overlap with the other concept of 
information in everyday use, which necessarily involves knowledge, language users 
and meanings.  None of this is a part of the technical concept of information at play in 
information theory.  This technical notion of information is an abstract noun due to 
the fact that it can only be understood as a typeof thing, as opposed to a token which 
instantiates that type.  Information is a statistical property of some information 
source.  As such, it is a category mistake to think of information as somehow being 
the basic stuff of the universe.  Upon analysis, it seems that this approach borders on 
incoherent.  We shall also see that a prominent information-theoretic approach, that of 
the subjective quantum Bayesian, fails as a full blown interpretative stance since for 





2.2. There’s Information, and then there’s Information 
 In undertaking our investigations, it is necessary to make more precise what is 
meant by information and quantum information.  Much of the excitement surrounding 
the field from a philosophical perspective stems from a vague idea that by bringing 
the concept of “information” into the realm of physics we can discover something 
fundamental about the world and our knowledge of it.  This is especially the case in 
the age of the rise of the dominance of information throughout (information super 
highways, the power of information, information technology, etc.).  But a lot of the 
talk is vague and enigmatic despite its promise.  John Bell lists among the words that 
should be kept out of the formulation of quantum mechanics “information”.  He asks, 
“ Information?  Whose information?  Information about what?” (Bell J. S., 1990, p. 
34)  This line of questioning pinpoints the fluidity of this term and highlights its 
various connotations, including the odd juxtaposition of a term, which usually implies 
that someone has information about something, with using it in a scientific context.  
We ought to heed Bell’s warning and proceed with caution.  What is information?  
What is the proper use of the concept in quantum mechanics? 
 Briefly, the most common definition of the technical concept of information, 
Shannon information, has to do with quantifying the amount of information in a 
communication channel.  The communication channel consists of a source, a receiver, 
and the channel between them.  Nielsen and Chuang (2000) characterize an 
information source as a set of probabilities pj, j = 1, 2, …, d.  The source emits strings 




letters of the English alphabet, and pj corresponds to the frequency of the use of each 
letter in standard English.  However, it is important to note that j need not be letters 
from any human ‘language’.  All that it means is that j is a discrete set of outputs 
from the source.  A message produced by the source then is some sequence of letters j 
of length N.  For messages with very large N, the message can be compressed to  
  
bits of information (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 52), where a ‘bit’ (short for ‘binary 
digit’) is  used to refer to the basic unit of classical information in terms of Shannon 
entropy, and to an elementary two-state classical system considered as representing 
the possible outputs of an elementary classical information source labeled  0 or 1. H
is the measure of Shannon information, or the source probability distribution in terms 
of its compressibility, the Shannon entropy. 
 The analogous measure corresponding to quantum information is the von 
Neumann entropy.  The von Neumann entropy is the measure of the compressibility 
of a quantum information source in terms of quantum bits, or qubits.  Qubits are two-
state quantum systems which may be labeled  and .  Whereas, a bit may only be 
in states 0 or 1, a qubit can, in general, be in a superposition of its basis states; 
.  The von Neumann entropy for some state is defined as  
, 
where  is the density operator and are the eigenvalues of  (Nielsen & Chuang, 
2000, p. 510). 
 In a particularly clear and sober analysis of the concept and use of 




between the technical concept of information used in information theory and defined 
as Shannon information, and information in the everyday sense.  Others have also 
insisted that this distinction be maintained, including Shannon in the introduction to 
his seminal paper “The Mathematical Theory of Communication”, where he says, 
The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly 
or approximately a message selected at another point.  Frequently the messages have 
meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical 
or conceptual entities.  These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the 
engineering problem. (Shannon, 1948, p. 379)  
There is a critical distinction to be made between the technical notion of informati n, 
as used in quantum information theory, and our everyday sense of information.  
Timpson emphasizes and addresses this distinction in a number of places (2004; 
2005; 2006).  With careful philosophical taxonomy, Timpson is able to show that 
these two concepts are distinct and that it is also not feasible to argue from one to the 
other. 
 Any philosophical work that is to be done regarding quantum information 
theory must first be very clear on the distinction between the everyday concept of 
information and the technical sense of information.  Timpson (2004) argues as 
follows.  The everyday concept of information is based on the more primitive idea of 
that which is provided when one is informed.  To inform is to bring someone to know 
something.  Furthermore, “Concerning information we can distinguish between 
possessing information, which is to have knowledge; acquiring information, which is 
to gain knowledge; and containing information, which is sometimes the same as 




possessing information and containing information.  To have knowledge, or possess 
information, is for the knower to have an ability with regard to that information.  An 
ability is a power or a disposition, which only persons have.  To contain information, 
however, is to be in a certain state, and this is categorically distinct from possessing 
information or knowing, which is an ability. This state is either providing or being 
able to provide knowledge.  That something can be in such a state – that of possessing 
information about something – comes from the fact that it contains information 
propositionally.  In other words, containing information about something requires that 
the sentences or symbols in which it is expressed carry meaning.  Such symbols only 
possess meaning because of their place in a framework of language and language 
users (Timpson, 2004, pp. 6-7).  “[T]he concept of knowledge is functioning prior to 
the concept of containing information: as I have said, the concept of information is to 
be explained in terms of the provision of knowledge” (Timpson, 2004, p. 7).  
Therefore, the everyday concept of information is necessarily linked with language 
and knowledge, and, therefore, a knowing subject.   
 Any statement of fact is a candidate for being a piece of knowledge.  Timpson 
makes a further differentiation between 1) a statement or proposition, 2) a sentence 
type, and 3) a sentence token.  Starting at the bottom, a sentence token is a particular 
instance of a spoken or written sentence type, instantiated in the sound waves or ink 
patterns of which it is composed.  The sentence type can be repeated, instantiated by 
more tokens of that type.  Writing “Today is a holiday,” and then saying “Today is a 
holiday,” is to have produced two token sentences of the same type.  This sentence 




language.  A proposition is distinct from a sentence type, since a given proposition 
may be expressed with a different sentence type – in another language for example – 
but carry the same meaning.   
 A sentence token is the kind of thing that exists in a particular time and space.  
It is a concrete thing.  Sentence types and propositions, however, do not exist in any 
time and space.  They are abstract things, not part of the material world.  Timpson 
continues to argue that the abstractness of types comes from the fact that they are 
properties of a given kind. The object, in this case the token, which has the property 
of being a certain type, will be a concrete thing, but the properties which it has are 
abstract things.  Thus, the information, in the everyday sense, which is expressed in a 
proposition, is an abstract noun. Again, a proposition has meaning only in the context 
of language and language users. 
 For the technical notion of Shannon information, the everyday notion of 
information, having to do with meaning and knowing, is irrelevant, as is the notion of 
sentence type, or that a particular token is instantiated.  All that matters is he 
particular pattern output by the source.  This pattern is a type, of which there can be 
different tokens.  Successful communication involves outputting another pattern of 
this type at the other end of the communication channel.  Shannon information 
characterizes not individual messages, but the source of the messages.  As a measure 
of the quantity of information, it represents the maximum amount a message 
produced by a particular source can be compressed without losing the reproducibility 




 Though Shannon information is primarily concerned with being a measure of 
the quantity of information of a source, one can derivatively express information per 
letter associated with a message with N letters where N is large.  A piece of 
information can also be defined derivatively. 
[I]nformation is what it is the aim of a communication protocol to transmit: information (in 
the technical sense) is what is produced by an information source that is required to be 
reproduced if the transmission is to be counted a success. (Timpson, 2004, p. 21) 
This necessitates characterizing information sources, what they produce, and wh t 
counts as success.  For the communication to be a success, it must at least be possible 
to reproduce a token of the type emitted by the source at the end of the protocol.  The 
piece of information is the sequence type, since to identify the sequence produced by 
the source, we refer not to the token, but to the type.  Successful transmission of the 
type means to produce a token at the source, and then reproduce a token of that same 
type at the output.  The sequence type or probabilistic structure of the output has no 
bearing on questions of meaning and knowledge.  
 At face value, this technical definition of information has very little to do with 
the everyday concept of information discussed above.  Shannon information does not 
give the irreducible meaning of the messages.  Meaning is irrelevant. 
…information must not be confused with meaning.  In fact, two messages, one of which is 
heavily loaded with meaning and the other which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent, 
from the present viewpoint, as regards information.  (Weaver, 1963, p. 8) 
Timpson introduces the label informationt to discuss the technical concept of 
information and to distinguish it clearly from the everyday sense.  The suggestion 




quantum information theory stems from an unfortunate selection of language.  If it 
had been called “Shannon statistical compressibility”, as opposed to “Shannon 
information” dangerous conflations would never have arisen.  This is not to say there 
is no relation, but instead of beginning there implicitly with no prima facie warrant, 
the connection would need to be explicitly demonstrated.  For more on attempts that 
have failed to make the connection see Timpson (2004). 
 Both types of information end up being abstract nouns, but for entirely 
different reasons.  As we saw, everyday pieces of information, true propositions, are 
abstracta.  Shannon information, as a measure of the compressibility of a source is an 
abstract noun, not concrete.  And pieces of information, as sequence types, are also 
abstract.  Information in both senses is abstract, but since the notions are separate, the 
basis for this judgment likewise differs. 
 This exposition of Timpson’s serves two purposes.  First, it emphasizes the 
independence of two uses of the term “information”.  Second, it establishes the 
ontological status regarding both concepts of information as being types, and 
therefore, as abstract nouns, analogous to concepts such as number, which as an 
abstract concept implies that there is no place in the material world that one finds a
number or a piece of information.  What one may find in the world is a token which 
instantiates some piece of information.  Both of these points will be exceedingly 






2.3. “All things physical are information-theoretic in origin.” 
 Some views on what makes the quantum information-theoretic approach 
foundationally interesting is that it supports a claim that information has some sort of
ontological significance, either that it is the fundamental “stuff” of the universe or 
that the universe is best viewed as a massive quantum computer.  If this sort of claim 
could be made, then quantum mechanics could indeed be reduced to a simpler and 
more basic set of ingredients, information.  Though perhaps this seems a radical view, 
it would not be an entirely new proposal.  Various authors have suggested that 
information is physical and that the world is basically made of information.  F r a 
variety of views see (Wheeler, 1990; Landauer, 1991; Lloyd, 2006).  For example, 
Wheeler says, 
It from bit.  Otherwise put, every 'it' – every particle, every field of force, even the space-time 
continuum itself – derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely – even if in 
some contexts indirectly – from the apparatus-elicit d answers to yes-or-no questions, binary 
choices, bits.  'It from bit' symbolizes the idea th t every item of the physical world has at 
bottom – a very deep bottom, in most instances – an immaterial source and explanation; that 
which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the 
registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, tha  all things physical are information-
theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe. (Wheeler, 1990, p. 5) 
Landauer, as another example, argues that “information is physical” and speculates 
that the laws of physics as algorithms for calculation (Landauer, 1996), and that the 
“laws of physics are, in turn, limited by the range of information processing 
available” (Landauer, 1991, p. 29).  It has been argued that the formal resemblance 
between Shannon information, or entropy, and thermodynamic entropy suggests that 




something deep about the world.  The problem, of course, is to specify what would it 
mean to say that information is somehow a fundamental constituent of our world? 
 First of all, it is again important to keep the everyday sense of information out 
of the picture.  The question is whether information in the technical sense is the kind 
of thing that can be the fundamental stuff.  Would this mean revising our concepts of 
things and of properties?  What then is this manifestation of a physical world? 
 As Timpson (2004) has noted, the question of determining the meaning of a 
view like this is presented with a dilemma.  On the one hand, if what is meant is that 
information, in the technical sense – itself a physically defined quantity – can only 
exist if it is instantiated in some physical manner, then the position is fairly trivial 
and, from a philosophical standpoint, uninteresting.  Landauer can certainly be read in 
this way.  However, as shown above, the actual occurrence of some information type 
means that it must occur in some physical token of that type, so it should be no 
surprise that all actual instances of information must be realized in a physical 
representation. 
 On the other hand, if what is meant is that the world consists of some basic 
stuff, and that stuff in information, then employing Timpson’s analysis, it is 
immediately apparent that a category mistake is implicated in claims regarding the 
type of thing that information is.  Information, in the technical sense, is merely a 
statistical measure of compressibility.  A ‘piece’ of information is a sequence type.  
And it is instantiated in a physical token.  Information is an abstract noun.  To say 
that the world is made of information is analogous to the claim that the world is 




 I will not here pass any final judgment on this proposition, but simply 
maintain that if it is to be carried forward, there is much that needs to be worked out, 
and it is not immediately obvious that it is not a non-starter.  Such a view must 
recognize the category mistake and must then somehow argue around it, that, 
nevertheless, an abstract noun can somehow come to be the fundamental stuff of the 
universe.  An analogously strange argument would need to be made to claim, for 
example, that the world is made out of numbers, or of relations.  I cannot rule such an 
argument out as in principle impossible, but it would require a very strange ontology 
indeed, and seems at present to be incoherent. 
2.4. Quantum Bayesianism 
2.4.1. The View 
 Another recent trend in the philosophy of quantum mechanics hearkens back 
to interpretations offered by some of its original founders, particularly Bohr, though, 
with an information-theoretic spin.  Since the days when the formalism of quantum 
mechanics was conceived, the peculiarities of the theory have led theorists to aband n 
a realist interpretation of quantum physics.  Issues such as not being able to 
simultaneously ascertain the exact values of variables such as position and 
momentum, where classically this is in principle possible, or the fundamentally 
probabilistic predictions of the theory and related measurement problem, convinced 
many theorists that quantum mechanics is at best a purely instrumentalist theory.  
Quantum mechanics, with its overwhelming success as a predictive theory, was 
merely an accurate tool for such predictions, but it offered no access to some 




There is no quantum world.  There is only an abstract quantum physical description.  It is 
wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is.  Physics concerns what we 
can say about Nature.  (Bohr as paraphrased by AagePetersen, 1963, p. 12) 
Additionally, realistic theories of the same physical phenomena appeared blocked.  
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935), argued that the assumption that quantum 
mechanics was complete was incompatible with commonsense assumptions about 
reality.  These assumptions are separability – that physical properties in one region 
are completely determined there regardless of other systems – and loc lity, which is 
the condition that there are no instantaneous influences across a spatial region.  
Together, these amount to an assumption of the possibility of a common-cause 
explanation.  Bell (1964) was the first to show conclusively that a theory, which 
includes the conditions of separability and locality, could not arrive at the predictions 
of quantum mechanics, which corresponded with experimental results.  Quantum 
mechanics, then, describes phenomena which simply cannot be explained in any 
purely standard causal manner.  Einstein’s issue is that physics must aspire o mor  
than this.  It must be able to describe a world where such explanations are in principle 
possible.  But quantum mechanics does not allow this. 
 Spurred by recent advances in quantum information theory, some authors 
have suggested that quantum mechanics is simply about our own state of belief 
regarding the quantum world.  Quantum information theory introduces a formalism 
for this approach to an interpretation of quantum theory.  At first glance, it mightalso 
seem to offer a simple and intuitive structure on which to base the more abstract 
mathematical structure of quantum mechanics, thus providing a better understanding 




approach is essentially a sophisticated descendent of Copenhagen-style 
instrumentalism.  Moreover, embracing the formalism of quantum information theory 
does not lend any support to motivate or justify this view.  The basis for adopting the 
subjectivist standpoint come from the standard issues regarding quantum mechanics 
and is not specific to quantum information theory.  Any temptation to think otherwise 
would only arise from not being careful about keeping the everyday concept of 
information, with its connotations regarding knowledge and mental states, distinct 
from the technical concept of information, which has nothing to do with claims of 
subjectivism. 
 Though the details differ, the basic inspirational spark for these views appears 
similar.  For example, Zeilinger makes the following claims: 
 The most fundamental viewpoint here is that the quant m is a consequence of what 
can be said about the world. Since what can be said has to be expressed in propositions and 
since the most elementary statement is a single proposition, quantization follows if the most 
elementary system represents just a single proposition… 
It is evident that one of the immediate consequences is that in physics we cannot talk about 
reality independent of what can be said about reality. L kewise it does not make sense to 
reduce the task of physics to just making subjectiv statements, because any statements about 
the physical world must ultimately be subject to exp riment. Therefore, while in a classical 
worldview, reality is a primary concept prior to and i dependent of observation with all its 
properties, in the emerging view of quantum mechanics the notions of reality and of 
information are on an equal footing. One implies the other and neither one is sufficient to 
obtain a complete understanding of the world. (Zeilinger, 1999, p. 642) 
 Fuchs, one of the main forces behind what we might call subjective quantum 




quantum mechanics is about subjective information or belief (2002).  He quotes an 
excerpt from a letter of Einstein’s to Michele Besso: 
What relation is there between the ‘state’ (‘quantum state’) described by a function ψ and a 
real deterministic situation (that we call the ‘real st te’)?  Does the quantum state characterize 
completely (1) or only incompletely (2) a real state?  … 
 I reject (1) because it obliges us to admit that tere is a rigid connection between 
parts of the system separated from each other in space in an arbitrary way (instantaneous 
action at a distance, which doesn’t diminish when the distance increases). Here is the 
demonstration:  [The EPR argument] 
 If one considers the method of the present quantum theory as being in principle 
definitive, that amounts to renouncing a complete description of real states.  One could justify 
this renunciation if one assumes that there is no law for real states i.e., that their description 
would be useless.  Otherwise said, that would mean: laws don’t apply to things, but only to 
what observation teaches us about them.  (The laws that relate to the temporal succession of 
this partial knowledge are however entirely determinist c.) 
 Now, I can’t accept that.  I think that the statistical character of the present theory is 
simply conditioned by the choice of an incomplete description. (Letter from Einstein to Besso 
1952; quoted in Fuchs 2002, p. 10.  Italics are mine.) 
 Fuchs takes the results of no-go theorems such as Bell’s as establishing that 
completing quantum mechanics in the ways philosophically required by Einstein is 
impossible.  As far as it goes, Einstein’s argument is taken to be airtight except that 
Einstein’s refusal to accept such incompleteness in a physical theory does not 
logically follow from his argument that quantum mechanics is incomplete.  
Therefore, the quantum state is information.  Fuchs says, “The complete 
disconnectedness of the quantum-state change rule from anything to do with 




information.  Subjective, incomplete information” (Fuchs, 2002, p. 11).  Instead of 
describing some aspect of the world, the quantum state represents our degrees of 
belief regarding the outcomes of measurements. 
 Fuchs argues that an accurate formal account of how quantum information 
works is by using non-commutative Bayesian probability theory.  The best way to 
understand probabilities is from a Bayesian perspective and this is especially true of 
quantum probabilities.  Quantum mechanics is the formal tool for arriving at the 
appropriate degree of belief for the outcomes of measurements.  Once a measurent 
has been made, the collapse in the wavefunction is nothing mysterious in the world; it 
is just the updating of one’s previous beliefs about the quantum system. The solution 
to the measurement problem and EPR-style paradoxes comes by showing these are 
not a problem when looked at from this purely subjective perspective.  Nothing weird 
happens upon measurement; one just gains some new information, and so one’s belief 
state changes.  There is no unexplained collapse, no spooky action at a distance.  
Quantum states are not probability assignments to states of the world.  As for any 
Bayesian account of probability, there is no right or wrong state of belief aboutthe 
probability of an event, just one’s subjective beliefs.  When new information is 
available, one updates one’s subjective beliefs on the basis of the information and 
Bayesian conditionalization rules. 
 Timpson (2007) argues that quantum Bayesianism is not an instrumentalist 
position.  The basis for this claim is that the Bayesian approach has pretenses at 
ultimately reaching a very realist position.  It is, for example, Fuchs’ goal in building 




aspect of quantum mechanics away so that some fundamental core which can answer 
the question about what makes it the case that the quantum world can only be 
represented as a subjective degree of belief. 
The quantum system represents something real and indepe dent of us; the quantum state 
represents a collection of subjective degrees of belief about something to do with that 
system…  The structure called quantum mechanics is about the interplay of these two 
things—the subjective and the objective. The task before us is to separate the wheat from the 
chaff.  If the quantum state represents subjective information, then how much of its 
mathematical support structure might be of that same character? Some of it, maybe most of it, 
but surely not all of it.  
 Our foremost task should be to go to each and every axiom of quantum theory and 
give it an information theoretic justification if we can. Only when we are finished picking off 
all the terms (or combinations of terms) that can be interpreted as subjective information will 
we be in a position to make real progress in quantum foundations. The raw distillate left 
behind—miniscule though it may be with respect to the full-blown theory—will be our first 
glimpse of what quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about nature itself. (Fuchs, 2002, pp. 
5-6) 
That is, this program is presented as a realist one.  As Timpson notes, yes, the 
quantum Bayesian is an instrumentalist about the quantum state, however, not an 
instrumentalist about quantum mechanics toute court.  Timpson ultimately rejects the 
quantum Bayesian position on other grounds.  However, what I hope will become 
clear is that these grounds all stem from the same source, and it is that there is a 
fundamental tension between holding that our best and only possible theory of the 
quantum world is and must be about our subjective degrees of belief, i.e. it must be 
instrumentalist, but that we can nevertheless “get at” some picture of th real quantum 




and that there are facts which are true of the world.  Where the problem comes in is to 
assert that what the theory provides is a way to update our purely subjective 
probability assignments.  In doing so, it is left unexplained why we should use this 
method as a reliable way to make predictions.  So while the ultimate aim of the 
quantum Bayesian to find a realist kernel of quantum theory, it is nevertheless backed 
into an instrumentalist position on the basis of it opening assumptions. 
2.4.2. Critique 
 Timpson poses three problems for the quantum Bayesian picture.  These are 
the problem of explanatory deficit, that the quantum Bayesian is committed to a 
Moore’s paradox-style problem, and that the means employed by the quantum 
Bayesian are not appropriate to their ends.  The first of these problems is that the 
quantum Bayesian has trouble with providing scientific explanation.  Timpson holds 
that for a non-instrumentalist theory, some level of explanation is a requirement.  And 
while quantum Bayesianism is purportedly not instrumentalist, it is hard to give an 
account by which it can provide adequate explanation for phenomena which we 
generally take quantum mechanics to explain.  That is, quantum Bayesianism seems 
to suffer from an explanation deficit.  The Bayesian can explain how agents arrive at 
their beliefs about some event taking place, but what a theory is supposed to do is 
explain why the event takes place. 
 For example, we want quantum mechanics to be able to explain why some 
solid bodies conduct electricity and others do not.  For quantum Bayesianism, the 
quantum state does not tell us anything at all about the quantum properties of objects.  




belief about what we expect the system to do.  There is no fact of the matter, 
regarding the microstructure of solid bodies, which explains their various conductive 
properties.  The same story applies to any number of phenomena which we would 
naturally want and take quantum mechanics to explain.  If the quantum state can say
nothing about the microstructure, quantum mechanics can only be a predictive tool, 
not an explanatory device, without some further story about explanation which differs 
from the standard conception. 
 The second problem Timpson is concerned with is what he calls quantum 
Bayesianism’s analogue to Moore’s paradox.  The apparent paradox here is in making 
a statement such as, “It is raining, but I believe it is not raining.”  Timpson’s ccern 
is that the quantum Bayesian position is committed to a similar type of assertion, 
what he calls the quantum Bayesian Moore’s paradox or QBMP: “I am certain that p 
([e.g.]that the outcome will be spin-up in the z-direction) but it is not certain that p” 
(Timpson, 2007, p. 35).  That is, it is often the case that a quantum state will be in a 
pure state with respect to some observable.  In this case, the subjective probability 
that a measurement of that observable performed on the system will return a give  
value will be one.  That is, the result is believed to be certain to occur given the 
measurement.  However, even in the case of a pure quantum state, the subjective 
quantum Bayesian view is committed to the idea that the quantum state is still purely 
subjective.  There is no objective fact of the matter which determines the 
measurement outcome, even in the case of pure states.  Therefore, there seems to be 
some sort of tension here between the expectation that an outcome will occur with 




 The Bayesian response is that nothing surprising is going on here if we look at 
it from the right perspective.  A story about some underlying structure will not make 
it any less surprising for the agent whose subjective beliefs are that the quantum 
system is in a pure state.  Whatever Bayesian process occurred for the agent, which 
led to that assignment, entirely explains the expectation that a particular result will 
occur with certainty.  What needs to be distinguished is the difference between an 
agent being certain of something, and “It being certain” that something is the case.  
The first is a cognitive state.  If I (an agent) do not consider it possible that x, hen I 
do not consider it to be possible that not x.  This is logically independent from the 
claim that “It is certain that x,” which is about facts in the world.  Therefore, it is not a 
logical contradiction to say, “I am certain that x, but it is not certain that x.”  
Likewise, it is possible for the Bayesian to contend that it is perfectly acceptabl  to 
give subjective probability assignments of certainty for the agent, while ma ntaining 
that it is not certain that the outcome will obtain. 
 Timpson replies to this defense by allowing that we can admit that providing 
any underlying facts will not alter the subjective belief set of the agent who is certain, 
thereby disconnecting the certainty of the agent from certainty of things.  However, 
the problem is greater than this.  It is not simply the disengagement of a different 
notion of certainty which needs to be addressed, but the further tension that the 
Bayesian agent must be certain of a particular measurement outcome, and yet ctively 
deny that there are any relevant facts which determine it.  “Isn’t the agent simply 
convicting themselves [sic] as irrational?” (Timpson, 2007, p. 36)  Moore’s paradox, 




what seems ought to be the case regarding what is in fact certain.  The quantum 
Bayesian is committed to a much more general and systematic adoption of this s rt of 
position. 
 The third difficulty Timpson brings up is what he calls the m ans/end 
objection.  The basic problem is that for the quantum Bayesian there is a fundamental 
disconnect between the ends which they seek and appropriate means to reach them.  
According to Timpson, there are two distinct ends for the Bayesian view: “one of 
finding out how the world is; the other the pragmatic business of coping with the 
world” (Timpson, 2007, p. 37).  For the latter of these ends, fundamentally, this 
means using quantum subjective Bayesian updating, on the basis of the data we have 
available, to make predictions about future outcomes.  However, there is a gap 
between our means, subjective updating using data from experiments, and the end of 
being able to make successful predictions.  If there are only subjective probabilities, 
then there seems to be no reason to expect the data to help lead to better predictions.  
The Bayesian view blocks the possibility of there being any good reasons to expect 
our subjective beliefs to match outcomes. 
 To this I might add my own means/end objection, though of a different nature.  
This has to do with the first end Timpson notes, the quantum Bayesian goal of 
discovering some fundamental quantum truth, and the means of reaching it, the 
subjective Bayesian approach.  The concern is that the strategy of “picking off all the 
terms… that can be interpreted as subjective information” to discover the “raw 
distillate left behind” (Fuchs, 2002, p. 6), depends on the subjective approach being 




such as the measurement problem, then stripping away quantum axioms which can be 
reformulated in subjective terms, such as the quantum state, may very likely strip 
away all aspects of the theory which make it a quantum theory.  With nothing left but 
a subjective theory, we are left in an instrumentalist position.  It is not clear that 
stripping out what can be put in subjective terms is not stripping out what might be 
important from a “raw distillate.”  This is a concern which may of course be answered 
by the still open program of the Bayesian approach, but it is not obviously clear that 
the strategy for finding some deep quantum structure this way is not a non-starter.  If 
the task it to answer the question “why the quantum?” then relabeling and removing 
quantum aspects of the theory, such as entanglement, as subjective may amount to 
plastering over the issue as opposed to analyzing it. 
2.4.3. Walks Like, Swims Like, Quacks Like 
 All of the difficulties Timpson discusses are symptomatic of the underlying 
problem, and that is that quantum Bayesianism, by adopting as its most central tenet  
subjective interpretation of the quantum state, is unable to get beyond an 
instrumentalist theory.  Timpson argues that the quantum Bayesian position is not in 
fact instrumentalist, due to its realist ambitions.  However, this may simply be 
splitting hairs, when, at the end of the day, the problems suffered by quantum 
Bayesianism are those suffered by instrumentalism and when no clear realist picture 
is available.   
 The three problems Timpson describes are all problems which arise not just 
for quantum Bayesianism, but are also central objections to instrumentalism.  The 




calculating predictions.  We want them to explain phenomena.  By maintaining that 
the quantum state is just a subjective probability, we can say very little about the 
quantum level which would explain things we want quantum mechanics to explain.  
Likewise an instrumentalist interpretation of a theory gives very little to explain 
phenomena which the theory covers.  It is not good enough to account for the agent’s 
expectations.  Instrumental theories also give us a means to develop rational 
expectations about future events.  What neither does is explain why the events 
themselves come about. 
 As far as the problem of Moore’s paradox is concerned, the instrumentalist 
does not really fall directly into it since the instrumentalist need not make any claims 
that any theory provides the agent with certainty except regarding empirical 
outcomes.  There is a similar, though weaker tension nevertheless.  The 
instrumentalist maintains some level of trust in the predictions a theory generates, or 
why go with a theory at all, yet at the same time denies there is any reason behind this 
past and expected future predictive success related to the real world.  As we shall s e, 
the Moore’s paradox problem for the quantum Bayesian is tied both to the problem of 
explanation and Timpson’s means/end objection, which are central concerns for an 
instrumental stance. 
 The means/end objection, which Timpson says is related to the problem of 
Moore’s paradox, is also a problem for the instrumentalist.  Theories are predictive 
tools.  We may say that we have evidence that they work as predictors on the basis of
experience with using the theory.  That is, the justification for their use comes from 




problem for the subjectivist and not for the instrumentalist, who can defend the view 
on the basis of empirical success, whereas the subjectivist does not even have that.  
However, Boyd (1973; 1984) makes an argument against instrumentalism very 
similar to the one which Timpson makes against Bayesianism.   On the standard 
instrumentalist account of scientific theories, the content of a scientific theory makes 
no assertoric claims which are true or false of the world.  That is simply not their job.  
The only elements of a theory which are assertoric are its empirical predictions, and 
these can be tested via direct observation.  Boyd argues that an instrumentalist 
conception of scientific theories fails to account for the instrumental reliability of 
theories however.  Instrumentalism does accept this reliability, since this is just the 
statement that we can trust the empirical predictions made by the theory (and without 
this, science is doing nothing for us).  However, Boyd argues, the predictive 
reliability of theory-dependent judgments can only be explained if, to some extent, 
they are approximately true.  Making empirical observations always requires theory-
dependent judgments. 
 The problem of explanation seems to be creeping in for the instrumentalist as 
for the subjectivist.  The explanatory gap problem is that an instrumental or subjective 
theory can not explain phenomena, but merely predict them.  The means/end 
objection is simply the redirection of the explanatory gap problem towards the 
application of the theory itself.  For Timpson, it applies to the quantum Bayesian, 
because, for the Bayesian, there is no reason to look at the data and use it for 
updating our beliefs and think that it should help us “cope with the world”.  




test of the predictions it makes must include a principle such as the following: “a 
proposed theory T must be experimentally tested under situations representative of 
those in which, in the light of collateral information, it is most likely that T will fail, if 
it's going to fail at all” (Boyd, 1973, p. 10).  However, such a principle is reliable only 
insofar as it is explained according to a realistic interpretation of the collateral 
theories.  For the quantum Bayesian and the instrumentalist, there is no explanatory 
account that would justify how the desired ends (being able to make predictions) 
should be met by the means (data gathering) one uses to do so.  It is here that the 
explanatory gap argument is particularly forceful. 
 At the end of the day, the problems for instrumentalism and subjectivism are 
more or less the same (in some respects, the Bayesian may have more trouble 
answering the problems).  The most central problem for instrumentalism can be 
summed up with Putnam’s claim on behalf of the opposing view that “[r]ealism is the 
only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle” (Putnam, 1975, 
p. 73).  That is, from a realist perspective, quantum Bayesianism and Copenhagen-
style instrumentalism are on a par and suffer from the same issues by committing to a 
view of the theory which specifically and consciously does not make claims about 
any fact of the matter, and which nevertheless guides what we ought to expect to 
observe.  Of course, the quantum Bayesian position offers a promissory note of some 
deeper realism.  One may hold out hope of such a program finding success, but it is 
not yet clear how it will come about or if it can.   
 It should be noted that it may very well be compatible with an instrumentalist 




maintain that there is some fact of the matter regarding reality entirely ind pendent of 
our theories.  The claim is that our theory tells us nothing about such a reality.  This is 
an epistemological claim.  As Leplin notes, more recent accounts of instrumentalism, 
responding to problems with formulating entirely non-assertoric accounts of 
instrumentalism, allow that theoretical claims can be true or false in virtue of the way 
the world is (2000, pp. , 394).  But this is only metaphysical realism; the truth or 
falsity of a theoretical claim can have no bearing on its scientific utilty.  Truth or 
falsity is impossible to verify and irrelevant in any case.  Instrumentalism as an 
epistemological stance breaks any connection between the predictive success of a 
theory and the possibility of its success as an approximately true description of he 
world.  If quantum Bayesianism can do no more than this, any aspirations to 
metaphysical realism are empty.  That is, without a clear means of filling in its 
metaphysical hopes, quantum Bayesianism seems to fall into this account of 
instrumentalism. 
 The point is that while Timpson allows that quantum Bayesianism is not an 
instrumentalist approach, since it ultimately aims at discovering something real 
beyond what is merely subjective, the criticisms which can be strongly levied against 
the Bayesian views are just those brought against the instrumentalist approach.  If one 
demands that this is not an instrumental approach on the basis of its aspirations, this is 
compatible with what I have to say since the issue primarily rests on a choiceof 
terminology and categorization.  At the end of the day, however, the view fails to 





 A central point of my argument here is that the subjective quantum Bayesian 
approach to quantum mechanics, such as Fuchs’, needs to beware of violating 
Timpson’s warnings that information theory is not about knowledge or knowing 
subjects.  It is not about belief either.  If we seriously heed this warning, it s clear 
that the argument that quantum mechanics is subjective (i.e. it is a theory about our 
knowledge) relies completely on the same crucial points of a very old debate in the 
philosophy of science about whether the task of science is to develop theories that are 
about an objectively real world, or whether this is a metaphysical goal beyond the 
reach of our epistemological capacities, often on the basis of the logical 
underdetermination of theories given the data.  This leads to the idea that scienceis 
about developing theories as instruments that merely help us make accurate 
predictions.  They have nothing to say about reality.  Of course, the situation gets 
more complicated when it comes to quantum physics, because here a clear-cut rlist 
theory actually seems to be fundamentally blocked by limitations such as Bell’s 
inequality.  Nevertheless, the claim that quantum mechanics is purely instrumental is 
an epistemological claim, which is a conceptually separate issue from quantum 
information theory.  Quantum information theory may appear, at first sight, to be the 
ideal way of formalizing a quantum mechanics that is only about our beliefs 
regarding the world.  That is, I fear there is a temptation to slide from new 
developments in quantum information theory, to claims that this shows that quantum 
mechanics has always been about information, and that it is only about what we can 
say about the world and not the world itself.  However, this is a slide from a purely 




linked to a subjective state of belief.  But this is an illicit confusion.  As such, that the 
term “information” is used in a purely technical sense should not be regarded as in 
any way backing up the instrumentalist claim that quantum physics is only about our 
state of belief.  Any philosophical hay that might be made from quantum informati n 
theory must be due purely to its technical formalism, and not that it is more closely 
related to any subjective account of the foundations of quantum mechanics. 
 It follows that any arguments for the subjective quantum Bayesian approach 
will be based on standard instrumentalist arguments.  Information theory does not 
enter the picture.  Likewise, any arguments against a subjective quantum Bayesianism 
views, such as Fuchs’, are, therefore, based on broader realist arguments agains  
instrumentalist interpretations of quantum mechanics.  At the forefront of these, is th  
feeling that the very success of a theory that is about the updating of our states of 
belief ought itself to be explained, and therefore justified, if we are to have good 
reasons for using the theory.  Otherwise, its success seems completely myst rious.  
Another argument is simply that physics must be about an objective world and offer 
approximate explanations of it or it is not clear what we are doing in science. 
 In any case, my argument here is not against instrumentalism, though I do not 
endorse it.  I take such an argument to be ultimately fruitless and based primarily on 
conviction rather than argument and evidence.  The conclusion of this section is that 
the subjective quantum Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics, which uses 
quantum information theory, must be wary of equivocation regarding what is 
contained in the notion of information in the technical sense and that in the common 




theory to quantum mechanics does not give us any reason to think that quantum 
mechanics is about our states of belief.  It follows that, despite claims to the c ntrary, 
quantum information theory does not resolve any foundational issues in quantum 
mechanics when it is used to develop a subjective interpretation of what quantum 
theory is about. 
 




Chapter 3: Principle Theories and Constructive Theories 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 We have now looked at some information-theoretic approaches to 
interpretational issues facing the theory of quantum mechanics.  It has been shown 
that these approaches either hinge on a category mistake about the kind of thing 
information is in its technical sense (or everyday sense), or amount to a retelling of 
the instrumentalist story regarding quantum mechanics, but in subjective Bayesian 
terms.  Whatever merits there may be in employing the language of informati n 
theory in discussing quantum mechanics – and there may be interesting ones, both 
theoretically and practically speaking – the approaches discussed in Chapter 2 do not 
suffice to answer the traditional philosophical concerns with quantum mechanics. 
 However, there may be another way in which the concepts of quantum 
information theory may be utilized for philosophical gain.  In a careful use of the 
technical notion of quantum information, Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (CBH 2003) 
propose to have found three information-theoretic principles that can be shown to be 
equivalent to that which they take to be the general features of a quantum theory.  In 
their formulation, CBH are careful to maintain that the notion of information used 
here is restricted to the technical version.  The philosophical work, it is argued, is 
done by formulating quantum mechanics, using straightforward information-theore ic 
constraints, in a manner analogous to the way Einstein used simple empirical 




 This chapter will investigate the CBH approach, the ideas explored in the 
original paper, as well as considerations undertaken by Bub in subsequent papers 
(2004a; 2004b) articulating the program further.  The question is whether this 
information-theoretic approach is philosophically fruitful.  In particular, does it meet 
its interpretational goals regarding the philosophical issues of quantum physics?  A 
preliminary task is to determine what these interpretational goals are.  As an 
interpretational program, there are three possible routes by which CBH might offer 
novel insight.  By the end of this chapter we will also be able to offer some idea of 
what it means to ask for and to give an interpretation of a theory.  What we will find, 
broadly speaking, is that a demand for interpretation is a demand for explanation. 
 The first way of reading CBH is as a fairly straightforward argument 
establishing the view that quantum mechanics is best interpreted as an instrume talist 
theory, where the measuring instruments are to be treated as opaque black-boxes, and 
that information-theoretic language is best suited to formulating this approach.  This 
approach should be discounted for a number of reasons.  First, an instrumental 
interpretation is not much of an interpretation.  Second, the role played by 
information-theoretic principles appears unnecessary from a philosophical 
perspective.  The call for instrumentalism can be made whether couched in 
information-theoretic language or in the standard mechanical formulation, but as 
CBH has shown, the two are formally equivalent.  So nothing extra is gained which 
establishes this conclusion by switching to an information-theoretic stance. 
 The second possible reading is not particularly viable.  A realist spin might be 




information as the basic stuff and that CBH gives us the means to do so.  This type of 
approach has already been dismissed as suffering from a category mistake regarding 
the concept of information.  It does not seem to be the aim of CBH to put forward 
such a claim, and as we have seen this is not a promising approach.  We will not 
discuss it further. 
 Finally, in this chapter we will investigate the role played by principle 
theories.  Perhaps, because CBH is a principle theory, as opposed to a constructive 
theory such as the standard mechanical formulation of quantum mechanics, CBH can 
offer some alternative interpretational solutions.  To investigate this further, we will 
take a much closer look at the distinction between pri ciple theories and constructive 
theories made by Einstein in describing his theory of relativity.  What we will 
discover is that the interpretational role of both kinds of theories derives from the 
kinds of scientific explanation they provide.  Constructive theories are fundamentally 
explanatory.  Their source of explanatory power comes from the ability to offer 
causal-mechanical explanations of phenomena, a type of scientific explanation 
advocated by Salmon (1989). 
 Principle theories are also explanatory.  The preliminary conclusion of this 
chapter is that the primary function of a principle theory is tied to the explanatory role 
it plays through unification.  The standard account of explanation as unification is that 
advanced by Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1989). While principle theories may often 
offer this kind of explanation by unification, it turns out that a better understanding of 
the role of principle theories for Einstein and for CBH can be articulated.  In Chapter 




constitutive one.  It is this role that is of primary importance for understanding 
principle theories such as special relativity, and as I will argue, for quantum 
mechanics.  It will also be left to Chapter 4 to argue that the constitutive nature of a 
foundational principle theory has an explanatory function essential for establishing 
the explanatory framework for empirical theories by way of resolving conceptual 
inconsistencies.  This occurs at a different level than the unification of phenomena 
described by Kitcher, and it functions as a precondition for this type of unification. 
 With this explication of the roles of principle and constructive theories, we 
can see why a successful constructive theory of quantum mechanics has been so 
notoriously difficult to find, since a standard causal-mechanical explanation of certain 
phenomena is blocked by Bell-type no-go theorems.  Reformulating quantum 
mechanics as a principle theory, in itself, does not provide an interpretation of these 
difficulties or make them go away.  If a principle theory approach is to succeed 
interpretationally, it must establish the possibility of unification which gives a 
principle theory explanatory merit.  It is argued in this chapter that the CBH approach 
does not provide unification in the standard Friedman/Kitcher sense beyond that 
which is already given by quantum mechanics.  As such, though it is presented as a 
principle theory, in this particular sense, CBH does not offer any further explanation 
for quantum phenomena.  Therefore it does no interpretational work either.  In 
Chapter 4, we will consider the conceptual work that can be done by a principle 
theory and the interpretational role they can play as constitutive theories, as well
the success of CBH considered in this light.  Having done the preliminary work in 




explanation by unification, we will be able to see how the success of theories such as 
special relativity stems from the constitutive nature of their principles.  If CBH is 
going to provide an interpretation of quantum mechanics, it is this aspect of principle 
theories, which is discussed in the next chapter, that must be at work.  
3.2. Informational Constraints as Principles of Quantum Mechanics 
 
 Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson’s paper, “Characterizing Quantum Theory in 
terms of Information-Theoretic Constraints” (CBH, 2003) shows that the fundament l 
elements of a quantum theory can be deduced from three information-theoretic 
principles.  This technical result motivates the claim that quantum mechanics ca be
viewed as a principle theory.  The primary inspiration for thinking that quantum 
mechanics should be viewed as a principle theory comes from a direct analogy with 
Einstein’s insight into his own theories of relativity, combined with their apparent 
lack of need for interpretation as perceived by the physics and philosophical 
communities.  The fact that quantum mechanics can be derived from a relatively 
small set of principles, which are in fact a set of information-theoretic constraints, is 
itself a strongly motivating breakthrough.  In the most complete version of this 
program, Bub (2006) advances this line of thought, arguing that from a foundational 
perspective, “quantum mechanics is a theory about the representation and 
manipulation of information constrained by the possibilities and impossibilities of 
information-transfer in our world, rather than a theory about the ways in which 




 The CBH result, with Halvorson’s (2004) addendum, shows that quantum 
mechanics can be successfully represented as a set of constraints, or principles, on the 
transfer, manipulation, and representation of information.  It is at least implicitly 
argued that a physical theory which is based on a small set of principles offers an 
interpretational advantage over existing interpretations of quantum mechanics.  Oe 
argument for this seems to rely on the interpretational success of the special and 
general theories of relativity as seen through the lens of Einstein’s own statements 
regarding these theories as principle theories.  Specifically, regardin  quantum 
mechanics and the CBH approach, Bub (2004a; 2004b) argues that the information-
theoretic approach is the only viable option for the foundations of quantum theory. 
The CBH approach develops a theory of quantum mechanics from simple and 
conceptually appealing principles.  For them, information-theoretic princiles fit the 
bill the best.  CBH begin with a structural framework broad enough to include all of 
the various physical theories that are available to modern science.  The mathematical 
framework used is the abstract C*-algebra.  This framework captures various classes 
of theories including classical and quantum ones.  The strategy is to come up with 
restrictions on this abstract structure, which divide it into those theories that are 
classical in nature and those that are quantum mechanical.  The first task of the 
authors is to find physical characteristics that are definitive of a general quantum 
theory.  These are: 
• that the algebras of observables pertaining to distinct physical systems must commute, usually 
called microcausality or kinematic independence; 





• that the physical world must be nonlocal, in that spacelike separated systems must at least 
sometimes occupy entangled states. (CBH 2003,  4) 
The authors claim that there are three information-theoretic principles that are 
entailed by these characteristics and which likewise entail them.  These equivalent 
information-theoretic principles are: 
• the impossibility of superluminal information transfer between two physical systems by 
performing measurements on one of them; 
• the impossibility of perfectly broadcasting the information contained in an unknown physical 
state; and 
• the impossibility of unconditionally secure bit commitment. (CBH 2003,  3) 
The CBH argument shows that a classical theory is equivalent to an abelian C*-
algebra.  This means that a quantum theory must be non-abelian, or non-
commutative.  Furthermore, non-commutivity mathematically entails non-local 
entanglement, but only mathematically.  The possibility of broadcasting is shown to 
imply an abelian framework, and the reverse, that commutivity entails the possibility 
of broadcasting, is also shown.  Therefore, non-commutivity entails the impossibility 
of broadcasting information.  The impossibility of superluminal information transfer 
is shown to be equivalent to kinematic independence.  Finally, no bit commitment is 
shown to guarantee the existence of non-local entanglement.  In this paper, CBH are 
only able to motivate the entailment of no bit commitment from non-local 
entanglement, but this entailment is proved in Halverson (2004).  Thus, CBH have 
shown that their three information-theoretic principles are equivalent to their 
characterization of quantum mechanics. 
 The question is now, so what does this mean?  There is no doubt that this is a 




represented as a principle theory, specifically, one that postulates “that we live in a 
world in which there are certain constraints on the acquisition, representation, and 
communication of information” (CBH 2003, 3).  As we shall proceed to show, a 
principle theory can potentially offer what Einstein calls security of the foundations, 
but can this formulation do any philosophical work for us? 
 If we are dealing with these information-theoretic principles using only the 
technical concept of information, then how do we decide whether this formulation is 
more philosophically successful than the traditional mechanical formulation of 
quantum theory that deals with particles and waves?  In a follow-up article to th
original CBH, paper Bub (2004a) addresses this question.  He argues that if we 
assume that these three information-theoretic constraints hold in our world then we 
are faced with the measurement problem.  This is a problem involving the linear 
dynamics of quantum theory, which describe the interaction of a quantum system 
with a measuring instrument such that they result in a superposition of states.  The 
eigenvalue-eigenstate rule then holds that only a state in the eigenstate of a particular 
property actually has that property.  Thus, it is possible to have an object and 
measuring instrument in an entangled state such that the measuring instrume t has no 
definite property corresponding to a particular pointer reading.  This does not accord
with experience however.  The measurement problem involves working out how it is 
that we experience what we do given the quantum description.  One route to 
developing a solution is to fiddle with the dynamics.  The “orthodox” interpretation of 
quantum mechanics postulates a “collapse”, such that the quantum state collapses into 




physical account of this collapse, essentially leaving the instrument out of the 
physical description, leaving it a black box through which we access the observed 
features of the world.  A GRW-type collapse theory (Ghirardi, Rimini, & Weber, 
1986) also alters the dynamics of quantum mechanics by postulating that there isa 
small probability that the wavefunction of a particle will collapse spontaneously.  Bub 
(2004a) argues that this alteration of quantum theory would violate the principle of no 
unconditionally secure bit commitment by allowing cheating due to the destruction of 
entanglement from spontaneous collapse. 
 Alternatively, one might propose solutions given by no-collapse theories such 
as Bohm’s or Everettian many-worlds interpretations.  Bub (2004a) argues that 
according to the Bub-Clifton Theorem (Bub & Clifton, 1996) no-collapse theories 
should be regarded as theories required to offer a mechanical explanation for the 
behavior of the measuring instruments, and so must give an explanation of the 
informational constraints that have been assumed to exist.  On the one hand, such 
theories may provide a mechanical account of measurement results and violate the 
information-theoretic principles.  But then such theories are not quantum mechanical 
in the sense defined by CBH.  If a theory is quantum mechanical in this sense, then it 
must be empirically equivalent to orthodox quantum mechanics.  Therefore, Bub 
argues, such theories, by their very nature, cannot provide empirical evidence for 
their mechanical account of measurement devices beyond that of orthodox quantum 
mechanics.  Therefore, there are in principle no empirical grounds for accepting a no-
collapse theory over standard quantum mechanics.  All of these theories are 




suspend judgment on these mechanical theories.  This means that measuring 
instruments remain black boxes in the theory.  As such, the quantum theory amounts 
to a theory about the representation and manipulation of information.  Thus the three 
theses of Bub’s paper: 
1) A quantum theory is best understood as a theory about the possibilities and impossibilities of 
information transfer, as opposed to a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or 
particles. (By ‘information’ here I mean information in the physical sense, measured 
classically by the Shannon entropy or, in a quantum world, by the von Neumann entropy.) 
2) Given the information-theoretic constraints, any mechanical theory of quantum phenomena 
that includes an account of the measuring instruments that reveal these phenomena must be 
empirically equivalent to a quantum theory. 
3) Assuming the information-theoretic constraints are in fact satisfied in our world, no 
mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of measurement 
interactions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of physics at the fundamental level 
then becomes the representation and manipulation of i f rmation. (Bub, 2004a) 
 This argument is basically an application of Occam’s razor.  When we are 
presented with a set of underdetermined theories, we are not warranted in postulating 
extra metaphysical assumptions that are in principle untestable.  In this case, 
mechanical formulations of quantum theory are necessarily underdetermined in this 
way.  As a result, we cannot explain the way instruments interact with quantum 
systems to give us the empirical results that we see macroscopically.  This means that 
instruments remain black boxes at some level.  According to Bub, this is equivalent to 
saying that quantum theory is a theory about information.  Measuring instruments, 





3.3. Principle and Constructive Theories 
3.3.1. Introduction 
 We have been looking at this paper of Bub’s to determine whether this 
information-theoretic formulation of quantum theory is somehow more 
philosophically successful than the standard mechanical formulation of quantum 
mechanics.  As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, Bub’s paper lends itself 
to three possible readings in terms of the interpretational work of which the CBH 
approach is capable.  The first is that it is an argument that quantum mechanics ought 
to be interpreted instrumentally, with the preferred fundamental structure reduced to 
an information-theoretic framework.  Second, it is trying to carve out a position in 
which information has some kind of special ontology, and so we are better off 
thinking of the world as information, rather than as particles and waves.  If these 
readings are rejected – as we argued in Chapter 2 they should be – the information-
theoretic principle theory must purport to offer some other interpretive stance, in 
virtue of being a principle theory, to which the standard mechanical formulation does 
not have access. 
This third interpretive possibility will require a bit more investigation 
occupying the remainder of this chapter and the next.  This approach trades on the 
distinction between principle and constructive theories, and the framing of a principle 
theory approach to quantum mechanics.  First, however, it is important to understand 
that though quantum mechanics can be represented as a principle theory does not 
imply that this representation provides a more successful interpretational basis for 




theories, versus that of constructive theories.  We need to explore how this can be 
cashed out. 
In this section, we explore the distinction between principle theories and 
constructive theories.  We will discuss how this distinction has been understood by 
others.  In particular, Flores argues that a better way to understand this distinction is 
in functional terms as opposed to the ontology which supports it.  He revises the 
distinction somewhat into what he calls framework and interaction theories (Flores, 
1999).  I emphasize that the particular function of central importance to this revision 
is the explanatory function of the theory, either as a unificationist explanation or a 
causal-mechanical explanation.  Both unificationist and causal-mechanical 
explanation are valid and scientifically valuable.  As such, both types of theories, 
principle and constructive, can be considered to have important functions in science, 
with different, but equally strong roles to play.  This chapter concludes with the 
preliminary claim that the distinction between principle theories and constructive 
theories is best understood as depending on explanatory requirements.   
It will be argued, however, that this is not the whole story.  Marking the 
distinction between constructive and principle theories merely as a distinction 
between causal-mechanical and Friedman/Kitcher-style unificationist explanation, 
respectively, misses important nuances regarding the role played by an important 
class of principle theories.  A principle theory can provide explanation by unification 
in the Friedman/Kitcher sense, and we will see that CBH does not succeed in 
providing unification in this sense of explanation.  However, this is not the only sense 




function at different levels in terms of establishing the possibility of explanation by 
unification.  In Chapter 4, we discuss in more detail this aspect of the function of 
principle theories, specifically in foundational theories such as Newton’s or 
Einstein’s.  There it will be argued that the best way to understand this distinction i  
relation to its invocation by CBH is according to the constitutive characteristic tha  
principle theories can have.  Principle theories can be constitutive of empirical 
meaning and thereby act as preconditions for the explanatory framework itself.  We 
will discuss the success of the CBH approach as a constitutive principle theory in the 
next chapter.  As it will turn out, this latter sense offers a better understanding of 
Einstein’s introduction of the notion of principle theory as it applies to theories such 
as special relativity as well as for CBH. 
3.3.2. Laying Some Groundwork 
Central to the CBH argument is the distinction between principle theories and 
constructive theories – a distinction raised by Einstein (1954b) regarding his own 
theories of special relativity and general relativity.  The CBH program explicitly 
compares itself with that of Einstein, who formulated his special theory of relativity 
from the two principles that 1) physics in any inertial frame is the same and th t 2) 
the speed of light is constant for all observers.  Regarding this theory, Einstein 
invokes a distinction between two conceptually distinct types of theories – principle 
theories and constructive theories – in “What is the Theory of Relativity”, saying, 
 We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics.  Most of them are 
constructive.  They attempt to build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the 




have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we invariably mean that a 
constructive theory has been found which covers the processes in question. 
 Along with this most important class of theories there exists a second, which I will 
call ‘principle-theories.’  These employ the analytic, not synthetic, method.  The elements 
which form their basis and starting-point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically 
discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to 
mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical 
representations of them have to satisfy… 
 The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adaptability, and 
clearness, those of the principle theory are logical perfection and security of the foundations. 
(Einstein, 1954b, p. 228) 
For Einstein, paradigmatic examples of these contrasting types of physical 
theories are represented in the kinetic theory of gases, which is a solidly constru tive 
theory, and thermodynamics, which is a principle theory.  The kinetic theory of gases
is a theory that begins with, or makes primary, the physical, molecular constitue ts 
and their interactions.  It is from these constituents, and the physical properties of 
these bodies, that the more general theory is built up or constituted.  In contrast to 
this, thermodynamics does not depend on there being any such constituents; rather, 
thermodynamics begins with a small set of principles – namely the zeroth th ugh 
third laws of thermodynamics, including the second law of thermodynamics, one 
formulation of which is the impossibility of constructing a perpetual motion machine.  
From these broad constraining principles, which are supposed to apply in all physical 
situations, one can then deduce all aspects of thermodynamic phenomena.  Further 
examples of principle theories are Einstein’s special theory of relativity and general 




them as such.  For the special theory of relativity, the conditions that the laws of 
physics are the same in all inertial frames, and that the speed of light is constant, are 
principles which allow the deduction of the consequences of relativity theory.  This is 
a fundamentally different type of theorizing from Lorentzian mechanics, special 
relativity’s predecessor and challenger.  Lorentz’s theory represents a distinctly 
constructive theory, depending as it does on the contraction of physical bodies 
moving through the medium of the aether to explain the same phenomena as special 
relativity.  In this approach, the phenomena are explained by hypothesizing 
mechanical interactions, which describe in a causal manner that which is observed. 
 Einstein’s principle theory won the day; Lorentz’s constructive theory lost. 
One may reasonably ask, what is the connection between the type of theory that was 
presented and which theory was accepted.  That is, what is the relationship between 
the type of theory and its success, particularly for a fundamental theory for physics?  
On the one hand, one could perhaps argue that it was Einstein’s use of principles 
which allowed for his success and that this shows that principle theories were bett  
suited to meet the problem in this case along with many other fundamental theories 
such as thermodynamics and Newtonian mechanics.  As Einstein notes, however, 
constructive theories are not without substantial merit, and as we shall see, he may 
have even preferred them.  If one is looking for completeness and a greater level of 
understanding, then constructive theories are better suited to this purpose, as can be 
seen in the kinetic theory of gases.   
 On the other hand, principle theories have their own strengths.  One of these is 




extrapolated from empirical conditions which have been found to hold universally.  
They are then elevated to the status of postulates.  In making such principles 
postulates of the theory, they function logically as more than very strong empirical 
generalizations.  They become principles whose truth is basically no longer in 
question, and which can only fall should the theory as a whole collapse.  The 
foundational security Einstein talks about is this analytic formal structure fo nded on 
essentially irrrevisable principles.  It is this foundational security of being a principle 
theory which appears to best characterize Einstein’s motivation behind using 
principle theories to resolve the fundamental conceptual tensions between classical 
electrodynamics and mechanics in the case of special relativity, and the conceptual 
tensions underlying the Newtonian notion of gravity in the case of general relativity. 
 CBH take their cue from this prospective insight into theory building, and 
appeal to the distinction made by Einstein between constructive theories and principle 
theories and apply it to their reformulation of quantum mechanics as a set of 
information-theoretical principles.  Bub (2004b), appealing to Einstein’s distinction, 
argues on two separate grounds that the principle theory approach is not only 
justified, but preferred and perhaps even necessary for there to be any foundational 
grounding for quantum mechanics that is philosophically satisfying.  The first o  
these arguments is the more explicit, and it is just that previous interpretations of 
quantum mechanics fail, based on Bub’s argument from underdetermination.  
Therefore, the only rational recourse we have available to us is the CBH position, a 




The second argument is less explicit, as it seems to rely on an appeal to the 
authority and the success of Einstein’s methodology.  The reason that I think that this 
argument is implicit in the CBH approach is that the above argument is merely a 
negative argument.  It shows essentially that all we are left with is the information-
theoretic principles on which to formulate quantum mechanics.  However, this does 
not in itself offer an interpretation of quantum mechanics beyond the claim that a 
measuring instrument is a black-box.  The worry is that this remains an inherently 
instrumentalist approach.  Simply eliminating the feasibility of other approaches does 
not in itself show that what is being offered is a better interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.  But it is clear that the CBH view is after more than this.  Something 
about being a principle theory needs to be doing some work here.  However, what this 
is is not spelled out.  Hence the implicit appeal to the success of Einstein’s 
methodology here.  Let us see if this positive argument can be elaborated. 
Einstein’s distinction, at least for those theories he discusses 
(thermodynamics, the kinetic theory of gases, relativity theory), is quite a plausib e 
distinction to make. That each type of theory exemplifies its respective strengths is 
likewise convincing.  Moreover, by arguing that special and general relativity are 
principle theories, Einstein bolsters the idea that principle theories are particularly 
well suited to give foundational security to a physical theory.  The theories of special 
and general relativity are both powerful fundamental physical theories.  Historically, 
they have been viewed as self-contained from an interpretational standpoint and as 
exemplifying a type of theorizing which solves philosophical issues rather than 




quantum mechanics.  The more prominent among such interpretations might arguably 
be seen as more constructive theories.  The Bohmian hidden variable approach 
explicitly postulates definite particle positions guided by the wavefunction to explain 
quantum phenomena.  GRW collapse theories also postulate a mechanism, the 
stochastic collapse of a real wavefunction, as an account of quantum phenomena and 
classical characteristics of macro-systems.   
In the Everettian many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, there is 
no collapse of the wavefunction.  The wavefunction of the universe plays an 
ontological role, as it is taken to be a complete and real description of the universe.  
On this interpretation, a number of things require explanation.  The first is the 
appearance of collapse, or more accurately on this view, the splitting of the world int  
non-interfering branches.  The second is an explanation of the decomposition into the 
preferred basis that we observe.  The third is the Born rule and the appearance of 
quantum probabilities in a universe where all measurement outcomes actually occur.  
In recent formulations1, the explanation for all of these employs the mechanism of 
decoherence involving the large number of degrees of freedom of particles making up 
the composite macro-system of the object being measured, the measuring instume t, 
and the environment.  The many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics takes 
the formalism of quantum mechanics at face value, without adding any additional 
structure, as a complete theory, and instead depends on the ontological role of the 
wavefunction.  However, to explain some important features of experience, and so to 
                                                
1 This view is sometimes called the “Oxford” version f many-worlds.  See (Deutsch, 1999; Saunders, 




succeed as an interpretation, the current view is that this approach must explicily 
appeal to the causal role of decoherence. 
Within the professions of physics or philosophy, there is not the general 
perception that relativity theory requires some further interpretation to justify or make 
sense of it.  To a large extent – more for philosophers than physicists perhaps – there 
is, however, an ongoing effort to provide such an interpretation for quantum 
mechanics, or to explain why no such interpretation is required.2  Therefore, it does 
seem reasonable to think that taking a different tack in the area of quantum 
mechanics, from various versions of what might be seen as more constructive theories 
to a new principle theory based approach, is a smart and innovative strategic move.  
To sum up, we have reason to reject standard interpretations of quantum mechanics 
and to look at the CBH principle theory approach on two distinct fronts.  First, as Bub 
and others have argued3, other approaches to interpreting quantum mechanics, which 
now may be viewed as more constructive approaches as compared with a 
information-theoretic principle theory approach, ultimately seem to fail as generally 
accepted interpretations, and we have reasons to think that they might never succeed.  
At any rate, for various reasons, none of these interpretations has gained wide 
acceptance.  Second, as suggested by Einstein, principle theories can be an altern tive 
model for success in developing fundamental theories. 
                                                
2 For some evidence of this see a compilation of some professional meetings in this area by Fuchs 
(2002, p. 2) 
3 Bub’s argument from underdetermination presented above makes this argument on behalf of the CBH 
approach.  Other broad claims that this is the caseh v  been made by Fuchs (2002, pp. 1-3), whose 
claim is based on historical evidence that for over 75 years of trying no consensus has been reached.  




So, the question is now do these arguments justify the CBH approach in 
particular?  That is, if one can in fact formulate a set of information-theoretic 
principles from which the general features of quantum mechanics can be derived from 
a technical standpoint, is this something which illuminates or otherwise addresses the 
traditional problems associated with quantum mechanics since its inception?  Part of
the task of the rest of this chapter and the next is to specify what it might mean to 
answer these questions and to answer them.  It needs to be spelled out what positive 
argument might be given for the interpretive role CBH plays beyond an 
instrumentalist conclusion.  In the rest of this chapter, we will continue to outline the 
distinction between principle and constructive theories.  We will also explore the 
interpretational value of principle theories from the standpoint of their ability to 
provide explanatory unification in the sense advocated by Friedman and Kitcher.  We 
then need to consider whether or not the CBH approach can provide this.  It is not 
clear that it does.  As we will see in Chapter 4, this is not the only way to view the 
interpretational role of principle theories.  It will have to wait until the next chapter to 
provide a detailed analysis of how this constitutive conceptual resolution works in 
principle theories such as special relativity. 
3.3.3. Einstein’s Use of the Distinction 
Klein (1967) argues that Einstein, in formulating his special theory of 
relativity, relied heavily on his understanding of the theory of thermodynamics and 
used it as a model of good theory building, among other things.  As Klein argues, the 
primary reason for this was that thermodynamics was essentially different from other 




were constructive theories, thermodynamics represented a prime exapl  of a 
principle theory.  Einstein says about thermodynamics,  
A theory is the more impressive the greater the simplicity of its premises is, 
the more different kinds of things it relates, and the more extended its area of 
applicability.  Therefore the deep impression that cl ssical thermodynamics made 
upon me.  It is the only physical theory of universal content concerning which I am 
convinced that, within the framework of applicability of its basic concepts, it will 
never be overthrown. (Einstein, 1949a, p. 32) 
Since thermodynamics does not depend on any particular causal-mechanical model or 
hypothetical constituents, Einstein was sure of its security and of its ability to guide 
him in further investigations.  Historically, this guidance occurred at two levels.  
First, the firm grounding of thermodynamic principles quite literally guided 
Einstein’s early work in the area of thermodynamics by offering virtually 
unquestionable axioms, delineating further avenues of research.  Second, the model of 
thermodynamics as a principle theory served as a philosophical guide, influencing 
Einstein’s ideas about how to develop physical theories in general, and in developing 
relativity in particular. 
According to Klein, a number of concerns guided Einstein in searching after 
this type of theory.  One was that the current state of physics presented sets of 
contradictions and incongruent structures, particularly between Newtonian mechanics 
and Maxwellian electrodynamics.  Newton’s laws hold for any inertial reference 
frame, but the form of Maxwell’s equations hold in only one frame, the frame in 
which the aether is at rest.  For Einstein something needed to be done to resolve these 




offer similarly secure foundations to guide his search for a theory which would 
address these concerns. 
Furthermore, in various places, including the passage above, Einstein 
indicates a driving preference for a unified foundation for physics.  Constructive 
theories must always begin with the underlying constituents, often still hypothetical in 
emerging scientific inquiry.  Sometimes, later developments in science vrify the 
existence of these hypothetical entities on a realist interpretation, sometimes not.  The 
originally hypothetical elements of atomic and molecular theory have since been 
verified.  However, constructive theories, such as Descartes’ vortex theory of 
planetary motion or the caloric theory of heat, eventually proved false.4  Principle 
theories, on the other hand, arising from very general empirical claims – such as the 
impossibility of building a perpetual motion machine – can remain independent of 
any particular physical picture.  Therefore, a principle theory, according to Klein, 
“could serve Einstein as an absolutely sure guide in dealing with the otherwise 
inexplicable difficulties of the physics of 1900” (Klein, 1967, p. 510).  This notion led 
Einstein to construct his theories of relativity around this model of a principle theory, 
thus guaranteeing their foundational security. 
Thus far, all we can say regarding the success of the principle theory approach 
is that they have this “security of the foundations” stemming from the elevation of 
empirical generalizations to the position of postulates of the theory.  That is, when 
                                                
4 One could argue that a constructive theory could offer equally secure foundations by postulating 
some basic ontology.  Doing so, however, breaks down ne of the central characteristics of the 
distinction.  Elevating some ontological element to his status puts it on par with being a fundamental 
principle, thereby making the theory analytic in nature.  As we shall see in the next section, there is an 
epistemological dimension to this distinction as well.  A constructive theory, properly understood, is 




certain conjectures or empirical generalizations are made postulates, by default th y 
are made secure by that very process, removing such principles from empirical testing 
and establishing them as axioms whose consequences are developed into the theory.  
Of course this is not a sufficient reason for the success of principle theories such as 
special relativity.  As presented by Klein, this is merely a methodological sort of 
security, based on the strictly formal conditions of these theories.  That is, as a 
method for scientific discovery, this approach lends itself to success, and, no doubt, 
for scientific investigations such exploration is valuable.  But from the standpoint of 
providing philosophical interpretations of physical theory, more needs to be said.  The 
philosophical question is not whether or not beginning with strong principles is a 
successful methodology for scientific advancement, but whether or not such 
principles can justifiably anchor our most fundamental theories and why.  This is t e 
question we must continue to explore. 
On later accounts of the development of special relativity, perhaps suggested 
by Einstein himself, Einstein’s principle theory approach to special relativity has been 
contrasted with the other current theory at the time, that of Lorentz, whose pre-
relativistic theory has been portrayed by Einstein and others as being a constructive 
theory of the same phenomena.  Therefore, the argument seemed to go, it was not as 
good, primarily because Lorentz’s theory was not as foundationally secure.  Lorentz’ 
theory explained the apparent inconsistencies between Newtonian mechanics and 
Maxwellian electrodynamics with a set of transformations for Maxwell’s quations 
for different frames relative to the aether.  Lorentz accounted for the absence of 




Morley (1887) by hypothesizing that the measuring instruments were contracting s 
they moved through the aether, thus compensating for the null result.  Einstein 
accused Lorentzian dynamics of being an ad hoc theory, attempting to fit this single 
experimental result into the theory.  This treatment of Lorentz turns out to be unfair.  
We will return to this particular debate in Chapter 5 where a more careful analysis of 
the contrast between Einstein’s and Lorentz’s theories will be undertaken.  We can 
say, however, that a constructive theory might open itself up to being ad hoc in a way 
that a principle theory is less prone to according to its nature.  The postulation, 
however well evidenced, of specific mechanisms to explain phenomena, when those 
mechanisms themselves cannot yet – or in this case in principle – be empirically 
verified, leaves room for accusations of ad hoc theory building.  This was a 
motivating factor for Mach’s distrust of unobservable entities in general and against 
atomism specifically.  For him, such purely theoretical constructive objects can at 
best be of instrumental value. 
But there seems to linger an unanswered, perhaps un-posed question, which is 
at issue here.  What exactly is a physical theory supposed to do for us?  And are 
different roles played by different types of theories?  Without addressing this 
question, it is hard to answer the questions we are asking.  These are about whether a 
principle theory or a constructive theory might be somehow better, or more able to 
fulfill an interpretational role in some sense, and what sense this might be.  Should we 
conclude that because special relativity is a principle theory, it is betteror more 
fundamental than Lorentz’s?  Why?  After all, why should such a causal-mechanical 




than one, such a special relativity, which requires the entire restructuring of space and 
time itself?  The next section will develop the principle/constructive distinction, and, 
in the process, uncover the role that explanation plays in the motivations behind 
developing both principle theories and constructive theories.  This will help us 
understand the roles these types of theories play in physics. 
3.3.4. Framework vs. Interaction 
One way to approach this issue is to look into the roles which constructive 
theories and principle theories play in physics as a whole.  Much of what follows 
comes from ideas proposed by Flores (1999; 2005).  Flores first notes that there isan 
even higher level distinction to be made, also attributed to Einstein (1954a).  This 
distinction is between theoretical physics and phenomenological physics.  This 
distinction is important to us because it gives us some insight into Einstein’s 
conception of the ultimate point, or functional goals, of scientific theorizing.   
The aim of science is, on the one hand, a comprehension, as complete as possible, of the 
connection between the sense experiences in their totality, and on the other hand, the 
accomplishment of this aim by the use of a minimum of primary concepts and relations.  
(Seeking, as far as possible, logical unity in the world picture, i.e., paucity in logical 
elements.) (Einstein, 1954a, p. 293) 
The category of theories operating as phenomenological physics lies, for the 
most part, at the purely descriptive level.  Phenomenological theories are represented 
clearly in Kepler’s law describing the period of motion of bodies relative to the sun, 
or in the ideal gas law, PV = nRT.  These theories accurately describe precise 
mathematical relationships, but they are not embedded within a broader framework 




may be derived, or understood.  Physical theories such as these arise, more or less, 
directly from the empirical technique of simple induction.  As a result, 
phenomenological physics “has to give up, to a large extent, unity in the foundation” 
(Einstein, 1954a, p. 302).  Phenomenological physics is a purely descriptive 
enterprise, closely tied to the phenomena themselves. 
‘Theoretical physics’ goes beyond merely ‘phenomenological physics’ by 
locating the theories in larger deductive structures, more removed from the direct 
empirical data.  This structure permits greater sets of relations between various 
phenomena and theories, hence providing greater unity.  For Einstein, theoretical 
physics progresses beyond a purely descriptive theory of phenomenological 
relationships and adds unity by going up a “layer”, as it were, embedding more 
diverse phenomena in a larger theoretical structure.  Indeed, this is ultimately the aim 
of science for Einstein.  The progress of science supports this view that there is a 
greater role for theoretical physics to play.  Theories beyond the purely descriptive 
are more powerful, in the sense that they can offer simpler theories with a larger 
domain of predictive power. 
Within theoretical physics, for Einstein, as we have said, there are two types 
of theories, principle theories and constructive theories.  Flores describes thre  
grounds on which Einstein justifies his distinction (1999, pp. , 125-7).  First, there is 
an ontological difference.  This ontological distinction is cashed out by noting that 
constructive theories are designed to answer the realist question “What is real?” with 
the entities that they postulate.  That is, constructive theories are realistic about the 




Principle theories cannot offer this type of realism nor are they meant to.  Instead, 
principle theories are concerned with nomological realism.  Principle theories are 
concerned with establishing which scientific principles are true in our world.5 
The second basis for the distinction between the constructive theory approach 
and the principle approach is their differing epistemological basis.  Flores maintains 
that, for Einstein, principle theories begin with empirically discovered general 
principles, and then, as is the case for special relativity, “we raise this conjecture [, 
that the laws of electrodynamics hold in all reference frames,]… to the status of a 
postulate” (Einstein, 1905a, p. 38).  The empirical generalizations are used in theory 
building as axioms for deriving the body of the theory.  This is a theoretical move, but 
its central epistemological aspect is that it begins with empirical claims.  On the other 
hand, we arrive at constructive theories by hypothesizing the existence of the entities 
in question, or by way of free creation, in order to explain some other phenomena.  
When a constructive theory is successful, it is because the existence of those entities 
is confirmed later experimentally.6 
                                                
5 Note that both theories which could be classified as constructive or as principle theories may be 
viewed in a purely instrumental manner.  However, I am not considering this approach for two reasons.  
First, I take it that the CBH approach is not meant to be a purely instrumental interpretation of 
quantum mechanics.  More importantly, however, I think that any discussion regarding the 
foundational significance of different types of theori s based on this distinction from an instrumental 
position would not be particularly meaningful.  On this view, there may be a structural difference 
between constructive and principle theories, however, any foundational difference would not rest on 
the distinction but merely on the theory’s empirical success and criteria such as simplicity and 
elegance (and quantum mechanics might require no further reinterpretation).  I take it that if the 
distinction is to be at all relevant it is due some aspect of realism gained from the constructive 
approach. 
6 I think this particular epistemological distinction is somewhat tenuous.  At the very least, in theory, it 
seems that a principle theory could come about through free creation and not be based on any 
particular empirical generalizations.  The process of coming to know or “discover” a theory is 
notoriously difficult to capture in a simple, all encapsulating formula and I will not address it in any 




Finally, Flores discusses a third way in which types of theories can differ.  
This is in terms of the conceptual roles they play, or their function.  For Einstein, 
principle theories function as universal constraints on any further application of 
theory under those principles.  Starting as they do with general empirical principles 
made into postulates, principle theories set the general conceptual and mathematical 
constraints imposed by the theory for any physical description falling under it.  This 
is not the case with constructive theories.  They are the theories whose elements must 
satisfy those conditions set by the overarching principle theory covering it.  
Constructive theories are, of necessity, developed under conceptual constraints, 
delimiting what is simply off limits.  If such a constructive theory meets with
difficulty, then, methodologically, we first attempt to modify it rather than the 
structural constraints imposed on it from above.  It is only in times of deep theoretical 
crisis that such a radical move is made.  In this way, the two types of theories play 
distinct functional roles in science. 
According to Flores, for Einstein the ontological dimension of this distinction 
is primary and the other dimensions are only derivative of that difference. 7  The 
epistemological distinction is a direct result of the difference between the focus on 
entity realism and nomological realism.  The law-like regularities of principle 
theories, according to Einstein’s view, are empirically discovered and are never th  
result of free creation.  The hypothetical elements of constructive theories are never 
empirically discovered.  Likewise, the functional roles that the types of theories play 
follow from their ontological status. 
                                                
7 I am not certain Flores’ portrayal of Einstein’s thoughts on this issue are entirely complete.  As we 
shall see in the next chapter, Einstein was well aware of the functional role of principle theories and his 




Flores resists the idea that the ontological distinction is primary, and instead 
argues that we should emphasize the functional aspect of the distinction between 
principle theories and constructive theories.  Central to this shift is Flores’ argument 
that there is no clear ontological distinction that applies to all theories.  In ome cases 
it is unclear where the fundamental starting point for a theory is; is it a principle or an 
underlying entity?  Flores provides an example of such a theory in Newton’s 
universal law of gravitation. This theory cannot be classified without problem as a 
principle theory since it operates within the structure of Newton’s laws of motion, but 
it is not entirely derived from these without appeal to the phenomena.  As such it 
cannot be a theory of principles because a set of principles is not its starting place; 
rather, it is partially a consequence of another principle theory.  However, the 
universal law of gravitation cannot be considered to be a theory based on underlying 
entities – even if these were broadly construed to include gravitational forces– 
because no such entities xplain the law.  Quite the contrary, the universal law of 
gravitation is the description of this force.  This means that the universal law of 
gravitation does not fall neatly into either the category of being a principle theory or a 
constructive theory on the basis of its ontological foundations. 
Instead, Flores proposes that we must focus on the functional roles that 
theories play.  In order to more clearly define the distinction Einstein raises, Flores 
slightly revises it, calling the “upper-level” theories “framework theoris”, in lieu of 
calling them “principle theories”, because it is the role of these theories t  provide the 
overarching framework by imposing constraints or restrictions on other theories.  




(typically expressed as ‘laws’) and definitions of physical terms which are expected 
to be applicable in the analysis of any physical system.” (Flores, 1999, p. 126)  The 
theories that these upper-level theories constrain Flores calls “interaction theories”, 
since they typically involve the interactions of various, more elementary constituents 
(though not necessarily mechanical ones), thus recalling the original definition of a 
constructive theory.  Interaction theories “describe specific physical processes within 
the constraints imposed by the principles (or one of the consequences) of a 
framework theory” (p. 129).  The distinctions between co structive versus principle 
and framework versus interactionist do not follow a strict one to one mapping.  
Principle theories and framework theories are coextensive, but, although all 
constructive theories are interactive theories, not all interactive theories are 
constructive.  According to Flores, this permits the classification of theories such as 
Newton’s universal law of gravitation into the category of interaction theory even if 
they are not constructive due to their functional role rather than their ontological 
basis. 
This revised distinction then sheds light on the nature of scientific theorizing 
in general.  What is it a theory is supposed to be doing?  A great deal of literature has 
been written on the nature of scientific explanation and the emphasis on function 
highlights the important role which scientific theories play in providing explanation.  
Two of the more influential philosophical viewpoints regarding explanation now 
appear ready made to fit in with this new distinction.  The Friedman/Kitcher prog am 
(Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1989) has long been to give an account of scientific 




unification of different phenomena.  Friedman argues for this approach with the basic 
idea that “A world with fewer independent phenomena is, other things equal, more 
comprehensible than one with more” (1974, p. 15).  Kitcher is more precise saying, 
“Science advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive 
descriptions of many phenomena, using the same [argument] patterns of derivation 
again and again, and, in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of 
types of facts we have to accept as ultimate (or brute)” (1989, p. 432).  The more 
descriptions able to be derived from an argument pattern, the better an explanation it 
is all things being equal.  As Flores notes, this is essentially explanation from the top 
down, explaining by unifying phenomena within an upper-level theoretical structure. 
Contrast this with the bottom-up view most prominently expounded by 
Salmon (1984; 1989).  Salmon’s position is that scientific explanation essentially 
stems from the ability to provide a causal-mechanical basis behind physical 
phenomena.  A law is explained by detailing the causal mechanisms which make it 
hold.  Like Friedman and Kitcher, Salmon also links this type of explanation to a 
notion of understanding, saying that there are “intellectual benefits that scientific 
explanation can confer upon us, namely… knowledge of how things in the world 
work, that is, of the mechanisms (often hidden) that produce the phenomena we want 
to understand” (1993, p. 15). 
Flores’ revised distinction among types of scientific theories can now shed 
light on this other debate going on in the philosophy of science, that of explanation.  
The different types of theories – interaction theories and framework theories – ar  in 




If different types of scientific explanation are exhibited by different types of scientific 
theories, it may not be possible to rectify the unificationist and causal-mechanical 
approaches to explanation or settle on one definitive model of scientific explanation.  
However, one can orient them with their respective type of theory and perhaps reach 
the conclusion that both are equally valid in their place.  Instead of competing 
theories on how scientific explanation works, they can be seen as complimentary 
aims, both with their own merits, but which serve different underlying roles in the 
scientific process.  When we ask for scientific explanation, perhaps there are two 
conceptually distinct kinds of things one might be asking for, although both are tied 
to the notion of increasing our sense of understanding about the world.  Different 
types of theories reflect this. 
The analysis of Flores’ is insightful.  When we go back and look at Einstein’s 
distinction between constructive theories and principle theories, we can see some 
degree of ambivalence towards their value on his part. In some statements it appears 
that Einstein prefers the constructive theory approach on the grounds that it provides 
us with a deeper understanding.  On the other hand, sometimes it seems that the 
logical certainty provided by principle theories is the true aim of our scientific 
endeavors.  It seems that Einstein might actually agree with Flores that the functional 
roles of principle theories and constructive theories are both equally valid, though 
conceptually distinct. 
3.3.5. Theoretical Pluralism 
One way of getting at this question is to look more deeply into Einstein’s 




sticking with it.  On a deeper analysis, it turns out that Einstein was not wedded to 
principle theories.  This fact, and the reasons behind it, will shed further light on te 
role that a principle theory approach can play in fundamental physical theories. 
By way of background, this distinction between types of physical theories 
along the lines of constructive theories and principle theories had been made prior to
Einstein.  Something close to this distinction was noted, interestingly, by Einstein’s 
contemporary, Lorentz.  This connection is the subject of investigation for Frisch 
(2005).  Lorentz had already proposed a distinction between types of theories by 
1900.  One type of theory begins by postulating “general principles” (1900, p. 335)8 
or “general laws” (p. 336) which express “generalized experiences” (p. 337).  There 
are, however, also theories which postulate a “mechanism of the appearances” (p. 
336).  Examples of the first type of theory include the second law of thermodynamics 
and conservation of energy, while examples of mechanism theories include the 
kinetic theory of gases.   
Clearly, Lorentz’s distinction resembles greatly the distinction betwe n 
principle and constructive theories made by Einstein, and it predates Einstein’s 
distinction which was discussed at length in 1919 in “What Is the Theory of 
Relativity”.  Moreover, if we look at Lorentz’s classifications using the language 
suggested by Flores, we can see that there is also a similar distinction between the 
functional roles played by either type of theory.  Principle theories act as constraints, 
guiding further theorizing.  Lorentz says, “’only when there is absolutely no other
way out to be found’ scientists will ‘dare to diverge from the generalized experi nc s’ 
embodied in principle-theories”  (Frisch 2005, 668 quoting Lorentz 1900, 337).  The 
                                                




overarching structure imposed by the principles is subject to revision only in extrem  
circumstances, providing the rules under which other theories operate.  This does not 
mean, however, that such constraints are ultimately not revisable, but that, barring
direct challenges that cannot be overcome, principle theories structure the parameters 
of scientific discourse.  The role of principle theories as unrevisable frameworks 
connects with the idea that principle theories offer security of the foundations.  We 
also get a hint of a better way to understand the meaning of this security.  The 
security is derivative of the constitutive characteristics of framework theories.  This 
will be taken up in Chapter 4. 
The prevailing view, both historically, and to this day, is that Lorentz 
preferred the mechanism approach to scientific theorizing.  Just as Lorentz and 
Einstein offered competing theories of what is now considered relativistic 
phenomena, this view contends that they also held competing visions of what an ideal 
physical theory ought to be like.  Einstein was able to formulate the special theory of 
relativity because he embraced the principle theory approach over the mecanisti  
one of Lorentz.  The view that Lorentz was guided by his predisposition towards 
mechanism theories is supported by the historical resistance Lorentz had towards 
Einstein’s special theory of relativity in favor of his own far more mechanistic theory. 
However, Frisch makes a compelling case that the philosophical views of 
Lorentz and Einstein in this regard are in fact much closer than is generally thought.  
In the first place, Lorentz thought that both principle theories and mechanism theories 
had a valuable role to play in science and he did not fail to recognize the benefits of a 




Einstein, who argues that principle theories offer more foundational security, for 
Lorentz, principle theories offer strong empirical generalizations covering a broad 
domain of physical phenomena.  Whereas, mechanism theories will, nearly 
universally, employ some element of hypothesizing, the foundations of a principle 
theory are particularly strong, since they rest on already established empirical 
generalizations, and thus can serve as guiding conditions for empirical discovery. 
Mechanism theories, in lieu of this security, offer the possibility of greate  
understanding, by postulating the underlying processes which explain scientific 
phenomena.  For Lorentz, a principle theory can say “nothing or only very little about
the mechanisms of the appearances, [thus] lead us to desirable results, but will not 
show us much during the trip” (1900, p. 355).  What is interesting for our purposes is 
that Einstein was also highly attuned to this advantage which mechanism – or 
constructive theories as he referred to them – can offer, as well as to the deficiencies 
of principle theories.  Principle theories, based as they are on empirical 
generalizations, do offer security in their foundations, as they are less likely to be 
overturned.  But in terms of explanatory advantage, just as Lorentz thought that 
mechanism theories provide understanding in ways that principle theories cannot, 
Einstein also recognized that, “When we say that we have succeeded in understanding 
a group of natural processes, we invariable mean that a constructive theory has been 
found which covers the processes in question” (1954b, p. 228).  Understanding is 
highly valued as an aim in scientific theorizing.  It should be recognized that 
‘understanding’ is itself an unclear term.  However, it seems to be doing work here on 




story of how phenomena come about we can understand it in something like the way 
we understand how a billiard ball gets from one end of the table to the other.   
To further demonstrate this fissure between constructive theories and principle 
theories in Einstein’s approach to scientific theorizing, it is worth noting that Einstein 
informs us that he first pursued a constructive approach to resolving the difficulties 
presented by the conflict between Newtonian mechanics and electrodynamics prior to
the formation of special relativity.   
By and by I despaired of the possibility of discovering the true laws by means of 
constructive efforts based on known facts.  The longer and the more desperately I 
tried, the more I came to the conviction that only the discovery of a universal formal 
principle could lead us to assured results. (Einste, 1949a, p. 53)   
This failure to find a constructive theory led to his eventual principle theory based 
approach to developing special relativity.  Klein (1967) argues that from the very 
earliest times in Einstein’s career he was guided by the example of th rmodynamics 
as a principle theory.  This may very well be the case, but it does not lessen the 
importance Einstein attached to constructive theories.  Indeed, as discussed above, 
Klein’s history portrays the thermodynamic model of theorizing as a model for 
procedure and methodology and not for the justification of foundational theories.  
Principle theories serve as guides, or constraints, in theory development by setting 
parameters in the form of universal laws.  For this purpose, principle theories are 
ideal, offering a firm foundation due to their generality and security of logical 
foundations.  Lorentz also seems to see the benefits of the principle theory based 




foundational theories (see Frisch 2005, 669).  Einstein at times also appears to take 
this view as well.  For example, Klein says,  
even in his very early work Einstein was not content o take thermodynamics only on 
its own terms, so to speak – to take it as a given, closed system.  As a “theory of 
principle” it had to be intelligible from a more basic point of view.  In other words, 
Einstein also concerned himself with statistical mechanics as a way of providing that 
deeper understanding of the laws of thermodynamics. (Klein, 1967, p. 510)   
Having the constraining principles or laws of thermodynamics at his disposal, and 
being sure of their solidity, allowed Einstein a restricted and guided search for those 
underlying constructive elements of statistical mechanics, including his work on 
Brownian motion.  But from this passage, it seems that for Einstein it was at this 
mechanistic level that real understanding and explanation of the phenomena, 
including justification for the laws of thermodynamics themselves, was to be f und. 
With this new perspective on Einstein and Lorentz, and their views on theory 
construction, it becomes less clear what we are supposed to say regarding the status 
of principle theories as fundamental theories.  It had looked as though perhaps 
principle theories were the appropriate model for doing fundamental physics, with the 
path forged by Einstein himself as a primary example.  However, it appears that he 
did not necessarily favor principle theories when theorizing.  None of the views at 
which we have been looking has resolved the question concerning any 
interpretational factors that necessarily motivate a principle theory approach over a 
constructive approach, or visa versa.   
 Flores advocates slightly altering the distinction based on the functional role 




framework theories and interaction theories.  This distinction differentiats types of 
theorizing done in physics, but it does not favor one over the other, as Flores 
specifically allows that there are different roles, satisfied differently, which are 
involved in scientific theorizing.  Lorentz, as Frisch notes, was explicitly a theoretical 
pluralist, saying that it is a matter of personal preference and not a matterof which 
type of theory is objectively superior or more fundamental to scientific enquiry 
(Frisch, 2005, pp. 669-670).  Even Einstein seems, at best, to have been ambivalent.  
One the one hand, he seems to favor the constructive approach and its clear advantage 
in providing realistic, causal-mechanical explanation.  Yet his greatest contributions 
to modern physics, special relativity and general relativity, are proudly offered as 
principle theories along the lines of thermodynamics, which Einstein touts as a highly 
successful and paradigmatic model of a principle theory. 
3.3.6. The Role of Explanation 
The question seems to come down to explanatory preferences and what type 
of explanation our physical theories are supposed to be offering, and even notions of 
what it means to “understand” some phenomena.  However, it seems that, through our 
analysis, very important, and what we may call fundamental theories, in physics are 
sometimes principle theories and sometimes constructive theories.  Compared side by 
side specific examples demonstrate this.  The kinetic theory of gases is the more 
fundamental theory, meaning that it, by and large, is taken to explain the principle 
theory, thermodynamics.  Whereas, special relativity, a principle theory, has been 
adopted over the more constructivist theory of Lorentz.  The preceding discussion 




their content and the function they play in our scientific endeavors, in terms of the 
explanatory structure they can offer.  And this makes sense.  Explanation seems to b  
about this somewhat vague notion of understanding.  Understanding is, to a large 
extent, a psychological pressure to feel as though something is “understood”.  
According to this view it is reasonable, and indeed expected, that there may be 
multiple meanings of explanation all united by the idea of increasing understanding, 
which as a psychological state is, by its nature, imprecise.  Thus theoretical pluralism 
is also to be expected. 
Flores argues that the distinction Einstein defined as that between principle 
and constructive theories emphasizing their ontological difference is better 
understood as a distinction between framework and interactionist theories on the basis 
of their functional role.  Recall the distinction noted earlier, between 
phenomenological physics and theoretical physics.  The inevitable progression of 
science from the phenomenological level to the more abstract theoretical level is 
rooted in the fundamental drive to unify the disparate phenomena under fewer and 
fewer basic elements.  We should now be able to see that there are two ways this can 
occur, and these ways are tracked by the distinction between constructive and 
principle theories.  The first way is that the unification comes about with the 
postulation of a causal-mechanical mechanism explaining the phenomena 
corresponding to Flores’s notion of an interactionist theory.9  The second way is that 
                                                
9 The phenomenological/theoretical distinction is not hard and fast, but one of degree.  Any principle 
theory must be relatively theoretical.  Constructive theories, it would seem, need not be.  So 
constructive theories need not be unifying, though many are.  To be clear, it is not in virtue of the 




the unification provides explanation via theoretical unification, corresponding with 
Flores’s notion of a framework theory. 
Theoretical physics seeks to unify.  Within theoretical physics there are two 
differentiable means by which this takes place.  One is through causal unification, the 
other is by theoretical unification.  As Salmon notes (1989, pp. 182-3), this second 
type of explanation is essentially different from the first.  It is of a kind that does not 
actually transcend descriptive knowledge.  This type of explanation increases 
understanding by organizing and systematizing knowledge.  The central characteristic 
essential to causal explanation is that it goes beyond purely descriptive knowledge to 
the mechanisms and processes behind the nature of things.  These two distinct types 
of explanation, however, are not incompatible.  In Chapter 4, we will return to 
analyze more closely the nature of theoretical unification and further diffeentiate 
between unification in the sense of Friedman/Kitcher and a more fundamental notion 
of conceptual resolution which is necessary for the possibility of such explanation. 
Flores argues that the distinction between types of explanation is derivative of 
the framework/interaction distinction.  However, it is clear from the preceding 
discussion that the basis for the distinction we are talking about rests on the 
explanatory motivations behind the theory.  Flores notes that there are three 
dimensions to this distinction – ontological, epistemological, and functional.  When 
we focus on the upper-level principle, or framework, theories, their functional role 
comes to the fore.  It is their ability to unify the theoretical structure by uniting 
diverse phenomena under a single description or by defining its operational 




special relativity is so explanatorily successful.  However, when we focus on bottom-
up constructive, or interactionist, theories, it is their powers of causal-mechanical 
explanation that makes them attractive.  This in turn depends on their ontological 
aspect, their realism about causal-mechanical entities.  Therefore, Einstein is wrong to 
think that it is the ontological characteristics of theories on which the distincton is 
made.  Likewise, the way Flores’s characterizes the functional aspect of the 
distinction glosses over the central role played by explanatory characteristi s.  The 
problem is that if the framework/interaction theory distinction is prior to the 
explanatory role, then it becomes unclear what particular function it is that interaction 
theories are supposed to play.  A framework theory defines the framework, but an 
interaction theory, on this dimension, is defined as a non-framework theory, a theory 
which is constrained by some upper-level framework.  But this fails to capture the 
importance of its ontological basis.  Being constrained does not imply any causal 
mechanical basis.  But this seems fundamental to how Einstein cashes out his notion 
of a constructive theory.  The dimension of most importance which I propose is also a 
functional one, but the function is explicitly an explanatory one.  The explanatory 
dimension to this distinction is primary.  This captures the theoretical unification of 
framework theories as well as the causal-mechanical role of constructive theories.  I 
will continue to use the terminology of Einstein, constructive and principle theories, 
but with this explanatory dimension in mind. 
One of the difficulties with this distinction, it that while it is quite useful, and 
can do a lot of work for us, it is not necessarily exhaustive no matter which dimension 




dimension along which the distinction is made.  It can still be a useful distinction 
though it may be better to see it as defining opposite ends of a spectrum, within which 
there are theories whose explanatory roles can overlap and function as hybrids.  
Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the centrality of the types of explanation 
behind the distinction.   
At this point, it is necessary to fully clarify the notion of explanation by 
unification.  The most prominent view of unification as scientific explanation is along 
the lines of the Friedman/Kitcher program.  On this view, something is a better 
explanation if it is able to unify a wider range of phenomena.  Many principle theories 
participate in this kind of explanation.  Newton’s and Einstein’s certainly do.  For 
instance, Newton’s laws of motion, together with the universal law of gravitation, 
unify celestial and terrestrial phenomena from planetary orbits, to the tides, to the 
behavior of objects on earth.  As I will conclude, CBH does not appear to unify in this 
manner.  However, this type of unification is not the only, nor the most fruitful, way 
to understand the role of principle theories as applied by Einstein or by CBH.  It will 
be argued that in these cases, the primary function of the principle theories is to 
establish principles which are constitutive of the very framework of some set of 
physical concepts.  This constitutive role is adequately fulfilled only if the principles 
successfully establish a coherent conceptual framework.  As such, theories such a  
Newton’s and Einstein’s, play a fundamental explanatory role by establishing the 
explanatory framework itself.  Though this argument must be left for Chapter 4, the 
conclusion here is that the distinction between principle and constructive theories is 




we will be able to see the centrality of unification for the principle theory approach.  
This in turn will help us to understand the role of constitutive theories in establishing 
that explanatory framework. 
We can now perhaps say something useful about the nebulous idea of 
interpretation.  Often is seems that there is a call for an ‘interpretation’ of a theory 
because at least one of two aspects of the given theory remain unclear.  The first is 
how that theory fits into a broader understanding of physics.  How do we make sense 
of this theory given other things we know?  Why is it the case that this theory holds?  
The second issue which begs for interpretation is to explain how the world is such 
that the predictions made according to the formalism of the theory turn out the way 
that they do.  What is the world like if the theory is true?  That is, an interpretation, in 
this case, is supposed to allow the theory to explain the phenomena it covers. Both 
calls for interpretation are calls for explanation.  The first is a demand that the theory 
be explained, providing an external explanation for the theory itself.  For example, 
why is quantum mechanics or special relativity true of the world?  What explains the 
principles or properties of the entities it postulates?  The second is a demand that the
theory itself be explanatory.  How does the theory explain the phenomena it covers?  
For example, how does quantum mechanics explain quantum phenomena? 
A theory cannot be expected to provide its own interpretation in the first 
sense.  One must go outside of the theory to explain it.  Although such interpretations 
are sometimes called for, they will require a broader theory in which to embed the 
theory we wish to have interpreted.  The broader theory explaining it will be its




theory to explain.  This interpretation often comes built into the theory itself.  In this 
case, the theory requires no further interpretation.  Here we may look at the kinetic
theory of gases for example.  In fact, any constructive theory, offering as it does a 
causal-mechanical explanatory structure, generally requires little if any further 
interpretation.  We will also see how a principle theory, such as special relativity, can 
supply its own interpretation later in Chapter 4, thereby not requiring any further 
interpretation to be applied to it. 
Quantum mechanics has nearly always been viewed as requiring further 
interpretation.  Historically, resolution has been sought in both senses of 
interpretation.  Certain phenomena covered by quantum mechanics have generally 
been viewed as inadequately explained, thus quantum mechanics requires 
interpretation of the second kind.  Problems such as the measurement problem and the 
EPR phenomena are expressions of the need for interpretation.  It is the demand that 
some account be given for how quantum mechanics can explain these phenomena.  
However, interpreting quantum mechanics in the first manner may also be fruitful.  
That is, if quantum mechanics can itself be explained, perhaps this explanation might 
help to explain quantum phenomena as well, thereby offering a suitable 
interpretation.  Different ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics can be characterized 
variously along this division.  The point is, the demand for an ‘interpretation’ of a 
scientific theory, and in particular quantum mechanics can often be seen as the 
demand for an explanation of some kind or an account which shows that such an 
explanation is not called for.  The need for an interpretation in such cases stems from 




provide it.  Interpretation is not explanation, but often the two issues appear to go 
hand in hand. 
3.4. Some Words on Constructive Quantum Mechanics 
Before returning to the CBH approach using information-theoretic principles 
to create a principle theory of quantum mechanics, I would first like to say a few 
things regarding the role of constructive theories in quantum mechanics, having 
explicated the explanatory role intended by such theories.  This discussion pertais to 
constructive theories in quantum mechanics in general, and potential constructive 
theories using quantum information theory as a basis.  Why would such an approach 
be appealing?  For the same reasons which influenced both Lorentz and Einstein: 
understandability and explanatory power.  A constructive theory provides 
mechanisms which in turn provide explanation by way of providing causal-
mechanical understanding. 
Again, turning to the insight of Einstein for clues, we find that his very early 
work, leading ultimately to the formulation of quantum theory, was fraught with the 
difficulty of fitting puzzling new phenomena into a constructive framework.  As 
Klein’s paper demonstrates, the theory of thermodynamics was heavily influentia  in 
Einstein’s thinking.  In the case of quantum mechanics, eventually, Einstein turned o 
the model of thermodynamics for inspiration, frustrated by the impossibility of 
discovering any constructive theory which reconciled the problems between 
electrodynamics and the kinetic-molecular theory, such as the problem of blackbody 
radiation and the photoelectric effect.  Eventually, of course, quantum mechanics 




driven to find an acceptable constructive theory for the burgeoning quantum theory, 
as was also the case for his work ultimately leading to the formulation of special 
relativity.  Einstein’s modus operandi, when presented with incompatible sets of 
results, was to first turn to an underlying mechanism which could explain them, thus 
extending our understanding of them.  It was only when such goals were thwarted, 
that Einstein turned to the strategy of using principle theories. 
By the time quantum mechanics had been developed, Einstein famously had 
serious qualms with the theory.  Most notably, Einstein faced off with Niels Bohr on 
the adequacy or completeness of quantum mechanics.  Einstein’s most famous 
objection to quantum mechanics came in the form of a thought experiment presented 
in the EPR paper (Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen, 1935).  It might be claimed that 
Einstein’s powerful objection here was in fact a way of articulating his frustration that 
quantum mechanics fundamentally ruled out a constructive formulation in its most 
rudimentary sense.  The incompleteness Einstein was worried about, stemming fro  
the basic assumptions of separability and locality, was an incomplete causal-
mechanical explanation for the correlations involved. 
Klein seems to take a different perspective on the point I am making.  
According to him, Einstein, in the EPR paper, is again using reasoning based on the 
thermodynamic model, that is, reasoning according to constraining principles (Klein, 
1967, p. 516).  While it is true that the basis of Einstein’s argument relies on his 
principles of separability and locality, I would argue that these are not principles of a 
particular theory, but rather they are meta-theoretic epistemological, or even 




physics.  That is, a principle theory, such as thermodynamics or special relativity 
employs empirical generalizations as principles.  In this case, the principles involved 
are at a different level entirely.  Specifically, if these principles are violated, then it is 
inherently impossible to provide a constructive theory.  This is distasteful to Einstein 
because it precludes the possibility of ever obtaining any understanding of the 
physical world.  And for Einstein, physics is about providing that deeper 
understanding. 
As a matter of fact, Bell’s later analysis (1964) of the problem clearly 
illustrates the impossibility of such a straightforward constructive theory of quantum 
mechanics.  The assumptions behind the Bell inequality show that quantum 
mechanics rules out the possibility of there being any common-cause explanation.  As 
such, any constructive theory of quantum mechanics, in its standard sense of 
providing causal-mechanical explanation, seems to be in principle ruled out.  At the 
very least, it is no straightforward task to show how to go about designing or 
envisioning a constructive theory of quantum mechanics. 
In the case of quantum mechanics, a successful, straightforward, constructive 
theory is not obviously available.  One might argue that other approaches or 
interpretations do attempt this.  It has been suggested that Bohm’s approach, which 
maintains a causal framework and is constructed from quantum particles and waves, 
does provide a constructive theory and that had history been different there would be 
no interpretational qualms surrounding quantum mechanics for that very reason 
(Cushing, 1998).  It seems like this might have the appropriate elements of a 




that it has the standard advantages of a constructive theory: causal-mechanical 
explanation and understanding.  However, as all issues in quantum mechanics seem to 
encounter, there are roadblocks for this view as well.  If I am right and the 
interpretive value in a constructive theory stems from its causal-mechanical 
explanatory basis, then it will not be a successful interpretation as a construtive 
theory unless its causal-mechanical explanatory role is fulfilled.  But by gaining 
determinism, by Bell’s theorem, Bohmian mechanics must be nonlocal.  For Bohmian 
mechanics, any change in the environment results in the instantaneous change of the 
quantum potential (Cushing, 1998).  GRW collapse theories must also incorporate 
nonlocal factors.  As such, these theories violate the assumption of locality behind the 
EPR problem and an assumption part of the concept of common-cause.  As such, the 
standard notion of causal explanation is violated by these theories.  The proposed 
ontology of Bohm and GRW collapse theories both require non-locality10.  Therefore, 
they cannot function as constructive arguments unless what it is to be constitutive is 
reinterpreted.  Therein lies the root of the fundamental disagreements between various 
interpretive schools.  Constructive interpretations are attempted, but they are not 
unequivocally constructive in the traditional sense.  The many-worlds interpretation, 
                                                
10 For a discussion on Bohmian mechanics, GRW collapse theories, and non-locality see Maudlin 
(2008) .  Maudlin says, “While in Bohmian mechanics, non-locality is achieved by the way the wave 
function choreographs particle behavior, so that what one particle does may depend on how a distant 
particle is treated, in the GRW theory non-locality is achieved through the collapse of the wave 
function itself.  It is this which, in the non-relativistic theory, is instantaneous and insensitive to the 
spatial separation between particles.  Interacting with a particle at one end of the universe can cause  
collapse that alters the physical state of an entangled particle at the other end” (2008, p. 166).  For the 
‘the mass density ontology’ version of collapse theories, the mass density of a particle spread out in 
space (e.g. in a two-slit experiment) will undergo a spontaneous collapse, instantaneously localizing 
the mass density.  Maudlin also discusses a recent relativistic formulation of GRW theory by Tumulka 
(2006).  Albert and Galchen (2009) point out that tis formulation introduces a new type of non-
locality: temporal non-locality.  The relativistic formulation does not remove non-locality; it makes it 
compatible with relativity.  There may still be spacelike separated events where the distribution of 
events at A depends on events at B.  But on the relativistic model, the direction of dependence is not 




as a constructive theory based upon a particular ontological structure, does not 
straightforwardly fail to be a constructive theory.  It is however not unproblematic.  
One challenge is against the expansive ontology of postulating the existence of 
perhaps infinitely many ‘worlds’ and histories in addition to the one we experience.  
Another is the derivation of quantum probabilities on a theory where all possible 
outcomes actually occur with certainty.  As an explanation, the interpretation is 
arguably both ontologically over indulgent and insufficient. 
Bub also objects to Bohm’s and other interpretations.  Bub argues that it is not 
rational to accept this or other mechanical interpretations of quantum mechanics 
because of the underdetermination of any interpretation equivalent to standard 
quantum mechanics discussed above.  As an explanation, any modal interpretation 
such as Bohm’s that is empirically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics fails by
being inherently hypothetical.  Interpretations such as this can not provide a reason, 
or an explanation, for quantum phenomena, since the hypothetical mechanism in 
principle has no empirical cash value beyond the predictions of quantum mechanics.  
Bub and others11 show us that there is no consensus among philosophers, and that 
furthermore, as of yet, there appears to be no principled way to chose between the 
various interpretations available to us  – e.g. wavefunction collapse, hidden-variables, 
or an Everettian world structure – except on the basis of some predilection or 
preference for certain epistemological or metaphysical principles.  But insisting on 
one set of such principles means that others must be dropped.  This suggests that there 
can be no principled reason to choose a particular constructive approach that does not 
contain some element of arbitrariness based on metaphysical leanings one way or 
                                                




another.  It is difficult to consider these successful constructive theories f r the two 
reasons that, for some, the mechanisms are inherently underdetermined, and that ay 
one of them must give up some part of the standard realist views of causal 
mechanism.  This explains the lack of any convergence in the field.  The interpretive 
work that must be done is not in coming up with a constructive theory and thereby 
explaining puzzling quantum phenomena.  It must be in explaining why the 
interpretation counts as explanatory at all given that it must give up some key asp ct 
of the traditional understanding of causal-mechanical explanation. 
3.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have been able to demonstrate more precisely what role a 
theory, either as a principle theory or as a constructive theory, plays in physics.  
Principle theories offer explanation through unification.  Constructive theories are 
best understood as fulfilling the role of providing causal-mechanical explanation.  
The lesson that we can take from this with respect to quantum mechanics is valuable.  
By framing the issue in terms of this distinction, we can see why broadly 
“constructive” approaches to quantum mechanics, such as Bohm, GRW, or Everett, 
have remained unsatisfactory interpretations of quantum mechanics to many, since 
they have failed to provide a straightforward causal explanation for certain 
phenomena; indeed quantum mechanics might seem to prohibit such an explanation.  
This is a failure of the basic strength of a constructive theory.  Hence the appar nt 
failure of such attempts has led thinkers such as Bohr to embrace the instrumentalist 
perspective.  It is not my goal to conclusively argue that none of the other 




arguments, and I need not repeat them here.  The point is that these interpretations 
have by and large been constructive spins on quantum mechanics.  There has been as 
of yet no consensus on such interpretations.  And this lack of consensus can be 
explained because the goal of developing a constructive theory has not been met 
without giving up some other aspect of a traditional constructive theory. 
So why not develop a principle theory?  If there is an interpretational aim for 
CBH it seems it must stem from such a motivation.  It does not offer a realist version 
of quantum mechanics as about information as the basic stuff.  And an instrumentalist 
interpretation both violates the spirit of the CBH approach, and it fails to justify the 
philosophical use of the information- theoretic language.  What we have seen is that 
one motivation behind taking a principle theory approach might be that it can provide 
explanation in the Friedman/Kitcher sense of unification.  That is, perhaps an 
interpretation based on a principle theory approach can take advantage of explanatory 
virtues not available to a constructive theory approach to quantum mechanics.  
Without significant further work, CBH does not seem to provide any additional 
aspect of unification in this sense.  CBH offers principles which are presented as 
having formal equivalence to some general quantum properties of theories.  Formal 
equivalence is, strictly speaking, not unification of any apparent sort.  Nothing more 
has been shown to be incorporated into an information-theoretic reformulation of 
quantum mechanics than quantum mechanics itself.  It is hard to see how it could 
offer more unification than quantum mechanics already does.  As such, the CBH 
principle theory-based approach does not provide any explanatory benefit of the 




mechanical) account which it is supposed to be replacing fails to be explanatorily 
satisfactory and is thus instrumentalist, so is this approach, if the work it is supposed 
to be doing is this sort of unification. 
Having established the explanatory basis for the principle/constructive theory
distinction and the unificationist role played by principle theories, in the next chapter, 
we will continue with the analysis of principle theories.  In particular, it will be 
shown that there is another way to understand the role of a principle theory, 
particularly when it comes to high-level theories such as Newtonian mechanics and 
Einstein’s theory of relativity.  Specifically, principle theories such as the e play a 
constitutive role in physics.  As we shall see, this is a more illuminating way to 
understand the role of principle theories in certain cases, and the information-
theoretic approach to quantum mechanics needs to be looked at in this light.  After the 
analysis of the constitutive role of principle theories and the conceptual role they 
play, we will be in a better position to evaluate the success of the CBH approach and 
say something about the role for an information-theoretic principle theory in 
interpreting quantum mechanics.  If CBH is to provide a successful interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, it is in this sense of principle theory that it will do so, just as this 





Chapter 4: Constitutive Principles 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Having now clarified, to some extent, the distinction made by Einstein 
between principle theories and constructive theories, I wish to take a closer lo k at a 
different and more foundational role principle theories can play.  Does this approach 
hold any hope of illuminating the foundational issues which have plagued quantum 
mechanics since its inception? 
As indicated in the previous chapter, I do think there is an important role 
which principle theories can and do play, especially for what we might call 
foundational physical theories.  This will be cashed out more in this chapter, but 
broadly speaking a foundational theory has large scope, with many theories falling 
under it and not falling under many theories itself.  A foundational theory is a theory 
which provides the basic conceptual framework under which other theories may 
function.  As such, the foundational nature of such a theory comes from the functional 
role of being a framework, or principle theory.  In particular, principle theories are of 
foundational significance when they are constitutive of the framework in which other 
theories can operate.  The clearest examples for such theories come from space-time 
physics such as Newton’s laws of motion and relativity theory. 
In this chapter, I hope to show, through the analysis of historical theory 
revision and the evolution of ideas in the philosophy of science, that the uppermost-




principles must provide the conceptual framework which establishes the meaning of 
empirical observation and measurability within the framework.  The epistemological 
character of such principles is that they serve a particular a priori role of being 
necessary prior to observation, but that their choice is, to some extent, conventional.  
However, there are good philosophical reasons, given particular moments in the 
progress of science, for selecting which principles ought to be put in place.  This 
choice is guided by the careful conceptual analysis of the existing framework, hich 
is at the time unviable due to fundamental conceptual inconsistencies in the theory.  
This requires careful revision of concepts to generate a new theoretical framework in 
which meaningful empirical claims can be made.  
 An adequate principle theory, i.e. one that lays out principles which do allow 
us to deduce the basic structure of broad physical theories, such as CBH does for 
quantum mechanics, does not necessarily offer a better interpretation of a theory by 
virtue of being a principle theory.  This can be seen even in Einstein’s take on his 
favorite example of a principle theory, thermodynamics.  While Einstein is entirely 
convinced of the security of the laws of thermodynamics, based as they are on 
strongly evidenced empirical generalizations, it is nevertheless not the most 
fundamental theory regarding its covered phenomena.  In this particular instance, the 
kinetic theory of gases offers a better interpretation of the phenomena from 
fundamental explanatory standpoint.  As we saw in Chapter 3, an interpretation for a 
theory is often seen as required when the theory appears to require external 
explanation, or when the theory appears not to be intrinsically explanatory.  In this 




this explanatory power, both explaining the laws of thermodynamics and showing 
how they explain.  In this case, the direction of explanation comes not from the 
principle theory, but the constructive theory. 
 However, one source of explanatory power, and one which a principle theory 
might naturally be seen to offer, is by providing unificationist explanation in the sense 
of Friedman and Kitcher.  CBH, as a principle theory, does not appear to unify in the 
way necessary for claiming interpretational advantages regarding quatum mechanics 
on this ground.  I do not claim that this cannot be done, but only that it is not clear 
how it might be accomplished, and that being a principle theory is not, in and of 
itself, sufficient.  Moreover, it does not seem to be the case that it is the aim of the 
CBH approach to provide unification of this kind. 
 Special relativity and general relativity are undeniably clear ex mples of 
principle theories.  They are also currently and historically viewed as highly 
successful theories both in their predictive power and as foundational theories which 
are generally not thought to require further interpretation.  Indeed, their em rg nce 
onto the theoretical scene propelled a newfound interest in the philosophical 
foundations of science itself.  It is no coincidence that there was both a resurgence of 
Kantianism around this time and also the development of the logical positivist 
movement in the philosophy of science.  Both took the success of Einstein’s theories 
as significant developments representing scientific and philosophical theorizing at its 
best. 
 What sparked this flurry of philosophizing was not only the raw success of 




time itself.  For over two hundred years, the physics of Newton had reigned supreme, 
and Einstein brought about the thorough overturning of this longstanding theory.  
Moreover, theorizing about space and time is, in many respects, uniquely different 
from other physical domains which are addressed in physical theories.  Knowledge of 
the characteristics of space and time has very much to do with accomplishing any 
other physics at all.  For Newton, space and time constitute the arena in which 
physical events take place.  Therefore, our theories and conceptions of space and tim  
are inherently foundational for the general body of physical knowledge. 
 As we shall learn, such theories must be framework or principle theories, 
given that their role is to establish such a framework for the rest of physics.  A 
principle theory provides explanation by unification.  However, in the class of 
theories at which we will be looking, the principle theories work at the conceptual 
level by establishing the necessary preconditions for explanation.  We find in both 
Newton and Einstein, conceptual analysis revealing that current theory is 
conceptually inconsistent.  The work which they do provides necessary conceptual 
resolution by establishing principles constitutive of the meaning of empirical terms.  
The constitutive work done by these theories establishes the explanatory and 
interpretational framework itself. 
 Einstein’s description of principle theories is better understood in this light.  
Likewise, it is a much more productive understanding of the principle theory 
approach of CBH.  We will investigate the question of whether CBH meets the 
standards of being a constitutive principle theory which, through conceptual analysis, 




Chapter 5, where we discuss a more comprehensive version of this program as 
advanced by Bub and Pitowsky (2007). 
 
4.2. Historical Development 
4.2.1. The Kantian Origin of the Constitutive Role of Principles in Science 
 More than a century before the emergence of relativity theory, following the 
Newtonian revolution in physics, itself a revolution of our knowledge of the 
fundamental framework for doing physics, Kant was also concerned with the 
foundational issues of physics and scientific knowledge. 
 Kant argues that the intuition of space and time “is nothing but the mere form 
of sensibility, which precedes the actual appearance of the objects, since in fact it 
makes them possible” (Kant, 2001, p. 284).  The concepts of space and time are 
concepts of the form of experience and not of the matter of experience.  That is to 
say, space and time are “formal conditions of our sensibility” (p. 284).  For Kant, the 
formal structure of these conditions on experience was crystallized in the work of 
Newton and specifically took the form of Euclidean space and time.  The 
epistemological nature of concepts such as space and time is that they are synthetic a 
priori  judgments.  That is, the nature of the forms of intuition regarding space and 
time cannot be proven from any concepts alone, and thus analytically.  That is, it is 
not part of the concept of “space” itself that it is Euclidean, in the way that it is part of 
the concept of “triangle” that it has three corners.  Nevertheless, on the basis of pure 
intuition, we can see that our particular concepts of space and time are necessary, 




character, it is always contingent.  Therefore the concepts of space and time must be 
known a priori, though not analytically. 
 Kant’s argument, as presented in the Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics, is a transcendental argument, starting with the claim that we have pure 
mathematical knowledge.  The question is how?  Among the two types of judgment, 
there is the explicative or analytic which adds nothing beyond what is given in the 
concept itself.  All such judgments are a priori and are justified on the basis of the 
principle of contradiction.   The other type of judgment is ampliative or synthetic in 
nature.  In this case, the judgment adds something beyond what is contained in the 
concept itself.  Among these are a posteriori judgments, justified empirically.  
However, for Kant, there is a vital category of synthetic judgments, which are known 
a priori.  That some judgments fall into this category can be seen by looking to the 
realm of mathematical judgments.  According to Kant, mathematical judgments are 
all synthetic.  They cannot be analytic, because nothing in the conclusion is contained 
in the concepts themselves.  Some synthesis must be involved, since the conclusions 
cannot be established simply using the principle of contradiction.  Moreover, 
mathematical judgments are known with apodictic certainty – that is, absolute 
necessity.  Necessity, however, cannot be known empirically.  Therefore, 
mathematical propositions are synthetic a priori judgments (Kant, 2001, pp. 266-8).  
Because they are not analytic, such judgments must come via intuition rather than by 
analysis of concepts alone.  This intuition must be pure, or free from empirical 
sources.  Mathematical judgments are gained from pure intuition.  But how can it be 




which, since it is a priori, must take place without an object of intuition?  That is, 
pure intuition must precede the empirical intuition of the object. 
Therefore in one way only can my intuition anticipate the actuality of the object, and be a 
cognition a priori, viz., if my intuition contains nothing but the form of sen ibility, which in 
me as subject precedes all the actual impressions through which I am affected by objects. 
(Kant, 2001, p. 282)  
In other words, the only way it is possible for synthetic a priori judgments to exist is 
for them to exist as a precondition for sensibility, by providing the form of how the 
objects of sense appear to us.  Synthetic a priori judgements do exist in pure 
mathematics since such judgments are not a alytic or a posteriori.  Therefore, so 
goes the argument, there are such preconditions brought to experience by our 
intuition. 
 At the foundation of pure mathematics, for Kant, are the concepts of space 
and time, representing the quintessential concepts of pure intuition.  The concepts of 
space and time compose the structure of empirical intuitions, and if we remove all 
actual intuition of empirical objects, the concepts of space and time remain as forms 
of possible experience.  The form of space is the Euclidean space, having three 
dimensions such that, “not more than three lines can intersect at right angles in on  
point” (Kant, 2001, pp. 284-5).  As a pure intuition, this judgment is apodictically 
certain, yet cannot be determined from the concept of space itself.  Kant provides a 
further argument to back up this claim.  This argument involves a supposed paradox, 
wherein two figures are given, whose complete spatial description of shape and 
dimension are identical, yet the two figures cannot be made to coincide.  An exampl  




counterpart).  Kant argues that there is nothing internal to the figures by which the 
understanding alone could differentiate these two figures.  It is only in relation to 
space as a whole that one can tell the figures apart.  Therefore, the pure intuition of 
the form of space itself is a prerequisite for this judgment of incongruity.  Kant says, 
Hence the difference between similar and equal things which are not congruent (for instance, 
helices winding in opposite ways), cannot be made intell gible by any concept, but only by the 
relation to the right and the left hands, which immediately refers to intuition. (Kant, 2001, p. 
286) 
This is clearly a rejection of Leibniz’s view of space as the relation between objects 
themselves.  It is also a rejection of Newton’s substantival view of absolute spac as 
something existing independently of the mind, in the world itself.  Space is instead a 
relation imposed by our own cognition on what we perceive; “pure space is not at all 
a quality of things in themselves but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation” 
(p. 288). 
 Kant distinguished between constitutive principles and regulative principles.  
Constitutive principles concern the possibility of experience or appearances.  Merely 
regulative are “those principles that are to bring the existence of appear nc s under 
rules a priori.” (Kant, 1998, pp. A179, B221).  The possibility of experience is 
necessarily given by pure intuition; therefore such synthetic a priori principles are 
constitutive of experience.  Since actual existence is not given with necessity, 
principles concerning it are merely regulative, that is, not necessary, acting s rules 
for the synthesis of experience out of perception. 
 Although this is a transcendental argument, starting from the premise that 




judgments in turn offers support for the claim that there can be such knowledge.  
Kant’s unique approach introduces the idea that our cognition imposes certain 
constraints on all that we can experience.  This accounts for the apparent necessiy of 
certain judgments about the world.  Indeed, for Kant, the a priori conditions of the 
possibility of experience simply are the objectively valid universal laws of nature.   
 Kant’s view on the aprioricity of the principles of Newtonian physics and of 
Euclidean space-time was, of course, shattered by the development of non-Euclidean 
geometries, which hinted that the framework of Euclidian geometry was not in fac
necessary a priori.  The subsequent arrival of relativity theory confirmed this in 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The characteristic, which Kant sees as intuitively certain, 
is that space has the form dictated by Newtonian physics.  This conflicts directly with 
the geometry of non-Euclidean relativity theory.  Not only does modern physical 
theory deny the content of Kant’s thought, it also throws doubt on his methodology.  
What Kant took to be apodictically certain according to pure intuition is in fact shown 
to be false, and, therefore, most definitely not apodictically certain.  Nevertheless, 
neo-Kantian philosophies hung on with great tenacity.  The challenge for any Kantian 
theory is to show that any physical principles at all can be proven to be synthetic a 
priori  truths in the Kantian sense.  What Kant took to be intuitively certain was 
shown to be wrong.  So how can one argue that any other principles can be known 
with certainty in a similar way? 
 It is not possible to argue from actual scientific theories that any principles are 
necessary.  This is merely an empirical claim and is open to refutation, especially in 




be given that any principles are necessary?  Pure intuition cannot provide self-
evidently valid principles, since, as we see with Kant, what might appear to be 
apodictically certain only appears so due to limitations of the imagination, rather than 
cognition itself. 
The challenge for the neo-Kantians is to square the Kantian philosophy with 
the advent of relativity, which explicitly denounces this form of space and time.  On  
option is to insist that Kant is correct.  This means either maintaining that relativity is 
wrong or that it applies only to scientific space and time, while Kant’s notion of space 
and time applies to our psychological concept of space and time.  The other option is 
to reject the content of what Kant thought was necessarily given by pure intuition.  To 
remain in line with the tenets of Kantian critical philosophy, this means discovering 
another set of concepts which stand in the same relation to our knowledge of the 
physical world as do Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics for Kant, but which 
conform to the principles of the theory of relativity. 
One of Einstein’s criticisms of neo-Kantianism, in this latter form, is that i  
seems to be an irrefutable theory.  Just as there seems to be no transcendental 
argument for the absolute necessity of any given neo-Kantian principle, ther  does 
not seem to be an argument that there cannot be any such principle.  As such, in any 
physical theory, one can always posit some “synthetic a priori principle”.  Einstein 
says, 
I am even of the opinion that this standpoint can be rigorously refuted by no development of 
natural science.  For one will always be able to say th t critical philosophers have until now 




system of a priori elements that does not contradict a given physical system.  (Einstein, 1924, 
pp. 1688-89) 
4.2.2. Logical Positivism and Constitutivity 
 The logical positivist or empiricist12 response to Kantianism is to deny the 
apodictic certainty of any principles.  On the other hand, they did not reply with strict 
empiricism either – that the laws of nature can simply be inferred from the data 
through generalization.  Instead, they acknowledged the contribution Kant had made 
in recognizing some a priori component of scientific theories.  That is, inseparable 
from a physical theory is that which is brought to it by us before any observable 
physical content can have any meaning.  A conceptual framework must be erected 
first, just as for Kant there are preconditions necessary for the possibility of 
experience.  The essential difference between Kant and the logical positivists s the 
precise nature of such principles.  Kant was limited by the logical, mathematical, nd 
scientific viewpoint of his time, but the logical positivists argued that specific 
structures, such as Euclidean space-time, are not given with apodictic certainty.  
Rather, the space-time structure which must be in place is chosen as a matter of 
convention or by “coordinating definition”.  It is necessary that such a structure be in 
place to provide meaning for empirical science, but the exact nature of the structure is 
open to choice.  Schlick is explicit in his delineation of empiricism from Kantianism,  
[M]ere sensations and perceptions are not yet observations and measurements; they only 
become so by being ordered and interpreted.  Thus the forming of concepts of physical 
objects unquestionably presupposes certain principles of ordering and interpretation…  An 
                                                
12 Among philosophers of this school (e.g. Schlick, Reichenbach, Carnap) there were of course 
differences among their views.  For a much more complete history of the development, context, and 




empiricist, for example, can acknowledge the presence of such principles; he will deny only 
that they are synthetic and a priori in the sense [of having the property of apodicticity]. 
(Schlick, 1979, pp. 323-4) 
Once the framework is established, then, in combination with observation, the 
physical theory falls into place.  And so, just as the geometry of space-time is not 
simply given by pure intuition, it cannot be established by purely empirical discovery 
either.  “[I]t is in no way a straightforward empirical matter of fact whether space is 
Euclidean or non-Euclidean” (Friedman, 1999, p. 7).  The issue is taken to be closely 
analogous to the axiomatic structure of logic or pure geometry.  Nothing about the 
world, or our cognition, imposes specific axioms of geometry, but once selected they 
completely define the geometric structure which follows from them.  Likewise for the 
structure of space and time. 
 Reichenbach is explicit in his separation of the two distinct aspects of Kantian 
principles: apodictic certainty and constitutivity.  He rejects the apodictic certainty of 
any principles.  In so doing, Reichenbach does not entirely reject the Kantian 
approach, since he embraces their “constitutivity”.  Apodictic certainty and 
constitutivity need not necessarily go hand in hand as they do for Kant (Reichenbach, 
1965).  Intuition has no role to play in specifying particular principles with necessity.  
Any supposed such intuition, like that for Kant, cannot have a priori grounding since 
progress in the empirical sciences can always override it in the future.  However, 
what is recognized is that without sufficient non-empirical definition, empirical laws 
cannot be meaningful.  For example, attempts at empirically discovering the 
curvature of space by measuring it are bound to fail if they implicitly rely on light 




absent some coordinative definition.  Some discussion among the positivists revolved 
around the exact nature of such definitions, but the general consensus was that their 
status is best understood as conventional, with there being some disagreement and 
discussion as to whether other restrictions must be considered regarding that choice. 
In Reichenbach’s terms, only once these “axioms of coordination” are established can 
“axioms of connection” be well-defined and have meaning.  We see in this distinction 
the emphasis on function, on the necessity of a framework in which to define theories 
which fall under its scope, which motivates Flores’ move to distinguish between 
framework theories and interaction theories as we saw in Chapter 3.  Reichenba , 
too, classifies Newton’s laws of motion as an upper-level theory, as axioms of 
coordination, and Newton’s universal law of gravitation as an axiom of connection 
which can only be given concrete meaning within the framework established by the
laws of motion.  We see in Reichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap rigorous attempts at 
making this divide between axioms of coordination and axioms of connection sharp 
and coherent.13 
 We also find here the seeds of the fall of logical empiricism.  Though there 
has probably been historic misrepresentation and certainly no one single logical 
empiricist position, this strict distinction between axioms of coordination and axioms 
of connection as different kinds of scientific propositions did not withstand attacks 
from Quinean holism, according to which there can be no such in principle 
distinction.  The logical positivists also face objections for their adherence to strict 
epistemological (and hence purely philosophical) strictures, such as verificationism, 
as leading to philosophical advancement in the philosophy of science. 
                                                





 Nevertheless, we have now a basis to think that there is a need in science for 
principle theories in order to frame further scientific inquiry in the physical world, 
and we have come a substantial way towards illuminating this relationship.  However, 
there is more to be said.  We have established, as was first noted by Kant and was still 
recognized by the positivists and Einstein, that it is necessary to have this framework; 
however, it has not been resolved what the nature of these principles must be.  What 
is the role played by intuition, or by empirical discovery, or are they purely 
conventional stipulations chosen on pragmatic grounds?  Can we meaningfully make 
a principled distinction between principles of coordination as different in kind from 
other propositions in the theory?  And finally, what role does explanation play in all 
of this? 
 Kant argued that there are preconditions which must be in place for the 
possibility of there being any physical experience at all.  For him these prconditions 
took the form of necessary a priori conditions given by pure intuition.  Newton, for 
Kant, had clarified and formalized these preconditions for experience.  The arrival of 
general relativity, and its use of non-Euclidean geometry, showed that Kant had been 
wrong in thinking that those preconditions for experience were necessary in the sense 
Kant had argued.  However, Kant’s point was recognized: there did need to be 
preconditions for experience that had to be in place prior to scientific observation.  It 
is just that those principles were chosen contingently to establish the framework.  It is 




 The principles of a foundational principle theory must be of this sort.  They 
must supply the framework, or the preconditions, which establish the meaning of the 
measurement of physical properties.  Measurability is a necessary condition for doing 
science, and establishing a conceptual framework is a necessary condition for 
measurement and observation.  Kant recognized this, but he was mistaken about the 
source and the nature of the principles which establish that framework.  The 
positivists saw that flaw in Kant, but also accepted the necessity of having a 
framework.  They saw it as a contingent choice.  They too were mistaken about the 
source and nature of the framework which must be established. 
 There are a number of problems for the logical empiricist approach, which 
come from opposing sides.  One problem is that, though there might be a meaningful 
distinction between axioms of coordination and axioms of connection, the choice of 
coordinative definitions is held to be entirely conventional, letting in an unacceptable 
degree of arbitrariness for the realist.  It will be argued below that the choice of 
constitutive principles is not entirely conventional, that there are significant 
philosophical considerations which come into play in determining such principles.   
 From the other side, it is argued that positivism fails to even make an adequate 
distinction between purely constitutive principles and empirical laws.  This is a line 
taken early on by Einstein, saying that the distinction must be made, but where it is 
made is itself arbitrary.  Later developments in the philosophy of science also posed 
challenges to the logical empiricists.  Kuhn (1962) argues that there are no 
philosophical arguments, such as the epistemological ones adhered to by the logical 




over a different framework.  I will argue that there are philosophical considerations 
which dictate to some extent where constitutive principles must play a role.  Einstein 
presents us with typically insightful thoughts on the matter.  Perhaps there is no 
principled place to make the distinction; nevertheless, given the structure of sci nce 
and its concepts at a particular place in time, this decision is not entirely arbitrary, but 
based on conceptual inadequacies of the theory or theories in place. 
 
4.3. Conceptual Foundations 
 DiSalle (2006) provides an analysis of the conceptual foundations of physical 
theories in a particularly nuanced manner.  DiSalle’s analysis places emphasis less on 
the nature of the conceptual framework of theories and more on the evolution of such 
frameworks, but in the process identifies some of the essential qualities of the 
frameworks which make such evolution possible.  By approaching the task in this 
way, DiSalle is able discern where concept revision comes to be seen as necessary 
and where convention plays a role. 
 When we look to historical examples in the evolution of our theories of space 
and time, and the actors who play the role of developing them, we see that there are in 
fact remarkable similarities in terms of how they come to the conceptual framework 
which they do.  This will hopefully shed some light on what the nature of these 
principles, which serve as the framework for scientific endeavors, must be like. 
 Kant introduces the idea that such frameworks must be there, and what has 
been up for debate is what they must be like, if they must be like anything at all.  




times does in fact become necessary – not in Kant’s sense of a pri ri necessary, but 
necessary in order to overcome something like what Kuhn describes as a period of 
crisis.  What this crisis amounts to, as DiSalle shows us, is the emergence of 
conflicting concepts within the current scientific framework.  Until this cri is is 
resolved, not much progress, at a fundamental level, can continue.  Of course the 
more intractable the conceptual inconsistencies are perceived to be, the more 
impressive the new theory which manages to resolve the crisis will be seen.  
Important examples of this include the theories of Galileo, Newton, and Einstein. 
 The manner in which the new principles resolve the old concerns reveals that 
aspect of principle theories which we are trying to uncover – that aspect which makes 
them foundational theories in need of no further interpretation – and which will 
hopefully aid us in resolving the interpretational issues which are presented to us by 
quantum mechanics. 
4.3.1. Galileo 
To investigate this further, it is useful to look at DiSalle’s analysis in some 
detail.  Let us go all the way back to Galileo and the revolution that he produced.  
Galileo recognized that the traditional Aristotelian concept of natural motion was in 
fact incoherent.  The Aristotelian concept of natural motion is based primarily on the 
composition of an object, and its tendency to move towards its natural place in the 
universe.  All objects are made up of the four basic elements, earth, air, water, and 
fire.  The natural place for the element of earth is at the center of the universe.  Hence 
objects made primarily of earthly stuff will naturally move downwards, towards the 




tendency to rise from the center of the universe.  The proportion of different elements 
in an object dictates its weight.  This then determines the speed at which an object 
moves according to its natural motion.  Heavier bodies will fall faster, proporti nal to 
their greater weight.  The Aristotelian system also holds that the earth is stationary, as 
it is the center of the universe.  Neither is there any natural motion which would alter 
that condition.  Applications of this framework, as later analyzed by Galileo, reveal 
serious inconsistencies. 
Aristotelian evidence that the center of the universe is the non-rotating center
of the earth, is provided by the fact that a stone dropped from a tower will land at the 
foot of the tower.  If the earth were rotating, by the time the stone hits the ground, 
moving as it would directly towards the center of the earth, the base of the tower 
would have moved along with the rotating earth.  However, as Galileo points out, this 
argument for the non-rotation of the earth fails because it is circular.  As Galileo 
notes, if the earth is rotating, then that movement would be transferred to the 
horizontal motion of the stone in addition to its vertical motion, thus explaining the 
fact that the stone lands at the foot of the tower. 
 If the Aristotelian insists that such horizontal motion is not transferred, as 
should be the case given the natural motion of bodies according to Aristotelian 
physics, then there is a conflict with everyday experiences, where we do not even 
consider doubting this transference of horizontal motion.  On a moving ship, one does 
not adjust for this movement if one drops a ball from the top of the mast.  Instead, that 




to determine if the ship is in motion or not based on the relative movement of objects 
in the hull.  Many other examples demonstrate this as well. 
 Aristotle offers an ad hoc account of this type of “violent”, or unnatural 
motion, possessed by a projectile with horizontal motion.  As the projectile deviates 
from natural motion, the unnatural motion must be initiated externally; it must be a 
form of violent movement.  Therefore, Aristotle tries to solve the problem by 
postulating that the air closes in behind the object and forces the horizontal 
movement.  This solution is rather problematic for obvious reasons.  But if this 
solution, even as ad hoc as it is, is adopted, then the original argument for the non-
rotating earth is circular, assuming that the horizontal component of motion cannot 
persist without an external cause. 
 Galileo further points out the internal inconsistencies of the Aristotelian view 
with the following thought experiment: 
Salviati. But, even without further experiment, it is possible to prove clearly, by means of a 
short and conclusive argument, that a heavier body d es not move more rapidly than a lighter 
one provided both bodies are of the same material and in short such as those mentioned by 
Aristotle.  But tell me, Simplicio, whether you admit that each falling body acquires a definite 
speed fixed by nature, a velocity which cannot be increased or diminished except by the use 
of force or resistance. 
Simplicio. There can be no doubt but that one and the same body m ving in a single medium 
has a fixed velocity which is determined by nature and which cannot be increased except by 
addition of momentum or diminished except by some resistance which retards it. 
Salviati. If then we take two bodies whose natural speeds are different, it is clear that on 
uniting the two, the more rapid one will be partly etarded by the slower, and the slower will 
be somewhat hastened by the swifter.  Do you not agree with me in this opinion? 




Salviati. But if this is true, and if a large stone moves with a speed of, say, eight while a 
smaller moves with speed of four, then when they ar united, the system will move with a 
speed less than eight; but the two stones when tied together make a stone larger than that 
which before moved with a speed of eight. Hence the heavier body moves with less speed 
than the lighter; an effect which is contrary to your supposition. Thus you see how, from your 
assumption that the heavier body moves more rapidly than the lighter one, I infer that the 
heavier body moves more slowly. 
Simplicio. I am all at sea because it appears to me that the smaller stone when added to the 
larger increases its weight and by adding weight I do not see how it can fail to increase its 
speed or, at least, not to diminish it. 
Salviati. Here again you are in error, Simplicio, because it is not true that the smaller stone 
adds weight to the larger. 
Simplicio. This is, indeed, quite beyond my comprehension. (Galilei, 1954, pp. 62-3) 
Here, the Aristotelian view, depending on how it is applied, produces contradictory 
results.  The Aristotelian system maintains concepts regarding motion wh ch are 
incompatible upon application. 
 Galileo argues that the principles of motion must be changed.  In particular, 
the principles which must be changed are conceptual ones.  The concept of motion 
itself needs to be altered due to conflict within the traditional Aristotelian model.  
Galileo recognized the departure of the Aristotelian model from principles implic t in 
everyday phenomena and was able to formulate a new principle, the nascent versio  
of Newton’s principle of inertia.  Though the correct rendering of this principle was 
only fully formed through the later work of Descartes, Huygens, Newton, and others, 





 Newtonian mechanics also rests on constitutive principles, which are formed 
out of the ashes of previous theories that Newton had the insight to see as 
inconsistent, both internally and with observation, and therefore headed for crisis. 
DiSalle demonstrates that this is the case in at least two separate instances, where 
Newton sees the problem with Descartes’ framework, and analyzes that problem in 
order to develop new principles, which stand as constitutive of the concepts needed to 
do physics.  DiSalle focuses on the concepts of absolute time and absolute space.  
These become, under Newton, defined concepts, which can in turn be used to define 
further the measurable quantities of classical mechanics.  These definitions were 
deemed as necessary by Newton in order to construct an empirical science at all. 
 The Cartesian view, a mechanistic philosophy predominant in contemporary 
physical science, contains within itself two separate, and incompatible, approaches.  
One approach focuses on the mechanical explanation of motion following from the 
work of Galileo.  The idea is that uniform motion persists unless influenced from 
without, and this influence requires a mechanical explanation.  Such an influence 
must involve the direct impact of one body on another for it to be mechanically 
intelligible. 
 The second approach develops out of Descartes’ philosophical, a priori, 
perspective.  For Descartes, the essential property of material substance is extension, 
making it distinct from spiritual or mental substance.  Space, as a non-mental 
substance, must likewise have extension.  Thus, space, having the essence of material 




substance serves as the basis for Descartes’ theory of planetary motion.  If b dy and 
space are substances with extension, then the entire universe is entirely full of matter.  
The universe, as an infinite plenum, only allows motion as circulations about various 
centers, because matter moving from one location can only move if that location is 
vacated, and so on.  The motion of the planets and celestial bodies can then be 
explained mechanically by the introduction of the motion of fluid vortices, which 
carry the planets in their orbits.  The universe is a plenum completely filled with 
matter, whose motion could only be accounted for by the existence of vortices.  Since 
“space” too is a fluid, motion on this philosophical view is not motion with respect to 
any kind of absolute space, but motion with respect to the immediately adjacent fluid 
medium. 
 For Newton, these two separate approaches, the geometrical and the 
mechanical, were incompatible with each other, and prevented any clear conception 
of empirical measurement.  The two viewpoints appear to be at odds over the concept 
of motion, which reveals, on deeper analysis, that they are also at odds with respect to 
the concepts of space and time.  Within the Cartesian system, there appears to b  a 
vicious circularity regarding the definition of motion and body.  Without a single, 
coherent concept of motion, measurement and any meaningful empirical investigation 
could not be done.  Therefore the preconceptions of space and time needed to be 
analyzed such that this could be accomplished.   
For Cartesian mechanics, the motion of the planets around the sun could be 
causally explained by the movement of the vortices as carried from the rotation of he 




philosophical perspective, Descartes could say that the earth was entirely at rest,
given that it was surrounded by the fluid, and relative to it, immobile.  Thus, there is a 
tension in the Cartesian framework regarding the concept of motion, which Newton 
articulates: 
[T]he individual parts of the heavens, and the planets that are relatively at rest in the heavens 
to which they belong, are truly in motion.  For they change their positions relative to one 
another (which is not the case with things that are truly at rest). (Newton, 1999, p. 413) 
Additionally, DiSalle addresses the famous thought experiment Newton 
devised, which envisions a bucket full of water twisted on a rope, and which has 
traditionally been taken to be an argument by Newton simply meant to show that 
space is absolute and not relative.  DiSalle points out that this interpretation is 
misguided, and that the real point behind the thought experiment is to show that the 
Cartesian position is inconsistent, even within its own physical theory.  First, we 
imagine a bucket of water suspended from a rope.  In it, the surface of the water is 
flat.  Then the rope is wound tightly, and with the bucket and water at rest, the bucket 
is released with a rapid rotation so that the unwinding of the rope will drive the 
rotation.  First, the bucket will spin rapidly relative to the water, with the wat r 
surface remaining mostly flat.  But the motion of the bucket will be transferred to the
water, and the surface of the water will become concave as it eventually comes to rest 
relative to the motion of the bucket.  If the bucket is stopped, the water will continue 
rotating, no longer at rest relative to the sides of the bucket, and with its concave 
shape until it eventually returns to the initial state (Newton, 1999, pp. 412-3).   
From the Cartesian point of view of rotating vortices, when the bucket is 




bucket.  As the water becomes more concave, its motion relative to the bucket 
becomes less and less, until at its greatest concavity – an effect we can measure – it 
has ceased moving altogether from the Cartesian standpoint.  Now, however, 
immediately after the bucket is stopped, the same concave shape is apparent, but the 
motion of the water is at its greatest, just as it had been when the bucket was initially 
released.  But of course, then the water had been flat.  Finally the water will stop its 
motion relative to the bucket and will also be flat.  In other words, according to the 
Cartesian philosophical standpoint, precisely the same motion of the water at two 
different times, i.e. motion relative to the sides of the bucket, produces very diffeent 
dynamical results.  At one time that motion is associated with a concave surface to the 
water, at another a flat surface. 
The dynamical results of the water climbing the sides of the bucket is, for 
Newton, the objectively measurable phenomenon.  Cartesian motion can say nothing 
about this phenomenon.  Yet, the dynamical phenomena must provide the measure of 
motion.  More condemning for the Cartesian system is the contradiction which arises 
from the explanation of the bucket experiment with the causal explanation for the 
movement of the planets and stars.  The Cartesian explanation depends on the 
centrifugal forces, along with the resistance of the fluid in other vortices, to describe 
the motion of the planets.  But these forces are ruled out by the philosophically 
motivated mechanical conception of movement.  For the Cartesian, non-rectilinear 
motion needs to have a mechanical cause to explain any deviation from natural 
motion.  Planets would continue their straight line path except that the fluid in the 




Cartesian philosophical theory, the planet has no motion at all, for it is at rest with 
respect to the medium surrounding it.  A planet has, at once, non-rectilinear motion, 
which needs to be explained by some force acting upon it, and no motion, which 
precludes the possibility of forces acting on it.  So the entire theory of planetary 
motion in the solar system is self-contradictory. 
If motion is defined in the Cartesian manner, then no planet or star will be in 
motion, or at least, it becomes impossible to say what its motion might be or mean.  
More importantly, it is impossible to say whether a body is free of forces acting upon 
it, and impossible to say whether it is in uniform motion or not.  Ultimately this lead  
to a breakdown in the ability of the physical science to function. 
The crux of Newton’s dynamical argument, then, is that the Cartesian definition ignores the 
aspects of motion that are central to Cartesian physics.  It defines a univocal velocity for every 
body – indeed, every particle – in the Universe.  But it does not offer any physical measure of 
the accelerations and rotations that are central to our understanding of the fundamental causal 
interactions. (DiSalle, 2006, p. 33) 
Newton also takes up the definition of uniformly moving time in his analysis 
of motion, since it is a concept, which, along with space, is integral to the 
understanding of the concept of motion.  Newton evaluates the concepts that are 
involved in the contemporary view of time, argued for by Leibniz, according to 
which, like space, time is a purely relational construction.  The assumptions of thi
approach were ones which Newton also held and which supported his view, but 
which, when brought to light, exposed problems with the relationalist view.  As for 
Cartesian physics, the relational view of time implicitly requires a notion of absolute 




laws of motion served to define the notion of uniform time, specifically determining 
how to differentiate between equal and unequal time intervals.  Among the implicit 
assumptions shared by Newton and his contemporaries is that there is a “genuine 
physical distinction between inertial motion and non-inertial motion, and that there is 
an unambiguous way of determining all of the forces involved in every non-inertial 
case” (DiSalle, 2006, p. 22).  Newton’s three laws provide a means of differentiating 
between inertial and non-inertial motion, first by defining it in terms of the presence 
or absence of external forces.  The other two laws establish the means of determining 
those forces or the absence of them. 
 Thus, what we see in Newton’s reasoning is the analysis of the concepts 
which were being used in contemporary physics, both explicitly and implicitly.  What 
he recognized was that some of these concepts were in need of more precise 
definition.  Indeed, to make the concept of motion, as understood at the time, 
meaningful, those presuppositions behind it needed to be first developed into a 
coherent conceptual framework.  DiSalle’s argument is that Newton’s development of 
the principles of motion was not simply the positing of hypotheses about the 
existence of absolute space and time.  Rather, Newton was defining the concepts 
necessary for making hypotheses that could be meaningfully understood and tested in 
the first place. 
4.3.3. Einstein 
Following DiSalle, we now turn to Einstein and his work in developing the 
special and general theories of relativity.  Einstein saw that the conflict wh ch had 




rooted in the implicitly held concepts of space and time.  The central problem 
emerging at the time was an apparent conflict between Newtonian dynamics and 
Maxwellian electrodynamics.  Newtonian dynamics adhered to the principle of 
relativity, that the physics in one system is the same for any system in uniform m tion 
with respect to it.  Electrodynamics stands as a possible exception to this princ ple, 
since it only holds in a frame at rest with respect to the aether.  This was complicated 
by the inability to measure any electrodynamic phenomena in motion with respect to 
the aether, most famously demonstrated in the Michelson-Morley (1887) experiment.  
Lorentz explains this failure by appealing to molecular forces, which contract 
proportionally to movement through the aether, thereby accounting for this null 
result. 
Both Lorentz’s and Einstein’s theories account for the empirical data.  The 
crucial difference, according to DiSalle’s analysis, is that Einste  recognizes that the 
Newtonian framework on which Lorentzian dynamics rests is conceptually 
inadequate.  The notion of an inertial coordinate system in undefined.  For this we 
require a kinematic description of motion, for which the concept of time must be 
defined.  The Newtonian system fails to do so because it relies on an intuition of 
simultaneity which cannot be connected to any empirical definition.  It depends on a 
notion of the instantaneous propagation of gravitational force.  However, 
approximating this empirically relies on physical processes and ultimately on light 





According to DiSalle, the breakdown occurs because the “intuitive theory of 
simultaneity” fails to meet the “intuitive criterion of simultaneity” (2006, p. 111).  
That is, operating to form the contemporary theory of simultaneity is a conception of 
its role in the theory of space and time.  However, Einstein determines that the ac ual 
theory departs from the common sense conception of the role simultaneity ought to 
play.  Specifically, “[Einstein] seeks a criterion of simultaneity that is independent of 
position and motion, that has a foundation in physical laws that are independent of 
any observer, and that makes simultaneity a symmetric and transitive relation” 
(DiSalle, 2006, p. 110).  The condition which Einstein establishes is that, “we 
establish by definition that the ‘time’ required by light to travel from A to B equals the 
‘time’ it requires to travel from B to A” (Einstein, 1905b, p. 894).  This satisfies the 
criterion Einstein requires. 
This definition does not, however, establish whether or not the velocity of 
light is in fact invariant.  The invariance of Maxwell’s equations could be explained 
by the universal contraction hypothesized by Lorentz.  However, what the Newtonian 
framework of Lorentzian dynamics lacks, Einstein’s theory of special relativity has, 
and that is a clear and meaningful definition of simultaneity, and, therefore, a clear 
and meaningful definition of time, space, and motion.  Lorentz must explain the 
theory and the Lorentz invariance of otherwise disconnected phenomena, whereas 
Einstein’s theory covers all of this with the definition of simultaneity, and there is no 
need of postulating any sort of hypothetical explanation.  Einstein recognized the 




possible to overlook this until then.  In overlooking it, however, the concept of an 
inertial frame had not been given a clear meaning. 
We can see how Einstein’s postulate regarding the propagation of light takes 
on an a priori character.  It is not simply the result of inductive generalization.  If this 
were the case, the constancy of the speed of light would require explanation.  Rather, 
the postulate acknowledges the constitutive role of the velocity of light and uses itto 
impose a structural framework wherein physical explanations can be made.  As 
DiSalle (2006, p. 118) notes, from this standpoint it makes no sense to demand an 
explanation for the principle itself.  To do so must always be circular, just as asking
for an explanation for force and acceleration in Newtonian dynamics is misplaced.  
These concepts serve as defining principles which can impose meaning on the 
concept of an inertial frame.  There can be no external justification for such 
constitutive principles. 
In the development of general relativity, a similar conceptual analysis take
place.  Einstein’s analysis discovers in the Newtonian system another instance where 
implicitly held views, upon analysis, cannot serve to form coherent definitions 
without arbitrary stipulation.  Implicit in Newton’s measurement of absolute 
acceleration, and hence inertial frames, is the ability to distinguish between bodies 
with inertial motion and bodies in gravitational free-fall.  However, just as, upon 
analysis, it turns out that the notion of absolute simultaneity rests not on actual 
empirical principles but on abstractions, so does the idea that we can distinguish a 
center of mass in gravitational free-fall from one in inertial motion.  But if they 




relative to the center of mass can only be relative acceleration.  Choosing the center 
of mass as an inertial frame is only an arbitrary choice of a coordinate system.  The 
apparent inconsistency, from the Newtonian point of view, is that two frames can be 
seen as inertial and yet be in relative acceleration to each other.  Accepting the 
equivalence principle means implicitly accepting the notion of geodesic motion, 
where, “what is distinct about free-fall corresponds to what is distinct about gedesic 
trajectories: the only objectively distinguishable state of motion corresponds t  the 
only geometrically distinctive path in a generally covariant geometry” (DiSalle, 2006, 
pp. 131-2).  The apparent contradiction from the Newtonian framework is, under 




DiSalle’s overall thesis demonstrates a number of points about theory 
building.  Among the points that are made are broad arguments that previous 
philosophies have run roughshod over the more subtle issues involved, historically, in 
the evolution of space-time theories in physics.  In particular, DiSalle takes issue with 
the Kantian approach, with the logical positivists, and the Kuhnian perspective.  What 
DiSalle tries to draw out is that all of these philosophical approaches are too 
simplistic in their analysis of theory construction.  On the other hand, DiSalle is 
concerned to maintain the idea that philosophical analysis, at least in certai
situations, has a strong role to play in theory development.  It is just that that role has 




takes the existing theory and analyses its presuppositions in the face of contingent 
empirical facts that have arisen since the time of the theories’ original nception. 
The reason we have looked at DiSalle’s analysis in such depth, from Galileo 
through Einstein, is to demonstrate the consistent pattern of conceptual analysis i 
theory generation.  It also shows that this analysis specifically addresses only 
particular kinds of theories.  These are theories which serve as preconditions for the 
possibility of scientific knowledge by establishing a consistent conceptual framework 
that defines the meaning of empirical investigations under it.  In DiSalle’s 
investigation, the most fundamental of these are theories regarding space and time.  
There are, arguably, other framework theories, based on principles which serve to set 
the framework in which empirical questions can be asked.  Examples of such theories 
might be thermodynamics, and from the point of view of this paper, quantum 
mechanics.  Theories of space and time occupy a unique position, in that the level at 
which they function is so high that they must be constructed as framework theories.  
They establish the structure within which all physics operates.  This also explains the 
a priori character they seem to have, as recognized by Kant and the logical 
positivists.  The justification for such theories is not solely empirical, for they actually 
serve to define what counts as an empirical justification in the first place.  Th ories of 
space and time, as developed by Newton and Einstein, define the structure in terms of 
which the notions of causal interaction and measurable physical phenomena are 
meaningful.   
 Space-time theories, are going to be “framework” theories in the 




they are the ultimate class of all framework theories, setting up the conditions for 
doing any meaningful physics in the first place.  As we saw in Chapter 3, any 
framework theory will also be a principle theory, insofar as it is based on conditions 
or principles constitutive of that framework.  We see, therefore, that in the particular 
case of space-time theories such as Newton’s or Einstein’s, the principle theori s are 
in fact of a particularly foundational nature, and why.  These broad theories establish 
the structure on which other theories must be built.  There is, therefore, a connection 
between being a foundational theory and being a principle theory. 
4.4.1. Holism 
 Here we must pause to consider a significant objection, one which was also 
posed to the logical empiricists both by Einstein and Quine.  This is that there can be 
no principled distinction between those aspects of a theory which are constitutive and 
those parts which are empirical.  If this is the case, then it might put any foundati nal 
role that principle theories could play in jeopardy by collapsing any unique and vitl 
function they might fulfill. 
 Quine (1951) presents a view of holism which regards theories as a 
complicated conjunction of statements.  Therefore, in testing a hypothesis, we are
really testing the theory as a whole, since the hypothesis cannot be meaningfully 
tested in the absence of the rest of the theory. 
If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual 
statement – especially if it be a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the 
field.  Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which 
hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements which hold come what may.  Any 




in the system… Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision.  Revision 
even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying 
quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between such a shift and the 
shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstei Newton, or Darwin Aristotle? (Quine, 
1951, p. 40) 
This Quinean holism means, not only that any element of a theory is in principle 
revisable, but that any distinction between axioms of coordination/constitutive 
elements of a theory and axioms of coordination or empirical/factual elements of a 
theory is undermined.  In turn, this undermines the functional distinction between 
principle/framework and interactionist/constructive theories, since both must be part 
of a theory’s holistic structure and from a logical point of view on a par. 
 Although holism, and the idea that no hypothesis can be tested in isolation, 
has come to be known as the Duhem-Quine Thesis, Friedman (1994; 1999) notes that 
there are important differences between the holism of Duhem and that of Quine.  The 
logical empiricists did not fail to recognize the problem of holism from very ea ly on.  
While there is significant danger of lapsing into Quinean holism, whereby the 
distinction between conventional and factual is meaningless (as occurs with Schl ck’s 
conventionalism), this does not have to be the case, at least not immediately.  Carnap 
(1937) accepts Duhemian holism, that a hypothesis cannot be tested in isolation and 
that any statement in a theory, constitutive (L-rule) or empirical (P-rule), is open to 
revision.  However, he still maintains that there can be a distinction between L-rules 
and P-rules.  The difference is that in revising an L-rule the language of the theory is 
altered, whereas the revision of a P-rule does not change the language itself, but only




ability to hold onto the distinction between non-empirical statements and empirical 
ones, while accepting general revisability, is what marks the distinction between 
Duhemian holism and Quinean holism. 
 Howard (1994) explores the depth of the relationship between the thinking of 
the logical empiricists and Einstein.  This relationship traces back to the earliest 
attempts at expounding the logical empiricist program.  As we have noted, the 
development of logical empiricism was strongly encouraged by the advent of 
relativity theory.  Howard even suggests that it may have been Einstein who first 
floated the idea that the a priori character of some physical principles is better seen as 
conventional.  However, Einstein did see such conventions as necessary for science.  
He says, “[the conventional “categories”] appear to be a priori only insofar as 
thinking without the positing of categories and of concepts in general would be as 
impossible as breathing in a vacuum” (Einstein, 1949b, p. 674). 
 Where the logical empiricists and Einstein eventually departed was with 
Einstein’s much more holistic view.  As noted, choices in a priori principles are 
conventional.  Thus, the choice between a Euclidean geometrical structure and a non-
Euclidean structure as a theory’s a priori principles is determined, not empirically, 
but for pragmatic reasons.  The choice is more or less conventional.  However, 
Einstein’s conventionalism does not exist at this level alone.  It is also a matter of 
convention as to where one makes the division between which elements of a theory 
are a priori and which are a posteriori.  Carnap’s dissertation (1921) provides an 
example of this idea.  It is not only that there can be a choice among geometrical 




measuring rod.  It is also the case that one may instead choose to select one’s 
measuring rod by convention, thereby determining one’s spacetime metric.  Einstein’s 
position is that there is no in principle distinction between axioms of coordination and 
axioms of connection, or constitutive principles and empirical claims.  However, 
though there is no fixed line, one must be drawn in order to test a theory.  There must 
be constitutive principles, though what they are and how they must be chosen is not 
determined.  This necessary condition for testing is in line with Duhemian holism, in 
that only a theory as a whole has content and can be tested, and that any principle is 
open to revision.  Einstein provides a useful analogy: 
All that is necessary is to fix a set of rules, since without such rules the acquisition of 
knowledge in the desired sense would be impossible.  One may compare these rules with the 
rules of a game in which, while the rules themselves are arbitrary, it is their rigidity alone 
which makes the game possible. (Einstein, 1954a, p. 292) 
He follows this up saying, 
The question as to which of the propositions shall be considered as definitions and which as 
natural laws will depend largely upon the chosen representation.  It really becomes absolutely 
necessary to make this differentiation only when one examines the degree to which the whole 
system of concepts considered is not empty from the physical point of view. (1954a, p. 293) 
In other words, the axioms of coordination are arbitrarily chosen, and the distinction 
between axioms of coordination and axioms of connection is also arbitrarily drawn.14 
 Just as Friedman’s account of Carnap does, Einstein seems to thread the 
needle between Duhemian holism and Quinean holism, though leaning more towards 
Quine than did Carnap.  He does this by allowing that while there is no principled 
                                                
14
 A historical note: Howard (1994, pp. 97-98) notes that Einstein’s holism and its impact on 
verificationism as well as the distinction between analytic and synthetic predates the publication of 




distinction between constitutive principles and empirical ones, in practice the divide 
can and must be made.  However, we are not provided with much information on 
what this divide might consist in apart from mere psychology perhaps.  Carnap, as we 
saw, tries to spell it out in terms of the basic language of the theory.   
 I argue that the analysis provided by DiSalle provides a way to shed light on 
this issue.  I think that it can give us a robust enough picture of theory revision and 
structure to construct a viable option between the pitfalls presented by holism, Kuhn, 
and concerns regarding unwanted degrees of arbitrariness in theory formation.  We 
can in fact accept some degree of theoretical holism and even embrace it – that 
theories are only meaningful as a whole, and that there is no in principle distinction 
between constitutive principles and empirical ones.  However, we learn from DiSalle 
that contingent aspects of scientific progress mean that, upon serious conceptual 
analysis, certain concepts of the body of theory reveal themselves to be in conflict
either with the main body of the theory itself or with empirical facts which arise.  In 
principle, we could revise the theory anywhere so that it can absorb or adjust to this 
conflict.  However, we revise it where we see it (or where individuals like Newton or 
Einstein see it), and those conceptual locales become established as the defining or 
constitutive propositions in the body of the theory.  That is, while there is no strict 
determination of where theoretical revision occurs, it is deemed necessary that 
revision should occur for reasons of internal consistency, and there are plenty of 
reasons, given the particular contingent facts about the actual state of science at the 





 This is where the philosophical considerations DiSalle is concerned to 
demonstrate enter into the picture.  Recognizing that the theory as a whole is 
incomplete or internally inconsistent and determining not just what is easiest to 
revise, but even understanding how it might be revised, requires serious conceptual 
analysis of the theory from a standpoint, which to some extent, is outside of the 
theory itself.  This picture provides a response to the Kuhnian, since there is rational 
progression from one theory to the next.  For those involved in this process, there 
cannot be any incommensurability between the old framework and the new, since it
requires deep understanding the conceptual limitations of the old theory if we are to 
develop a new structure which is holistically sound.  We can also drop the need for a 
principled way to divide our theoretical language into two distinct parts, axioms of 
coordination and axioms of connection using Reichenbach’s terms.  We can see, 
however, that any concept revision will require non-empirically justified principles, to 
establish the meaning of the theory.  The epistemological divide is therefore rooted in 
the state of science and in the particular conceptual analysis that takes place.  Though 
conventional to a certain extent, there are good philosophical and contingent 
empirical reasons for choosing the conventions that get chosen.  This results in a sort
of structured holism. 
4.4.2. Unification and Explanation 
 From a holistic standpoint, lack of conceptual coherence represents a 
breakdown in meaning within a given theoretical structure.  Since a theory stands or 
falls in its entirety, any element of the theory which is incompatible with the rest 




may function successfully for a long time, perhaps indefinitely, with hidden 
underlying conceptual inadequacies.  This was the case with Newtonian physics for 
example.  As we saw, it operated with an implicit understanding of the notions of 
simultaneity and of the ability to distinguish inertial motion from gravitational 
motion.  For much of the long history of Newtonian physics, that these were not well 
defined simply did not matter.  However, contingent empirical discoveries made it 
clear that there were underlying conceptual inconsistencies that had to be resolv d for 
future science to be well defined.  Hence, in some circumstances involving 
foundational theories regarding notions like space, time, and causation, conceptual 
clarification becomes a necessary aspect of theory progression. 
 This also allows us to discuss more concretely the relationship between 
principle or framework theories and the unificationist program in scientific 
explanation of Friedman and Kitcher.  Unification by covering the most facts with the 
least argument patterns (Kitcher, 1989) is the product of bringing more phenomena 
under one theoretical structure.  Principle theories can offer explanation by 
unification in this sense as discusses in Chapter 3.  Principle theories can also have 
significant foundational merit in some cases because they establish the conceptual 
framework necessary for a theoretic structure with empirical meaning, by providing 
the preconditions for the explanation and understanding of phenomena that fall under 
the theory as established in this chapter.  That is, theories such as this are necessary 
for any explanation at all because they provide the conceptual framework.   
 We can also say something about the historical connection between 




apparent that a particular framework is in a state of crisis, it is becaus  of the 
emergence of phenomena unanticipated by it and about which the theory can say 
nothing.  That is, a problem becomes apparent because of disunity at the level of the 
phenomena, and the intractability of the problem can sometimes point to an 
underlying conceptual problem.  This is what Einstein was able to see.  In cases of 
where conceptual problems are resolved, it will often be that they are noticed because 
of problems with unification at the level of the phenomena.  Likewise, the resolution 
of their conceptual issues will often allow the possibility Friedman/Kitcher-type 
unification and explanation of the problematic phenomena.  We see this in the special 
theory of relativity.  The necessity of conceptual revision becomes evident because of 
the apparent conflict between Newtonian mechanics and Maxwellian 
electrodynamics.  Einstein’s analysis establishes the constitutive framwork defining 
a functioning concept of simultaneity and of spacetime.  The conceptual analysis 
allows for the unification of the fields of electrodynamics and mechanical dynmics. 
The tools necessary for evaluating the framework, of necessity, come from 
outside of it.  This requires a broader perspective, from which it is possible to 
reestablish a meaningful definition of those concepts necessary to do physics.  This 
was the case in developing Newtonian mechanics, special relativity, and general 
relativity.  This will often lead to the unification of new sets of phenomena.  This is a 
function of how the crisis presents itself.  For this unification to be possible, the 
conceptual framework must be such that the empirical terms employed are well 
defined.  This requires conceptual analysis according to which the principles that play 




 The concepts of the prevailing framework come up against empirical facts 
which do not fit.  As DiSalle, shows, philosophical analysis is then the vitally 
important tool in determining just what conceptual presuppositions are at stake and 
which are in conflict with the new physics.  This in turn leads to further analysis as to 
how to carry on by resolving the apparent inconsistencies.  As a procedural fact, at 
least historically, this analysis comes at a time of crisis, which highlights the problem.  




In summary, some types of theories are necessary as the preconditions 
necessary for defining empirical measurement and hence, the preconditions for 
scientific or empirical explanation.  The most obvious, and perhaps only clear 
historical, example of this is found in space-time theories, hence their special 
relevance in the history and philosophy of physics.  These theories are framework 
theories in Flores’ sense.  They establish the framework within which other theories 
can be formulated and within which questions can be asked with the possibility of 
getting empirically meaningful answers.  Thus it is necessary that, as both Kant and 
the positivists realized, these theories must have an a priori character that is not based 
strictly on empirical discovery since they define the nature of that empirical 
discovery.  Therefore, these theories are constructed in part via a process similar to 
definition.  As definitions they are, therefore, principles restricting the meaning of 




formed when it becomes the case that we need a new constitutive framework, when 
the old framework becomes insufficient in light of empirical discoveries that 
eventually come to be seen as falling outside the scope of that conceptual structure.  
The principles arise, as a matter of fact, from the necessity of resolving conceptual 
conflict.  Framework theories of this foundational type are generated out of a need to 
resolve conceptual conflict.  “This interpretive aspect of the laws of physics is the 
source of their a-priori and seemingly unrevisable character; their actual revisability 
reflects what a stringent requirement it is upon such a theory, that it be capable of 
bringing the relevant phenomena within its interpretive grasp.” (DiSalle, 2006, p. 
161)  In other words, the crisis arises from conceptual conflict or lack of coherence 
and this drives the need for conceptual analysis and revision. 
To reiterate, we are talking about a small class of theories.  This is not mean
to be an explication of all physical theories or a general philosophy of science.  I  
Chapter 3 we saw that both principle theories and constructive theories aim at 
explanation, but the mode of explanation defines the distinction.  Principle theories 
explain by way of unification.  The upper-level type of theory that we have been 
looking at in this chapter works at the conceptual level and established the 
preconditions for explanation via unification.  To clarify, these upper-level theories, 
such as those discussed involving space and time, must be principle theories.  Their 
purpose is to define the conceptual structure of physics.  Recall that a call for the 
interpretation of some theory often stems from some explanatory failure.  Therefore, a 
principle theory that succeeds from an interpretational standpoint will fulfill a suit ble 




constituting the explanatory framework itself.  The theories we have been looking at 
in this chapter fulfill this function through the resolution of conceptual conflict and 
hence the establishment of preconditions for scientific explanation.  As DiSalle says,  
When we ask how the principles of a theory are to be interpreted, or how the structure 
associated with a theory is to be interpreted, we have already lost sight of the genuine content 
of those principles.  For the principles are not, after all, purely formal principles in need of 
interpretation; rather, they are themselves principles of interpretation. (DiSalle, 2006, p. 160) 
The foundational conceptual work in these theories is the deepest and most basic 
precondition for explanation, of increasing understanding, by conceptual revision to 
formulate a coherent whole out of previously inconsistent conceptual parts, thereby 
establishing an explanatory framework. 
Once again, to remind ourselves of where we are, recall that our aim in 
continuing this line of investigation is to determine the viability of using the 
developments of quantum information theory to solve the interpretational problems 
historically attending quantum mechanics.  We have ruled out certain types of 
approaches which this perspective might seem to engender, namely the instrumental 
approach of subjective Bayesian quantum mechanics and any sort of ontic or 
constructive approach using information.  This still leaves the possibility of 
developing a principle theory along the lines laid out by Einstein. 
One such approach has been carried out by CBH and further by Bub.  We saw 
in the last chapter that it could not be seen as unifying in the sense of Kitcher and 
Friedman.  Do the information-theoretic principles presented allow the conceptual 
analysis necessary for developing an interpretation of quantum mechanics 




not.  Among the central concepts which sit at the center of the storm are those of 
measurement and causation.  Like space and time, these concepts are among the most
fundamental and basic for the understanding of empirical science.  Therefore, like in 
the case of theories of space and time, a clear and consistent conceptual scheme 
regarding these notions must be in place prior to any other physical science.  The 
constitutive approach along the lines outlined by DiSalle is thus entirely appropriate.   
The CBH approach, however, does not establish for these concepts any clearer 
meaning, reconciling somehow the intuitive th ory of measurement and causality 
which fails to meet the intuitive criterion of measurement and causality.  The 
argument is that if the information-theoretic principles hold, measuring instruments 
must ultimately be viewed as information sources, or as black boxes.  In the sense 
that it does any analysis, it seems to be an argument for instrumentalism.  If the 
principle of the constancy of light is constitutive of the notion of simultaneity by 
revising that concept such that it must be a relative description, then the no-cloning 
principle restricts the concept of measuring instrument such that quantum mechanics 
must ultimately be only about prediction and can say nothing of how measurement 
results come about.  This is essentially the argument for complementarity couched in 
information-theoretic terms.  Unless somehow there is some ontological role for 
information, the no-cloning principle is equivalent to the claim that the structure of 
quantum mechanics is non-commutative.  So this is not a new argument that quantum 
mechanics is best seen as instrumentalist.  The information-theoretic aspect of th  




Leaning on the analogy with special relativity a bit further, the principles of 
special relativity are constitutive of the concept of simultaneity and thereby of a 
coherent notion of time, space, and motion.  There is a principled derivation behind 
this definition of simultaneity.  And we can accept this principled reason because 
without it there is no coherent framework.  This is not the case for CBH.  We might 
think that because there is a principled argument for instrumentalism, that the same 
sort of thing is being done.  One reason that this is not the case is that the 
information-theoretic principles, as such, are not doing any work which the structure 
of quantum mechanics does not already provide.  The no-cloning principle implies 
instrumentalism.  But the non-commutivity of quantum mechanics implies 
instrumentalism in just the same way.  But I take it that there is supposed to b  
something additional going on by using information-theoretic principles.  It is not 
clear what this is. 
There is something of a self-supporting, or circular character to Einstein’s 
argument.  Normally this might be considered a bad thing, but as we have seen, it is a 
fundamental aspect of constitutive principle theories.  It is also what is lack ng in the 
CBH approach.  The structure of the argument seems to be the following: Quantum 
mechanics can be axiomatized by some set of information-theoretic principles.  If this 
set of principles is true of the world (as they appear to be), then quantum mechanics is 
best seen as an instrumentalist theory (along with the specific details of the theory).  I 
take it that the overall CBH objective is to establish not just the consequent of this 
conditional, but also the further conclusion that the antecedent is the best 




the argument for special relativity.  If its two postulates are true of the world (as we 
have reason to believe they are), then the concept of simultaneity must be a relative 
one (along with the specific details of the theory).  But there is more going on here.  
To this we add that if the concept of simultaneity is not understood in this way, then 
there is no clear meaning of essential empirical terms such as space, time, and 
motion.  Therefore, we ought to accept these principles since they are constitutive of 
this concept of simultaneity.  The justification for the principles is that they are 
constitutive in a way that is necessary for establishing the meaning of physical 
concepts and an explanatory framework. 
The CBH argument does not seem to have this feedback loop which is vital 
for a constitutive principle theory.  The objection does not rest simply on the fact that 
the principles imply instrumentalism and that is objectionable (though I think that it
is).  The objection is that the analogy with special relativity does not hold up.  There
is not the additional constitutive aspect such that if instruments are not considered 
black boxes, then there is no clear meaning of the relevant empirical terms.  That is, it 
is necessary to understand instruments as black boxes just as it is necessary to have 
this new conception of simultaneity for the sake of providing a well 
definedconceptual framework.  The issue is indeed how to understand concepts like 
measurement and causation in quantum mechanics, but the argument here does not 
seem to go any way towards proving any conceptual insight.  The approach 
establishes it a as postulate of the theory that these are irresolvable concepts.  It may 
be that this is the best way to see quantum mechanics; that Bohr was always right.  




special relativity or Newton’s laws of motion which justify those principles.  At the 
end of the argument, the troublesome concepts are no less so.  So there is no reason, 
as there is for special relativity, to accept the principles as constitutive in a way that 
clears up interpretive issues.  And because the principles are not constitutive, there is 
no more reason to prefer them as the basis for an argument that measuring 
instruments are ultimately black boxes over that given according to the Copenhagen 
interpretation.  That is, the information-theoretic aspect is not operational in any
justification for instrumentalism, if there is one. 
The conclusion of this discussion will need to wait until the next chapter 
where an important extension of the CBH program advanced by Bub and Pitowsky 
(2007) is discussed.  We are in a better position now to offer insight into how this 
strategy, of developing a principle theory around quantum mechanics, could be 
successful.  Likewise, the language of quantum information theory does seem to be 
an ideal candidate for attempting this, in the same way that the development of non-
Euclidean geometries provided a language and broader framework within which 
Einstein could develop a theory of relativity.  So while the CBH program itself is not 
successful, it does point the way to a potential framework, or how to find one.  The 








In a recent paper by Bub and Pitowsky (2007), the authors pursue the analogy 
between quantum mechanics interpreted as quantum information theory and special 
relativity.  As in Bub (2004a; 2004b), quantum mechanics is presented as a principle 
theory, but the emphasis is shifted away from the direct implications of being a 
principle theory.  Instead, the primary lesson to be taken from special relativity nd its 
success is the explanatory structure it offers, which is seen as specifically due to a 
shift from a dynamic viewpoint to a kinematic one.  It is this shift which is taken to 
make special relativity preferable over Lorentzian dynamics.  The projct f r Bub and 
Pitowsky is to make a similar shift in quantum mechanics, thus offering a realistic 
information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics.   
The Bub and Pitowsky paper works on a number of levels.  In the broadest 
sense, it offers a comparison between various interpretations of quantum mechanics, 
specifically between the Oxford Everett view and Bub and Pitowsky’s new 
information-theoretic position, with somewhat less emphasis on contrasts with Bohm 
and GRW.  The problem for quantum mechanics is defined in terms of two 
measurement problems, the big measurement problem and the small measurement 
problem.  The big measurement problem is the standard measurement problem 




to account for the classical characteristics of the macroworld given its quantum 
underpinnings.  The small measurement problem is more easily dealt with using a 
physical solution by appealing to the process of decoherence.  Essentially, the authors
argue, the big measurement problem arises when one adheres to what they call the 
two dogmas of quantum mechanics.  These two dogmas consist in 1) the demand for 
complete dynamical analysis of a measurement and 2) the insistence that th quantum 
state has ontological significance representing what is true and false in the world.  If 
we can reject these two dogmas, then the traditional measurement problem in its two 
distinct forms goes away.  It seems that the main project of the paper is to show how 
it is possible to reject the two dogmas without thereby falling into instrumentalism.  It 
is here that the analogy between the information-theoretic approach to quantum 
mechanics and special relativity comes in to play.  The argument is that the 
explanatory structure of special relativity which makes it uniquely successful in 
contrast to Lorentz’s dynamical theory can be mirrored in quantum mechanics by 
undertaking a shift from a dynamical perspective to a kinematic one, and that this 
allows the rejection of the two dogmas, while at the same time maintaining a realist 
position, as is done in special relativity. 
Like the argument for a principle theory approach to quantum mechanics, this 
view offers a similar and related meta-theoretical shift, though instead of focusing on 
the principle/constructive theory distinction, the focus is on the distinction between 
the structure of kinematic explanation and dynamical explanation.  It is necessary that 
we investigate this conceptual shift to see how it works and whether or not it is 




The strategy is related to the principle theory approach, but it again misses the 
underlying significance which is foundationally relevant in special relativity but still 
seems to be lacking here.   
 The significant shift which takes place in this information-theoretic 
interpretation is to the kinematic perspective.  This is a powerful theoretical sh ft, but 
the significance behind it is missed both by Bub and Pitowsky, and by Janssen, whose 
work on special relativity motivates much of the work done here.  For Janssen 
(Janssen, 2002; 2007), the kinematic stance that special relativity has makes that 
theory superior to Lorentz’s precisely because it offers what he calls a common origin 
inference structure, whereas Lorentz’s theory must accept the Lorentz invariance of 
completely different kind of forces as an unexplained coincidence.  While the 
quantum information-theoretic interpretation takes the kinematic perspective, it do s 
not result in a similar type of common origin inference.  Moreover, I think there are 
compelling reasons to think that there are deeper issues involved with special 
relativity than simply being able to postulate a structure that can act as a common 
origin.  Its particular foundational strength is indeed unifying in nature, but it stems 
from the conceptual work it does to clarify the physical terms out of which we 






5.2. Bub and Pitowsky’s Overall Picture 
5.2.1. Layout: Two Dogmas; Two Problems 
The structure of the issue for Bub and Pitowsky is that the traditional 
problems associated with quantum mechanics, on a foundational level, can be recast 
and made distinct by considering the separate concerns of the big and the small 
measurement problems.  The big measurement problem in the words of the authors is 
“the problem of explaining how measurements can have definite outcomes, given the 
unitary dynamics of the theory: it is the problem of explaining how individual 
measurement outcomes come about dynamically” (Bub & Pitowsky, 2007, p. 5).  
When one thinks of the standard and intractable measurement problem of quantum 
mechanics, as famously illustrated in Schrödinger’s cat problem, this is the problm.  
In its standard representation, the problem gets started with the linearity of the wave 
function.  The quantum state of the system to be measured and that of the measuring 
instrument become coupled according to Schrödinger’s equation when they interact.  
A system which is in a superposition of the states to be measured will become 
entangled, because of the linearity of Schrödinger’s equation, with the measuring 
instrument.  Thus we have a state which is not in either of the possible measurement 
outcome states.  Of course this is not what is observed.  When the experiment is 
complete, we observe either one or the other outcome. 
The small measurement problem is “the problem of accounting for our 
familiar experience of a classical or Boolean macroworld, given the non-Boolean 
character of the underlying quantum event space: it is the problem of explaining the 




measurement outcomes in a quantum measurement process” (Bub & Pitowsky, 2007, 
p. 5).  This problem is basically that of explaining how the macroworld arises out of 
the quantum world.  How is it that we observe classical objects rather than entangld 
objects?  This is taken to be a genuine problem, but one which is comparatively easy 
to resolve with a physical solution, namely decoherence.  The authors are more 
concerned with the big measurement problem, though solving the small measurement 
problem does have a role to play in their overall program.  From a theoretical 
standpoint, if the small measurement problem can be solved in the context of this 
information-theoretic approach, it can be solved to just the same extent using the 
same dynamical basis of decoherence in other interpretations.   However, just as 
Oxford Everettians use decoherence as a fundamental constituent in their theory, Bub 
and Pitowsky utilize decoherence to buttress the analogy between their approach and 
that taken in special relativity.  As we shall see, decoherence, and the resolution f the 
small measurement problem, is taken to be a proof of the completeness of the 
information-theoretic approach, and so evidence for its viability. 
The big measurement problem is, of course, the perennial foundational issue 
in quantum mechanics which has persisted now nearly a century.  It is also the 
impetus for the plethora of interpretations of quantum mechanics.  Traditionally, the 
standard interpretation is characterized by the Copenhagen interpretation.  It is ot a 
straightforward historical task to describe the components of the Copenhagen 
interpretation and authors disagree on its fundamental tenets.  Nevertheless, we can 
say that the “collapse” of the wavefunction is an accepted principle.  This is the idea 




upon observation.  The wavefunction itself is seen as a device for making 
probabilistic predictions, but not as representing any ontological state in the world.  
As we have discussed, other interpretations have since been put forth.  Among these 
are hidden variable solutions such as that offered by Bohm, wavefunction collapse 
theories such as GRW, and many-worlds interpretations such as Everett.  None of the 
interpretations of quantum mechanics is without its share of philosophical problems 
and detractors. 
The persistence of the measurement problem is due to the acceptance of what 
Bub and Pitowsky have called the two dogmas of quantum mechanics.  That is, if we 
accept these two dogmas or assumptions, perhaps only implicitly, it is inevitabl th t 
we will run up against the big measurement problem.  The first dogma is attributed to 
John Bell (1990) and it is that “measurement should never be introduced as a 
primitive process in a fundamental mechanical theory like classical or quantum 
mechanics, but should always be open to complete analysis, in principle, of how the 
individual outcomes come about dynamically” (Bub & Pitowsky, 2007, p. 5).   
I think that this dogma is based on perceived conceptual constraints regarding 
the concept of measurement itself.  Bell’s warning in the referenced work is 
concerned with the use of the very word “measurement” in discussions about 
foundational issues in quantum mechanics.  His concerns are twofold.  The first 
worry with the term “measurement” is that it “anchors [in quantum mechanics] the 
shifty split of the world into ‘system’ and ‘apparatus’” (Bell J. S., 1990, p. 34).  The 
second worry is that the use of the word “measurement” imports all sorts of meanings 




In particular, the term “measurement” connotes the idea that the result tell  us 
something about what was there prior to the measurement, about some pre-existing 
property of the object which the measurement uncovers for us.  This is a warning 
against using measurement as a primitive in quantum theory. 
The second dogma has to do with what the quantum state is interpreted as 
representing.  It is that “the quantum state has an ontological significance analogous 
to the ontological significance of the classical state as the ‘truthmaker’ for 
propositions about the occurrence and non-occurrence of events, i.e., that the 
quantum state is a representation of physical reality” (Bub & Pitowsky, 2007, p. 5). It 
is not surprising that the quantum state came to be seen this way, arising as it did 
from classical mechanics, where there is no problem viewing the state as a description 
of the world, and indeed it is natural to do so.  The classical state is a description of 
the properties of particles, and whether or not this description is true or false is 
determined by the actual existence of particles with those properties in the world. 
The two dogmas are not to be given up lightly.  That is, one is not simply 
being stubborn or naive in adhering to them.  On both philosophical grounds and 
theoretical ones, the two dogmas are not illegitimate concerns.  In particular, if one is 
concerned about problems of realism it might appear that the dogmas are indeed 
indispensible to quantum mechanics and any physical theory.  That is, on the face of 
it, the two dogmas appear to be essentially realistic principles required to avoid 
sinking into instrumentalism.   
The main thrust of this paper by Bub and Pitowsky is then not simply to point 




reject them.  One could easily take this step and thereby concede that quantum 
mechanics is a purely instrumental theory.  The primary goal for Bub and Pitowsky 
must be to show, having recognized these two implicit assumptions, how we can in 
fact reject the two dogmas of quantum mechanics and still maintain a realist position 
in regards to the theory of quantum mechanics.  In order to do this, the apparent need 
for realism to adhere to the two dogmas must be shown to be unwarranted, or they 
must be significantly revised or replaced.  The authors also have an interest in 
showing that their resolution, in rejecting the two dogmas, is superior to a solution to 
the measurement problem given by an interpretation of quantum mechanics that 
accepts the two dogmas. 
In order to see how Bub and Pitowsky argue that it both possible, and 
preferable, to reject the two dogmas, we must first see how the two dogmas lead to 
the measurement problem.  The second dogma, that the quantum state has an 
ontological significance, sets us up for the measurement problem.  If we take the 
quantum state to have such ontological significance, then, in conjunction with the 
linear dynamics of the quantum mechanics, we must deal with the problem of 
explaining how the world goes from this state – which, quantum mechanically, can in 
general be described as an entangled state between the system being measured and 
the measuring device, and which, according to the second dogma, we take to say 
something real about the world – to a state with the definite outcomes which we 
experience as resulting from measurements.  In particular, the ontological status of 
the classical state is that it divides the world into events that do take place and those 




may, in general, be in a superposition of states.  This system, upon interacting with 
the measurement device becomes entangled with that device, thereby leading to a 
state in which the measuring device is in a superposition of the possible outcome 
states.  This is of course something we never experience.  In the case of Schrödinger’s 
cat, not only is it something we do not experience, but what it might mean to say that 
the cat is in a superposition between being a live cat and a dead cat seems 
inconceivable. 
There are various solutions to this big measurement problem, as we have seen 
and discussed.  One option is to remain an instrumentalist about quantum theory, and 
understand the theory as a purely predictive instrument telling us nothing about the 
world.  This is a direct rejection of the notion that the quantum state represents some 
ontological aspect of the world, i.e. the second dogma.  Motivated by the desire to 
avoid instrumentalism, many interpretations have therefore accepted the second 
dogma because of the link between its rejection and instrumentalism.  Furthermore, it 
seems that the particular form which the solutions to the resulting measurement 
problem have taken has been more or less dictated by a motivation to adhere to the 
first dogma, that is, to give a dynamical account of measurement.  It does not seem 
that the first dogma leads to the measurement problem as such, but it has constrained 
the solutions offered to it by necessitating a dynamical explanation for this “collapse” 
upon measurement.  Once the measurement problem is established by accepting the 
second dogma, if one also maintains the first dogma, then solutions to the 





It may also be that the second dogma must be rejected to solve the small 
measurement problem.  The small problem is how to account for the experience of a 
classical event space given the more basic quantum structure of the world.  The 
proposed solution to this problem relies on the physical process of decoherence.  In 
this process the interaction of the microsystem being measured, the macro-measuring 
device, and the environment are all taken into account.  Dynamically, what happens is 
that the portions of the quantum state of this system that interfere with one another 
very rapidly become very small compared with the diagonal elements of the density 
operator for the system.  This diagonalization essentially creates an emergent Boolean 
structure of macro-events which remains stable.  If this is to work as a solution to the 
small measurement problem, we cannot treat the quantum state as having ontological 
significance.  Otherwise, we still have a quantum state, where, though effectively 
diagonalized to a preferred basis, this diagonalization remains only effective as trace 
elements of superposition remain.  Nor is an outcome selected, only an emergent 
Boolean event space.  This may simply mean that one must solve the big 
measurement problem in order to solve the small problem. 
Working backwards, the problem for Bub and Pitowsky is to argue that the 
first dogma – that measurements must open to complete analysis – can be rejected.  
Indeed, they argue it must be.  For this, there are two reasons.  The first is that the 
dynamical solutions to the big measurement problem which have been proposed are 
philosophically unsatisfactory, and much has been said on this subject in the 
literature.  To a large extent, the proposed solutions cover the apparent space of 




dynamically.  This might lead one to suspect that no satisfactory solution can be 
forthcoming and that therefore the first dogma is inappropriate.   
More importantly, and centrally for the program of Bub and Pitowsky, the 
particular basis for resolving the big measurement problem dictates that the first 
dogma be given up.  This then seems to lead back to the big measurement problem; 
but now, having rejected the first dogma there can be no dynamical solution to it, nor 
ought there to be one.  To escape the big measurement problem, therefore, we must 
reject the second dogma – that the quantum state must be taken to have some sort of 
ontological significance.  In other words, if any dynamical solution to the big 
measurement problem is in principle barred, then the only way to “solve” the big 
measurement problem is to avoid getting into it altogether.  Since adherence to the 
second dogma leads to the measurement problem, the only way to avoid the problem 
is to also reject the second dogma.   
But how to do this without descending into instrumentalism?  The purpose 
behind the Bub and Pitowsky paper is to answer this question.  The problem, as 
touched on earlier, is that the second, as well as the first, dogma seems integral to 
maintaining a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.  The first dogma sees
philosophically and epistemologically an inherent request for a realist scientifi  
theory as a condition for measurability.  Measurement is that key component of 
science which connects our theories of the world to the world itself.  Though there is 
certainly no single accepted definition of what it is to be a realistic scientific theory, 
in general, it means that our theories in some way reflect an actual physical world and 




science interacts with that world.  If Bell is correct, the term “measurment” implies 
objective reality in the sense that it means uncovering and perhaps quantifying 
something that was already there in some manner, separate from whatever is doing 
the measuring.  Linked with this idea is the notion that measurement acts as an 
accurate and objective reflection of this physical reality.  Therefore, it mus be open 
to a causal analysis or this connection becomes tenuous.  Indeed one definition of the 
anti-realist approach to measurement is conventionalism.  A standard definition of 
conventionalism is that “measurement procedures do not provide evidence of 
quantities that exist independently of our efforts to measure” (Trout, 2001, p. 271).  
Later: “The realist account of measurement treats the act of measurement as a product 
of a causal relation between an instrument (broadly interpreted) and a magnitude” 
(Trout, 2001, p. 272).  A realist interpretation of a theory seems to require that there 
be a relation of dependence between real physical conditions and measurement 
outcomes.  Thus, given the factors in this assumption, the dependence must be based 
on a causal relationship between the world and the measuring instrument.  If physics, 
as a realist endeavor, is to describe the world, then on this view, this causal 
relationship must also be open to analysis. 
The second dogma flows from classical mechanics where the classical state is 
taken to represent facts about the world.  In this context, this is almost a definitional 
statement of what realism is.  Physical theories, under realistic criteria, are supposed 
to tell us something about the world, something beyond the fact that certain 
regularities hold.  Realism just is the idea that some part of the theory genuinely 




If one asks what is characteristic of the realm of physical ideas independently of the quantum-
theory, then above all the following attracts our attention: the concepts of physics refer to a 
real external world, i.e., ideas are posited of things that claim a “real existence” independent 
of the perceiving subject (bodies, fields, etc.), and these ideas are, on the one hand, brought 
into as secure a relationship as possible with sense impressions. (Einstein, 1971, p. 321)   
It is the role of the concepts in our theories to, as far as possible, be about things in 
the world. 
These concerns of Einstein’s are also related to concerns about giving up the 
first dogma, that measurement be open to complete dynamical analysis.  Einstein 
continues, 
Moreover, it is characteristic of these physical things that they are conceived of as being 
arranged in a space-time continuum.  Further, it appe rs to be essential for this arrangement of 
the things introduced in physics that, at a specific time, these things claim an existence 
independent of one another, insofar as these things “lie in different parts of space.”  Without 
such an assumption of the mutually independent exisence (the “being-thus”) of spatially 
distant things, an assumption which originates in everyday thought, physical thought in the 
sense familiar to us would not be possible.  Nor does ne see how physical laws could be 
formulated and tested without such a clean separation. (1971, p. 321) 
Also, 
[I]f one renounces the assumption that what is present in different parts of space has an 
independent, real existence, then I do not at all see what physics is supposed to describe. For 
what is thought to by a ‘system’ is, after all, just conventional, and I do not see how one is 
supposed to divide up the world objectively so thatone can make statements about the parts.  
(Einstein 1969, 223-4, trans. by Howard 2004) 
For Einstein, we see that his criteria for objectivity are conditions for reality.  




be underwritten by a world where there exists the possibility of separability and 
locality.  Thus, objectivity is a metaphysical condition.  In a strong sense, this is put 
forth like a Kantian necessary a priori principle which is necessary for doing physics. 
One can categorize the various proposed solutions to the measurement 
problem according to how they answer the aspects of the problem by addressing the 
assumptions regarding the linearity of quantum mechanics, that the dynamics of 
quantum mechanics is linear, or the eigenvalue/eigenstate link, that only eigenstates 
with probability 1 or 0 are determinate.  The various interpretations can also be 
categorized in terms of how they relate to the two dogmas suggested by Bub and 
Pitowsky.  For the most part, interpretations of quantum mechanics can be divided 
into two classes: First are those which deny the second dogma, such as the 
Copenhagen interpretation, which remain consciously instrumental.  On the other 
hand, there are those that accept that the quantum state describes, in some sense, what 
the world is like analogous to the way the classical state does.  This is to accept the 
second dogma according to Bub and Pitowsky.  This is true of the Bohmian and 
GRW approaches as well as the Everettian approach to quantum mechanics.  This 
then of course leads straight to the big measurement problem.  All of these 
interpretations attempt to resolve the problem in a way which brings to the fore a 
dynamic solution in some way.  For the Bohmians and GRW, this involves adding 
structure to quantum mechanics, which provides a dynamical explanation for 
measurement outcomes, thus implicitly accepting the first dogma.  Everettians avoid 
the big measurement problem by claiming that all possible outcomes do in fact occur, 




be explained.  Workable versions of this interpretation rely on the dynamics of 
decoherence to account for the meaning of probabilities in a quantum universe where 
all possible outcomes do occur. 
Though the argument does not seem to be made explicit in Bub and Pitowsky, 
it is clear that we are supposed to take these other interpretations as being inadequate.  
Part of this comes, I think, from the latent sense that their problems have not been 
overcome as a matter of historical fact, and that they open up equally unclear 
philosophical questions in addition to the ones they purport to solve.  This discussion 
has been well documented in nearly all of the literature involving the philosophy of 
quantum mechanics from its inception onwards. 
Bub and Pitowsky try to shed light on this discussion by putting it into the 
context of looking at these solutions as similar to the solutions offered by Lorentz to 
the problems developing between Newtonian mechanics and electromagnetism.  The 
Lorentzian theory explained or accounted for the discrepancy using the contracti  
hypothesis.  This theory has often been viewed in light of the challenge to it put forth 
by Einstein’s theory of special relativity.  For the most part, special relativity is 
perceived as the correct account of the phenomena while Lorentz’s, though 
empirically adequate, has since been judged as inadequate by contrast.  Standard 
reasons given for this inadequacy appeal to notions of the theory being ad hoc or by 
diagnosing the problem as a failure to recognize that Newtonian spacetime was 
simply ill-defined without a clear definition of simultaneity. 
For Bub and Pitowsky, as we shall see, the essential difference between 




explanation fails on philosophical grounds.  Similarly, the authors trace the problems 
with other interpretations of quantum mechanics to this failure to make the shift to a 
kinematic framework.  So in a manner analogous to the way in which Lorentzian 
dynamics fails against Einstein’s special theory of relativity, other int pretations of 
quantum mechanics fail in comparison with the information-theoretic interpretation.   
More will be said on this later. 
5.2.2. Treatment 
The basis of the Bub/Pitowsky program is the recognition of, and the 
elevation of, an apparent empirical regularity to the status of fundamental priciple.  
This is the “no cloning” principle carried over from CBH.  This approach is done 
explicitly in the mode of special relativity.  Acceptance of the no cloning princi le 
immediately requires the denial of the first dogma.  The no cloning principle, or more 
accurately the “no broadcasting” principle, is essentially a no-go theorem which
disallows the existence of a universal cloning machine, and which functions in a 
manner similar to the way the second law of thermodynamics prohibits the existnce 
of a perpetual motion machine of the second kind or the way the light postulate 
imposes universal limitations on the velocity of light. 
An important consequence of the no cloning theorem is that it implies that 
there is an inherent loss of information in a measurement process, regardless of th  
dynamics of that process.  It also follows from this that in principle there can be no 
complete dynamical account of the transition which takes place in a quantum 
measurement process.  (For more on the no cloning principle and what it entails see 




measurement should always be open to complete dynamical analysis.  The no cloning 
principle directly contradicts this possibility.  Therefore, if the no cloning principle in 
fact holds for our world, then the first dogma ust be rejected. 
Essentially, if we accept the no cloning principle, and must thereby deny any 
dynamic account of quantum measurement, then we are left in an irresolvable 
position if we accept the second dogma – that the quantum state has an ontological 
significance.   This is because, as we saw above, if the second dogma is accepted, 
then we are forced into the big measurement problem.  However, without access to 
any dynamic explanation to account for the apparent transition from a superposed 
quantum state to the actual outcomes we observe, as dictated by the no cloning 
principle, the big measurement problem becomes impossible to solve.  The “collapse” 
can only be viewed as impossible to analyze further.  This is the instrumentalist 
Copenhagen interpretation.  Therefore, if the no cloning principle holds, we are 
forced to reject, in some manner, the second dogma as well as the first if we are to 
avoid this consequence. 
This is what is dictated by the no cloning theorem.  It also seems to be the 
case that the authors argue that it has been the non-recognition of this principle in a 
clear way which has led to the measurement problem.15  If we reject the two dogmas, 
both because they underlie the measurement problem, and because the no cloning 
principle, if accepted, requires their rejection, then the big measurement problem is 
merely a pseudo-problem.  I take this to mean that an alteration in perspective or in 
our conceptual framework ameliorates the impact of the problem, resolving it by 
                                                
15 I think that it could be argued that it was articulated by Bohr early on.  At the time, however, it was 
far less clear why this should be accepted as a fundamental principle until other avenues had been 




avoiding it, rather than attempting to take it on and solve it with a dynamical solution 
which adequately explains it. 
In order to reach this view, we must reject the notion that the quantum state 
has some sort of ontological significance, in particular, a significance like that 
generally associated with the classical state, which we take to represent the actual 
position and momentum of particles in the real world.  Bub and Pitowsky therefore 
take the quantum state to be “a derived entity, a credence function that assigns 
probabilities to events in alternative Boolean algebras associated with the outcomes 
of alternative measurement outcomes” (Bub & Pitowsky, 2007, p. 15).  In Chapter 2, 
I argued that an approach looking quite similar to this, that of Fuchs, who also denies 
the ontological significance of the quantum state, but who instead sees it as a function 
of our subjective beliefs regarding measurement outcomes, must ultimately be 
understood to be an instrumentalist theory.  The question is: is there anything 
different going on here?  Where is realism going to enter the picture on the 
information-theoretic interpretation? 
Another way to put the question is to ask why we should accept this 
information-theoretic position over, for example, an Everettian or Bohmian one?  We 
might instead reject the no cloning principle as fundamental, and thereby have room 
to develop a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.  So why should we accept 
this principle as fundamental? 
The answer to this question is a proposed conceptual shift suggested by 
following the no cloning principle to its logical conclusions.  Doing so not only 




alternative solution to the problem of instrumentalism.  The theoretical holism of this 
approach, if it works, lends it strength, as happens in the case of special relativity.  
Elevating the light postulate to a fundamental principle does a number of things 
simultaneously.  It acknowledges an empirical regularity that seems to hold in all 
known circumstances; accepting it rejects the unexplained hypothesized dynamical 
phenomena of Lorentz contraction; and following it to its logical conclusion offers 
the solution to the problems at hand in the special theory of relativity and the 
structure of Minkowski spacetime.  Specifically, no cloning indicates, like the lig t 
postulate does for Einstein, that the correct explanatory posture in the relevant th ory 
is kinematic and not dynamic.  Accepting no cloning requires the shift (by forcing out 
the two dogmas), but on same grounds offers the resolution by providing the grounds 
for a realistic interpretation by providing the structure of the proposed kinematic 
framework.  In this sense, it is argued that the information-theoretic approach is 
analogous to special relativity, and that it is likewise the preferable theory or 
interpretation as opposed others on offer, specifically those offering a purely dynamic 
solution. 
Bub and Pitowsky draw on an analysis of special relativity by Janssen 
(2007).16  Janssen argues that the fundamental shift which special relativity brought t 
bear on the apparent inconsistencies between Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell’s 
equations was an explanatory shift away from dynamics to a kinematic framework. 
The contrast most relevant is with the dynamical explanations offered by 
Lorentz to explain the inability to experimentally observe any aether shift.  Lorentz 
posits a kind of intermolecular interaction, which is brought on by moving through 
                                                




the aether, in just such a way that material bodies would contract to the extent tha  
would exactly compensate for the expected light shift in moving through the aether, 
thereby accounting for any null result.  This explanation was viewed as inadequate by 
Einstein, who with the principle of relativity and the light postulate accounted for 
these phenomena with special relativity.  The theory of special relativity suggests that 
the correct way to see physical interactions is as taking place in Minkowski spacetime 
as opposed to the Euclidean space and time of Newtonian physics.  In making this 
shift, there is no longer the need for any dynamical explanation of phenomena such as 
length contraction and time dilation.  Instead, these phenomena are simply considered 
to be consequences of the kinematic structure imposed on all physics by the 
framework of Minkowski spacetime. 
Just as the principle of relativity and the light postulate constrain the 
geometrical structure of spacetime to Minkowski spacetime, so the no cloning (or no 
broadcasting) principle and no superluminal signaling principle impose probabilistic 
constraints on the correlations between events.  This can be represented by the 
projective geometry of Hilbert space structure.  The structure of the problems for 
special relativity and quantum mechanics are then strikingly similar.  There appear to 
be deep problems or inconsistencies and so dynamical solutions are proposed (e.g. 
Lorentz or Bohm/GRW/Everett).  There appear to be empirical regularities, once 
recognized, from which the structure behind the phenomena can be derived.  If these 
are elevated to fundamental principles, they offer a structure through which to 
interpret the phenomena.  In particular, the no cloning principle makes a claim on the 




The same can be said for the light postulate.  Regardless of the dynamical story which 
is told in a particular case, certain symmetries must hold due to the structure of 
special relativity.  This suggests that just as special relativity was succe sful – by 
making the conceptual shift from problematic hypothetical dynamical solutions to 
inconsistencies, to a kinematic framework understood as being explanatorily prior 
and more fundamental – so might quantum mechanics. 
By kinematic, Bub and Pitowsky mean pre-dynamic, by which they mean 
“generic features of … systems, independent of the details of the dynamics” (Bub & 
Pitowsky, 2007, p. 6).  The correct way to see quantum mechanics, information-
theoretically, is to take the Hilbert space as the kinematic framework for the physics 
of an indeterministic universe.  That is, the projective geometry of Hilbert space, a 
non-Boolean event space, imposes “structural probabilistic constraints on correlations 
between events (associated with the angle between events)” (Bub & Pitowsky, 2007, 
p. 6).  The dynamics of any events in the quantum world are constrained by the 
kinematic framework in which they take place.  This is the same as for events in the 
framework of special relativity, for which the dynamics of any given event are 
constrained by the Minkowski spacetime in which it occurs. 
The dynamics of quantum mechanics remains the unitary dynamics.  The shift 
in perspective, to a kinematic framework, however, means that the dynamics of any 
given event “evolves the whole structure of events with probabilistic correlations in 
Hilbert space” (Bub & Pitowsky, 2007, p. 7).  That is, the unitary dynamics of 
quantum mechanics describes the evolution of set of possible events.  This is distinct 




one “actual co-occurrence of events to a subsequent co-occurrence of events,” and 
distinct from taking the quantum state to do the same.  This is a shift from seeing the 
unitary evolution of quantum mechanics as a dynamic description of how events in 
the world change, to one where the change is in the structure of the possible event 
space, along with constraints imposed by the Hilbert space nature of that structure.  
The quantum state, , does not act like a description of the actual events which 
take place or do not take place in the world, thereby denying the second dogma.  
Instead it acts as a credence function for keeping track of objective probabilities of 
possible events. 
A number of things seem to happen when you take this standpoint.  First, the 
general features of quantum mechanics, which seemed to beg for explanation, are 
built in as part of the kinematic structure.  Phenomena such as entanglement and 
interference are not things to be explained but are aspects of the kinematic constraints 
of the Hilbert space structure.  Again, this is analogous to the situation in special 
relativity where general phenomena, such as Lorentz contraction, need no explanation 
from the point of view of special relativity.  It simply arises out of the Minkowski 
spacetime structural constraints.  Lorentz contraction is a pre-dynamic aspe t of the 
kinematics of the theory. 
Secondly, independent dynamical explanations for particular events become 
secondary to adherence to constraints imposed by the kinematic framework of Hilbert
space.  In a thought experiment proposed by Bell (1987), we see that a single event, 
when seen from different reference frames, can have different dynamical 




occurrence in all frames is a relativistic one dependent on the kinematic structure of 
Minkowski spacetime.  Many became familiar with this kind of “paradox” as novice 
students of special relativity, in which the description of an event dynamically varies 
depending on the frame in which it is described.  Invariably, the paradox is explained 
by kinematic constraints imposed by special relativity.  In this case, the thought 
experiment involves three spaceships A, B, and C.  A is equidistant from B and C, and 
B and C are attached by a thin taut thread.  A sends a signal to both B and C to begin 
accelerating.  As they accelerate, the thread undergoes Lorentz contracti  from the 
inertial frame of A.  Eventually, it will be too short and snap under the tension.  From 
different inertial frames the explanation for the source of the tension, a Lorentz-
invariant force, changes.  From the inertial frame where the rockets end up at rest, the 
explanation is that they decelerate at different rates, hence the tension is caused.  
From the perspective of the inertial frame in which A, B, and C are initially at rest, the 
moving thread undergoes a Lorentz contraction in the direction of its motion, which 
increases with the velocity of the spaceships, and the thread eventually breaks 
because this contraction is resisted by the thread being tied to B and C, which 
maintain a distance apart greater than the contraction requires.  The dynamic 
particulars no longer play the role of fundamental explanation as they can differ for 
the same event depending on the frame in which they are described.17     
In quantum mechanics, this all goes to minimize concerns about giving up the 
first dogma – that measurement must be able to be analyzed dynamically.  As we see
in special relativity, dynamics is not primary.  Indeed, dynamical description may 
                                                
17 This is actually not the conclusion which Bell draws.  He argues that at least for pedagogical reasons 




differ depending on the inertial frame for the very same event.  So it seems more 
difficult to argue that the dynamical analysis must be fundamental.  Likewise, for 
quantum mechanics, the relevant explanatory stance to take is the kinematic one.  
This is, therefore, an argument justifying the denial of the first dogma – that
measurement must be open to a complete dynamical analysis – or at least providing a 
justification for why we need not insist upon it.  Thus, while the no cloning principle 
requires giving up the first dogma, it also shows why this might not be problematic, 
just as insisting on a particular dynamical description in special relativity is not 
necessary, or even possible, given the framework of special relativity. 
The switch to a kinematic framework is also central to giving up the quantum 
state as some sort of ontological truthmaker.  It allows the quantum state to be a 
derivative structure operating in the theory as a credence function.  The quantum state 
is a cataloging device for the outcome probabilities of events in the Boolean algebras 
belonging to the non-Boolean Hilbert space corresponding to particular 
measurements.  As such, the quantum state does not correspond to any description of 
the world and so in turn we are not led into the measurement problem. Giving this up, 
as we have said, seems like it might lead directly to instrumentalism.  The move, 
however, is to replace the element of realism, which the state provided in classcal 
mechanics with another, alternate type of structure, the Hilbert space kinematics.  
That is, we are not merely rejecting the quantum state as a real description of the 
world and saying that quantum mechanics is an instrumental device used to generate 




the kinematic structure of the world, just as special relativity is.  Later we will 
consider just how close this analogy is. 
But one might immediately wonder on what “realistic” entities such as tigers 
supervene, as the authors put it.  For interpretations that accept the second dogma, 
that the quantum state has an ontological significance, this question is answered by 
how that view interprets the quantum state.  For Bohm, objects supervene on the 
underlying particle configuration.  For collapse theories such as GRW, macro-objects 
supervene on the collapsed wavefunctions.  For Everettians, macro-objects supervene 
on elements of the quantum state, all of which exist in separate worlds.  For the 
information-theoretic interpretation, objects are said to supervene on “events defiing 
a 2-valued homomorphism in the emergent Boolean algebra” (Bub & Pitowsky, 2007, 
p. 18).  This interpretation comes out of the dynamics of the information-theoretic 
interpretation.   
What is important for the dynamics of a given theory is that they be consistent 
with that theory’s kinematic structure.  This is particularly important here, wh re the 
ontological significance of the quantum state has been jettisoned, and the realism of 
the theory rests on its kinematic structure.  It is important to make a distinction 
between the two levels of the dynamics we might be talking about, the micro and the 
macro-levels, and then consider the relationship between them, which is an emergent 
one.  At the macrolevel, there are objects such a measuring instruments (or tigers), 
which behave like and interact with other macro-objects in a classical manner.  This 
is a distinct notion of dynamics from the traditional notion of quantum dynamics, 




process of decoherence, which is entirely consistent with the kinematic Hilbert space 
structure, the classical, or Boolean, event space of classical mechanics emerges as 
also entirely consistent with the kinematic structure of quantum mechanics.  This is 
meant to be analogous to cases in special relativity, like that of the spaceshi  example 
above, where the possibility of a particular dynamic story explaining the Lorentz 
contraction, which is consistent with the kinematics of Minkowski spacetime, shows 
that the theory is complete. 
This consistency proof is meant to accomplish two things for Bub and 
Pitowsky.  The first is that it solves the small measurement problem.  Recall that this 
problem was how to account for the emergence of a Boolean classical world given the 
underlying non-Boolean quantum structure.  Here we are given a quantum 
mechanism for explaining the classical probability structure of the macro-wo ld, as 
well as maintaining the consistency of the appearance of such a macro-world given its 
quantum nature.   
Perhaps more important for the Bub and Pitowsky program are claims that the 
existence of such a consistency proof underpins the realistic status of the information-
theoretic interpretation.  On realism, the authors say,  
The possibility of a dynamical analysis of measurement processes consistent with the Hilbert 
space kinematic constraints justifies the information-theoretic interpretation of quantum 
mechanics as realist and not merely a predictive instrument for updating probabilities on 
measurement outcomes. (Bub & Pitowsky, 2007, p. 8)  
Although it is not explicitly stated, it cannot be the case that this possibility s offered 
as a sufficient condition for realism.  The authors must mean that it is a necessary 




together.  If it does not, then instrumentalism is not the only concern, so too is 
completeness.  The advantage for the information-theoretic approach is the claim that 
this consistency is all that is needed, as opposed to this AND a dynamical account of 
individual measurement outcomes.  Once you take the kinematic framework of 
Hilbert space seriously, there seems to be something on which to hang realism, and 
then for the sake of completeness you must also show that this perspective is 
consistent with and accounts for our experience of macro-world classical events and 
not quantum ones.  This can be done with the theoretical apparatus of decoherence.  
Nevertheless, I think that for Bub and Pitowsky this consistency is given a great deal 
of weight in legitimizing the program.  It seems that it legitimizes th  kinematic 
perspective as a structure that is quantum, but from which one would expect to find 
classical-like macrostructures given the appropriate dynamical conditions.   
To summarize then, Bub and Pitowsky argue that the measurement problem 
(most significantly the large problem, but also the small problem) can be solved if 
the, so-called, two dogmas are dropped.  At face value, if this is done, it seems that 
quantum mechanics can only be an instrumentalist theory.  However, the crux of the 
argument is the introduction of the idea that quantum mechanics is correctly viewed 
as a theory whose most fundamental explanatory structure is a kinematic one.  Ifno 
cloning is elevated to a principle, the first dogma must be rejected.  There can be no 
dynamical explanation for measurement outcomes.  This further suggests a kinemtic 
switch based on constraints imposed by the no cloning principle.  This Hilbert space 
kinematic framework replaces the realist structure which the two dogmas were 




mechanics is no more instrumentalist than Einstein’s special relativity.  In special 
relativity, we also have the elevation of empirical regularity to fundamental principle.  
The light postulate suggests that the correct standpoint is to take a kinematic view of
spacetime, that is, the geometry of Minkowski spacetime.  Particular dynamical 
explanations involving specific forces are all secondary to the restrictions imposed by 
the overall kinematic structure.  For both the information-theoretic interpretation of 
quantum mechanics and special relativity, there are important completeness proof 
which show that any particular dynamical story will align with the kinematic structure 
dictated by the theory. 
The final question is how does this information-theoretic interpretation stand 
up against other interpretations of quantum mechanics such as Everettian or Bohmian 
theories?  In this particular paper, the authors do not explicitly argue that other 
proposed solutions to the measurement problem fail, but it is intimated that the 
information-theoretic interpretation is to be preferred. 
 
5.3. Understanding Special Relativity 
By way of an analogy between analogies, this one, like that between CBH and 
special relativity, merits closer inspection as it presents a very intriguing new 
perspective on quantum mechanics.  As we have seen previously, however, it requires 
close inspection to determine where an analogy succeeds and where it fails.  In thi  
instance, as opposed to CBH, some of the strengths of a constitutive principle theory 
approach are more explicitly pushed and the analysis tries to pull them out of the 




as a foundational theory.  But does it work?  Is the analogy to special relativity close 
enough to share in its apparent realism?  What role does and ought realism play?  And 
do the analogies on these points hold up? 
The central issues involved here are deep and important ones in the 
philosophy of science.  Those are realism and explanation.  As we have been doing 
all along, it is important to pay close attention to what it is we ought to expect from a 
scientific theory, and specifically a foundational one.  The two notions of realism and 
scientific explanation are highly intertwined, and for the most part it does seem 
reasonable to argue that we want our scientific theories to be genuinely explanatory 
and to offer a realistic interpretation of the phenomena in their domain.  We want our 
theories to tell us about the world and not merely be instruments of prediction.  
“Explanation” in an instrumental theory amounts to being an explanation of how we 
reached the theoretical results or predictions that we did.  What formula was used, 
what assumptions, etc.  For scientific explanation, however, the explanation should 
go some way to helping us understand how the predicted experimental results came 
about or how they fit in with other things we understand about the world, not merely 
how we predicted them.  That is, it is about describing something in addition to the 
theory itself.  Questions of scientific explanation are therefore inherently tied to the 
concept of realism, i.e. the world pushing back.  For Bub and Pitowsky, we saw that a 
switch in explanatory priority, from a dynamical perspective to a kinematic one, is 
supposed to allow for a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
For Bub and Pitowsky, as for Bub (2004b), there remains a principle theory-




structured on information-theoretic principles.  However, diverging from Bub and 
CBH, it is not solely in virtue of the principle theory characteristics of the 
information-theoretic interpretation that the interpretational work is being done.  For 
Bub and Pitowsky, the no cloning principle indicates that there ought to be a new 
emphasis placed on the kinematic perspective, and that the principle helps to facilitate 
this explanatory shift by adding realistic structure to the theory.  This shift to a 
kinematic framework is an important addition which is in line with the arguments 
from Chapter 4, that a foundational theory plays the functional role of a framework 
theory.  The nature of a foundational physical theory is that it establishes the 
conceptual foundation of empirical meaning.  This seems to be part of what is at work 
both in special relativity and in the Bub/Pitowsky approach to quantum mechanics, 
and their similar focus on the kinematic framework, as opposed to particular 
dynamical explanations for the phenomena concerned.  Without such a kinematic 
framework, for any foundational physical theory, the notion of dynamical interaction 
within that theory is ill-defined.  The shift to a kinematic framework is tied directly 
with the shift from a poorly defined constructive theory to a defining principle or 
framework theory.  This is the case in going from Lorentzian dynamics to the 
principle theory of Einstein’s special relativity.  So, following lessons learned in 
Chapter 4, the pertinent question at this stage is whether or not the Bub/Pitowsky 
program is equally successful in constitutive analysis and resolution.18 
                                                
18 As an aside, there is, I think, a distinction between being a framework theory in general, and being a 
theory with a kinematic framework, and also a theory with a robust kinematic framework like special 
relativity, which is aided by the rigorous geometry of Minkowski spacetime.  It seems at least 
conceptually possible that a framework theory is not kinematic in nature.  However, any kinematic 
theory is by its functional nature a framework theory f some sort.  It sets the conditions or framework 
in which the interaction theories under it can operat .  Furthermore, it might be argued that there is 




As we saw in Chapter 3, for Flores (1999) and for Einstein (1954b), there is a 
distinction to be drawn between types of theories and also the types of realism they 
characterize.  Constructive or interaction theories are often preferred because they 
trade on entity realism.  Principle or framework theories concern nomological 
realism.  I have also argued that this distinction operates in tight conjunction wi h a 
standard distinction made among types of scientific explanation; between the causal-
mechanical and unification models respectively.  The Bub/Pitowsky position relies on 
a notion of realism and it is worth disambiguating that notion given the information-
theoretic interpretation’s kinematic structure, and then asking what type of realism 
they gain, and asking if all types of realism are on a par when it comes to 
foundational questions.  Finally, is realism ultimately what we are after in a 
foundational theory? 
5.3.2. Janssen’s Argument 
Much of the analysis of special relativity by Bub and Pitowsky stems from an 
analysis done by Michel Janssen (2007).  Here Janssen is concerned to show that 
special relativity is preferable to Lorentzian dynamics due specifically to its 
kinematic stance on explanation.  We can discuss this, along with other work by 
Janssen (2002, 2004), within the context of our previous analysis on principle theories 
and foundational issues in physical theories. 
                                                                                                                                          
Minkowski spacetime.  This seems to have been the cas with special relativity.  I do wonder if this 
mathematical clarity and simplicity does not in itself invest the theory with some sort of realistic feel, 
in virtue of some sort of clarity or understandability, apart from any actual ontological significance 





Janssen argues that standard accounts of how Lorentzian dynamics fails and 
Einstien’s special theory of relativity succeeds are wrong.  Generally speaking, the 
standard claim is that Lorentz’s theory proposes to resolve the conflicts between 
Newtonian mechanics and electrodynamics, but that it is ad hoc in the manner of its 
explanation while special relativity is not, especially with respect to the Michelson-
Morley experiment’s null results.  For a more complete discussion see Janssn (2002, 
pp. 431-441).  Einstein’s expressed position shows concern that Lorentz’s contraction 
hypothesis is 1) put forth specifically to account for only one experimental result, and 
2) that even by the standards of Lorentz’s theory, the contraction hypothesis is highly 
contrived.  While Lorentz (1998) admits to being guilty of the first charge, it is not 
decisive in determining ad hoc-ness.  If the explanation fits the more general theory 
and is supported by plausibility arguments based on, for the time, reasonable 
assumptions about molecular structure, then only accounting for specific phenomena 
is not detrimental.  On the second charge, Lorentz disagrees, and, moreover, it is a 
charge leveled against Lorentz’s original contraction hypothesis and not the 
generalized contraction hypothesis19.   
Another account of what makes an explanation ad hoc is given by Popper.  A 
hypothesis which is inherently not falsifiable is one which is ad hoc.  The contraction 
hypothesis was, thereby, accused of being ad hoc due to the fact that in principle one 
                                                
19 The original contraction hypothesis, independently found by FitzGerald and Lorentz, assumes that 
material bodies moving through the aether at velocity  contract by the factor: .  What 
Janssen calls the generalized contraction hypothesis is that “a matter configuration producing a certain 
field configuration in a frame at rest in the ether will, when the system is set n motion, change intothe 
matter configuration producing the corresponding state of the field configuration in the frame moving 
with the system” (2002, p. 425).  This generalized assumption will explain a broad class of 
phenomena, including the electron’s frequency of oscillation and mass depending on their velocity 
with respect to the aether.  The generalized contraction hypothesis amounts to the assumption that all 




could not empirically test that there was or was not any such contraction, given that 
any measuring instruments being used to measure it would undergo a similar 
contraction, thereby making the contraction unobservable and the contracton 
hypothesis in principle unfalsifiable.  This accusation turned out to be premature.  
When the generalized contraction hypothesis is considered and properly amended,  
the theory is testable and can be shown to be epirically equivalent to, and so just as 
testable as, Einstein’s special relativity.  Therefore, Lorentz’s hypotesis is not ad hoc 
in the sense of being unfalsifiable in principle. 
Grünbaum suggests that the problem with Lorentzian mechanics is the 
hypothsized existence of the aether and Newtonian space-time, which are in principle 
unobservable.  This is in line with Mach’s positivism and even Occam’s razor.  
Janssen rejects this type of criticism as a general argument, wary of a wholesale 
rejection of all unobservables. 
Janssen, having rejected these other criticisms of Lorentz’s theory, argues that 
the fundamental characteristic which sets special relativity apart as  superior theory 
is that it offers a common cause for various phenomena, while for Lorentzian 
dynamics, the obvious connections between those various phenomena remain 
unexplained coincidences.   Janssen makes a direct comparison with the historic 
rivalry between Ptolemaic models and the Copernican model of the solar system.  
Here, too, there are two formalisms which both accurately account for the motion of 
the sun, planets, and the earth in terms of making empirical predictions and 
describing the phenomena.  What Copernicus offers is a reinterpretaion of the 




notes, the transformation in our physical worldview was not completed with 
Copernicus, but continues through the work of Galileo, Kepler, and culminates in the 
work of Newton.  While for the Ptolemaic system, the correlations between the 
various movements of the planets with the sun remain unexplained coincidences, for 
the Copernican system, since the planets revolve around the sun, these correlations 
are explained in terms of a single model.  The correlation between the apparent 
motion of the sun with the motion of the planets is due to the motion of the earth 
around the sun. 
Janssen argues that the same situation is the case in the rivalry between 
Lorentz’s theory and Einstein’s.  The tension between Newtonain mechanics and 
Maxwell’s equations stems from the fact that Maxwell’s equations hold only in the 
frame of reference where the aether is at rest while Newtonian mechanics olds in all 
inetrtial frames.  To solve this problem, Lorentz introduces fictive space-time 
coordinates, which depend on that frame’s velocity relative to the aether, and fictive 
electric and magnetic fields as functions of the fictive space-time coordinates.  In 
these terms, Lortenz was able to construct Maxwell’s equations that hold in any 
frame, regardless of its motion through the aether, that is, Lorentz invariance.  The 
second order affects of the difference between real fields in frames moving at 
different velocities through the aether should produce a difference in interference 
patterns in sufficiently accurate aether-drift experiments.  The Michelson-Morley 
experiment found no such difference.  In order to account for the null result of the 
Michelson-Morely experiment, or any similar experiment, Lorentz hypothesized that 




is a theory in which all laws governing matter are Lorentz invariant, as are those 
governing electromagnetic fields.  What is lacking, however, is any reason for this 
invariance in the laws governing matter.  Why should such disparate and apparently 
unconnected types of forces such as those governing fields and those governing 
matter all be Lorentz invariant?  One possible solution, considered at the time by 
Lorentz and others, was that matter is simply governed by the laws governing electric 
and magnetic fields.  This, however, turned out to be problematic and unfeasible to 
formulate.  Janssen concludes that there remains significant unexplained coincidences 
in Lorentz’s theory. 
Once again, we can look at the two different theories of Lorentzian dynamics 
and special relativiy in terms of their structure.  Lorentzian dynamics repres nts a 
constructive theory while special relativity is a principle, or framework theory.  As I 
have argued previously, it is not simply in virtue of being a principle theory that 
special relativity is more foundationally satisfactory.  However, being a principle 
theory allows the possibility of resolving fundamental inconsistencies which ar se 
from previously under-analyzed frameworks.  For Janssen, special relativity, in the 
two principles of the relativity postulate and the light postulate, subsequently 
formulated in the structure of Minkowski spacetime, offers a common cause with 
which physics can explain all of the phenomena Lorentz leaves as happy 
coincidences.  It is this recognition of a new spacetime structure, as opposed to 
Newtonian space and time still used in Lorentz, which alters the framework for doing 
physics, and which thereby provides a common structure which explains the Lorentz-





In a later presentation, Janssen (2007) is concerned to ward off objections 
posed by Brown and Pooley (2006) and Brown (2005) that Minkowski spacetime is 
not the sort of thing which can do any explanatory work.  Rather, it is simply taking 
the facts which are described by Lorentz and asserting them as fundamental 
principles.  As Lorentz himself put it,  
I cannot speak here of the many highly interesting applications which Einstein has made of 
this principle [of relativity].  His results concerning electromagnetic and optical phenomena... 
agree in the main with those which we have obtained  the preceding pages, the chief 
difference being that Einstein simply postulates what we have deduced, with some difficulty 
and not altogether satisfactorily, from the fundamental equations of the electromagnetic field. 
(Lorentz H. A., 2003, pp. 229-30)   
Brown and Pooley contend, “In our view, the appropriate structure is 
Minkowski geometry precisely because the laws of physics, including those to be 
appealed to in the dynamical explanation of length contraction, are Lorentz covariant” 
(2006, p. 10), and “From our perspective, of course, the direction of explanation goes 
the other way around.  It is the Lorentz covariance of the laws that underwrites the 
fact that the geometry of space-time is Minkowskian” (2006, p. 14).  Brown and 
Pooley have a number of points to make.  The first is that whatever type of 
explanation Minkowski spacetime may offer, it is not the sort of explanation found in 
a constructive theory.  It does not tell us why laws are Lorentz invariant in a 
constructive manner, i.e. causal-mechanically, nor does it tell us how, for example, 
length contaction comes about dynamically.  Second, as noted above, the order of 




Minkowki spacetime geometry the appropriate structure to use, rather than the other 
way around.  Finally, Minkowski spacetime is, in a sense, a structural device used as 
shorthand for saying that all laws are Lorentz invariant.  As such it is not a real 
structure.  It has no ontological or causal role to play as a substance.  Therefore, th  
common cause argument in favor of special relativity is a non-starter. 
Janssen (2007) replies this line of objections.  Janssen modifies the language 
slightly from “common cause” to “common origin inference”, but the argument is 
still that the superiority attributed to special relativity over Lorentzian dynamics lies 
in the fact that it can provide a common origin for all of the Lorentz-invariant laws 
which must hold given the structure of Minkowki spacetime, a kinematic theory.  
There is also a shift in emphasis to the kinematic structure not present in his earlier 
paper (Janssen, 2002), perhaps to add weight to the common origin argument and 
shifting away from the causal language by focusing on the kinematic/dynamic 
explanatory distinction. 
What Janssen is struggling with is how to coherently argue that the structure 
of Minkowski spacetime can be a common cause or act as a common origin in any 
way.  It is essential that Janssen be able to establish something along these lines to 
show why special relativity is more fundamental than Lorentzian dynamics.  Brown is 
correct in arguing that Minkowski spacetime cannot be a common cause explanation 
for relativistic phenomena.  However, this is to miss the relevant features of the 
theory.  This debate confounds two distinct and valid modes of scientific explanation.  
The language used by Janssen and Brown suggests that it is the causal-mechanical 




special relativity, as explanatory.  Causal-mechanical explanation, however is within 
the purview of constructive theories.  This, therefore, requires some kind of entity 
realism, and Brown correctly argues Minkowsky spacetime is not a substance, and so 
cannot give rise to common-cause explanations.  At the same time, Janssen’s analysi
is correct; it is the kinematic explanatory structure of special relativity which gives it 
its foundational strength.  The type of explanation involved is precisely that which 
belongs to principle or framework theories, that is unificationist explanation.  
Technically, according to the definition of kinematic as pre-dynamic or 
“generic features of… systems, independent of the details of the dynamics” (Bub & 
Pitowsky, 2007, p. 6), the kinematics of a theory operate essentially as constraints on 
the dynamics in physical theories.  This fits well with the functional dimension of the 
distinction between principle theories and constructive theories.  Therefore, any 
principle theory fits within this definition of being kinematic.  We might say that 
what Janssen is getting at is that special relativity, in being essentially about 
kinematics by positing constraining principles, via the structure of Minkowski 
spacetime, succeeds as a framework theory, and, moreover, that is because it provides 
a single unifying structure under which all of the relevant phenomena can be cast and 
explained. 
What justifies the rejection of Lorentzian dynamics, in a Newtonian spacetime 
structure, in favor of a Minkowski spacetime structure, or in other words, the shift 
from a dynamical theory to a kinematic one, is not simply the fact that special 
relativity is a principle theory.  Being a theory of kinematics is not, once again, 




the kinematic explanation is superior?  For Janssen, it is contained in the idea that 
Minkowski spacetime provides the source of explanation for various previously 
unexplained issues, where the dynamical theory fails to forge a link between different 
types of Lorentz-invariant laws.  The problem with this is that the ability to provide a 
common cause or a common origin explanation does not necessarily stem from 
kinematics.  Indeed a well placed dynamic or constructive hypothesis can give rise to 
such a common cause explanation.  An example of this can be found in the kinetic 
theory of gases.  Here, rather simple constructive hypotheses serve to uniteand 
explain the principles of thermodynamics by way of providing the common cause of 
interacting gas molecules.  This shows that a good common-cause explanatory theory 
need not be a kinematic theory, so it is not kinematic emphasis, as such, that is 
important. 
One might reply that Minkowskian kinematics is preferable just because it is 
the only single structure which accounts for all of the phenomena in question.  That 
is, rather than providing a causal explanation, Janssen’s argument might be 
understood to be invoking a unificationist model of explanation in the 
Friedman/Kitcher sense.  As we have discussed, this is a viable notion of scienti ic 
explanation, and the one at work in principle theories.  However, while this may be 
the case, it does not provide definitive desiderata regarding Janssen’s versus Brown’
arguments. 
As stated above, the difference between asserting that all laws operate 
according to Minkowskian geometry is only a formal step away from saying that all 




which is the explanandum.  Because the step is a formal one and not a conceptual 
one, the argument from a common origin for different laws being Lorentz invariant 
does not have much force for Brown and Pooley: 
We agree that… according to our preferred dynamical interpretation, the Lorentz covariance 
of all the fundamental laws of physics is an unexplained brute fact. This, in and of itself, does 
not count against the interpretations: all explanatio  must stop somewhere.  What is required 
if the so-called space-time interpretation is to win out over the dynamical interpretation… is 
that it offers a genuine explanation of Lorentz covariance.  This is what we dispute.  Talk of 
Lorentz covariance “reflecting the structure of space-time posited by the theory” and of 
“tracing the invariance to a common origin” needs to be fleshed out if we are to be given a 
genuine explanation here… Otherwise we simply have yet another analogue of Moliere’s 
dormative virtue. (Brown & Pooley, 2006, p. 13) 
And 
In our view, neither of these papers succeed in clarifying how space-time structure can act as 
a “common origin” of otherwise unexplained coincidenc s.  One might, for example, go so far 
as to agree that all particular instances of paradigmatically relativistic kinematic behaviour are 
traceable to a common origin: the Lorentz covariance of the laws of physics. But Janssen 
wants us to go further. He wants us to then ask after the common origin of this universal 
Lorentz covariance. It is his claim that this can be traced to the space-time structure posited by 
Minkowski that is never clarified. (Brown & Pooley, 2006, p. 14) 
Janssen (2007) accepts that Minkowski spacetime does not offer a causal 
explanation, as it were.  However, shifting to a kinematic perspective in order to 
cover more phenomena under one structure leads to a situation where the choice, with 
no other deciding factors, comes down to explanatory preferences.  On this front, 
neither Brown and Pooley nor Janssen make a definitive case.  As we have seen, 




roles in science.  It seems clear from what has been said that Janssen is arguing that 
special relativity is the more fundamental theory because it can explain by 
unification, while Brown and Pooley argue that the dynamical theory is more 
fundamental because it can explain causal-mechanically.  It would appear that the two 
parties are arguing past one another due to the lack of a shared conviction regarding 
what counts as explanation.  Determining which is the cart and which is the horse 
requires bringing more considerations into the picture. 
The protractedness of the debate between Janssen and Brown and others 
(Brown & Pooley, 2001; Janssen, 2002; Janssen, 2007; Balashov & Janssen, 2003; 
Brown, 2005; Brown & Pooley, 2006) itself serves as evidence that a new approach is 
warranted.  It is important to note that the relative perseverance of both positions 
speaks to the fact that both have a handle on an element of truth.  At the heart of the 
issue, though, is that both parties are employing somewhat circular arguments from 
the perspective of a preferred route to explanation.  From the Brown and Pooley 
perspective, to say that all laws are Lorentz invariant without explanation of that fact 
is simply to say that all laws operate in a Minkowski spacetime geometry.  They are 
equivalent formulations; one just posits as facts what the other posits as a geometrical 
structure, but there is still no more explanatory or other philosphical benefit.  
Describing phenomena from a Minkowski framework adds nothing over and above 
the Lorentzian view.  It gives no common cause explanation for the fact that “all l ws 
are Lorentz invariant”, nor is it any more unifying than accepting that statement as 
brute fact.  And since Lorentzian dynamics does provide a causal explanation for 




From Janssen’s perspective, that “all laws are Lorentz invariant” is a fact that 
requires explanation.  There is no dynamical, or causal-mechanical explanation which 
is any ‘deeper’, but special relativity, with its Minkowski spacetime structure as a 
unifying theory does the explaining.  What we have here though is a situation where 
we have two theories, one constructive, and the other principle, which have the same 
empirical content.  Two issues make it difficult to select one over the other as 
explanatorily prior based on the framing of this debate.  The first is that in any 
situation such as this, there is no principled method for choosing the causal-
mechanical explanation over the unificationist explanation of the same phenomena.  
Both explain, but in different ways.  In this particular case, however, the problem is 
more complex in that in neither approach does the type of explanation pursued 
entirely succeed as it has been put by Janssen or Brown.  While the dynamical theory 
does have a mechanism, contraction, which explains phenomena, the mechanism 
itself, and in particular why all things obey it, is left unexplained causally.  As far as 
unification goes, as we have said, the kinematics of Minkowski spacetime, taken on 
its own, is not more unifying than the claim that “all laws are Lorentz invariant.”  So 
although it is a unifying geometrical structure, it is not on its own any more 
explanatory. 
I do want to argue, along with Janssen, that special relativity is explanatorily 
more fundamental than Lorentzian dynamics.  However, the reason behind this has 
been missed by both Janssen and Brown. 
To demonstrate this, let us recall Janssen’s comparision of special relativity 




cause aspect of special relativity which renders it superior to Lorentzian dynamics.  I 
would add that what really cemented the place of the Copernican system over the 
Ptolemaic model was not simply a common cause explanation attributed to the 
structure of the system with the sun at the center of the solar system.  Rather, it came
after some time with Newton’s introduction of a common cause explanation uniting 
that structure along with other phenomena.  On the one hand, we might view this as 
the hypothesizing of a true common cause – the force of gravity in the universal law 
of gravitation.  This then would explain the success of a constructive theory finally 
offering a causal explanation for the various phenomena we now know to be 
attributable to gravitational forces.  However, the story is not so simple due to the 
mysterious nature of this action at a distance.  This lack of causal mechanism means 
that no satisfactory causal explanation can be offered.  What cemented the 
ascendency of Newtonian mechanics, and thus the Copernican revolution, was the 
foundational analysis by Newton, who not only provided a single model to explain 
multiple facts, such as falling bodies, planetary motion, and tidal events, but who 
recognized that the description of such facts could only be made coherent within a 
framewok where the notions of force and motion had clear empirical meaning (see 
Chapter 4 and DiSalle, 2006). 
Simplicity in theory building is undoubtedly a virtue.  In this, the Copernican 
system represented in Kepler’s laws was a preferable theory to the Ptolemeic one.  
However, there remains no reason why we should think of it as a better model of 
what the solar system is like.  The Ptolemaic system relies on various unexplaid 




explanation for why that model is any more true of the world.  The same is true of the 
debate between Janssen and Brown regarding Lorentz and Einstein.  What matters is 
the conceptual reconciliation introduced by special relativity in defining co cepts 
which had previously been poorly defined as discussed in Chapter 4, not a simpler 
model per se. 
This idea of unification is of central concern.  The manner in which this is 
important, however, is different from Janssen’s notion of a common origin 
explanation.  While this can be valuable, foundational theory formation involves not 
merely the explanatory unification of phenomena, but the resolution of concepts 
which previously had been in conflict.  This constitutive conceptual work is the key 
aspect of a foundational physical theory.  This argument is made in Chapter 4. 
What this tells us is that both Janssen and Brown are right in their respective 
criticisms of the other’s standpoint, but both are wrong in assessing what it shows.  At 
best, we have a stalemate and we cannot tell which is the cart or the horse in terms of 
whether Minkowski spacetime explains Lorentz invariance in all physical laws, or 
whether the fact that all laws are Lorentz invariant justifies the use of the Minkowski 
spacetime framework.  Janssen is correct, however, along with what I take to be the 
standard view, that special relativity is a more fundamental theory than Loretzian 
dynamics.  What differs in Einstein’s special theory of relativity is the conceptual 
analysis of previously vague concepts such as simultaneity.  This points the way to 
the appropriate interpretation.  Without the conceptual work which Einstein’s 
principles do, there is no explanatory framework at all, either unificationist or causal-




sense of physics, the conceptual foundation for doing physics.  Therefore, it is 
primary and it precedes the dynamics on a theoretical level.  It would be wrong to say 
that this provides a common-cause explanation for the Lorentz invariance of physical 
laws, but it does tell us why the laws of physics must be Lorentz invariant give the 
conceptual foundations of spacetime physics.  They must be in order for empirical 
claims to have meaning.  This provides the possibility of explanation via conceptual 
resolution as well as a justification for preferring special relativity over Lorentzian 
dynamics. 
Having said this, it follows that, among other things, a foundational theory 
such as special relativity will have many of the aspects which have been under 
consideration above.  A foundational theory, because of the role it plays, will be a 
framework theory, and so a principle theory; it will be a kinematic theory in at least 
the weaker sense of simply being pre-dynamic; and it will often involve unification at 
the level of the phenomena.  This goes a long way to explain why so many of these 
characteristics have been put forth to account for the success of theories such a
special relativity, which has all of these characteristics. 
5.4. Return to Quantum Mechanics 
5.4.1. On the Issue of Realism 
Now we return to the program of Bub and Pitowsky.  Up until now we have 
been discussing issues of explanation.  Janssen does not tackle the question of 
realism.  His primary concern is to show why special relativity is a preferable theory 
to Lorentzian dynamics.  His answer is based on the explanatory unification offered 




see that it is not just in virtue of there being a single kinematic geometric structure, 
i.e. Minkowski spacetime, that we should take special relativity as being more 
fundamental.  Rather, this is best understood as arising from the additional element of 
constitutive conceptual analysis.  The central question for Bub and Pitowsky, 
however, is whether or not the information-theoretic interpretation of quantum 
mechanics can genuinely be seen as a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
The reason that this question is so important is because in other interpretations of 
quantum mechanics the underlying basis for adhering so insistently to the two 
dogmas is because giving them up seems to come at the expense of giving up realism.  
Bub and Pitowsky argue that with the quantum information-theoretic interpretation 
this is not the case.   
So what kind of realism are we dealing with and how do we get it?  Generally, 
I believe, when one thinks of realism it is entity realism which one has in mind.  This 
is to be a realist about particles and waves and causal-mechanical explanations.  
When Einstein at times seems to favor constructive theories, it is on realist grounds.  
Again, “[w]hen we say we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural 
processes, we invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers 
the processes in question” (Einstein, 1954b, p. 228).  On the other hand, a principle 
theory could certainly be a realist one.  That is, realism and principle theories are not 
incompatible with one another.  However, it is not in virtue of being a principle 
theory that quantum mechanics is realist in this sense.  Likewise, a kinematic theory 
is not realistic in light of being kinematic as far as entity realism is concerned.  This 




favor of special relativity over Lorentz.  Minkowski spacetime is a theoretical 
structure, not an entity, so it cannot be considered a common cause for any 
phenomena.  It is not the type of thing which interacts in a causal manner (the case is 
different for general relativity).  Therefore, it cannot contribute to an entity-realist 
interpretation or act as a common cause. 
On the same grounds, I do not think that we could argue that Bub and 
Pitowsky’s interpretation gives us any kind of entity realism.  So there must be 
something else.  Let us consider another kind of realism – nomological realism.  This 
is the belief that certain physical principles or laws are true of the world.  There are 
two questions which go along with this type of realism: 1) What makes a theory 
realist in a nomological sense, and 2) Is this kind of realism interesting from an 
interpretational standpoint? 
5.4.2. Principles and Kinematics 
The first thing to look at is to examine what work is being done by the idea 
that the information-theoretic interpretation is a principle theory approach.  Another 
way to pose this question is to ask if this approach is equally valid supposing we do 
not posit the no cloning theorem?  Does the interpretation rely on this principle in the 
same sense that special relativity needs the relativity and light postulate ?  Or could 
we simply begin with the kinematic perspective of Hilbert space and go from there 
and equally well reach the conclusion as argued in Bub and Pitowsky without any talk 
of underlying principles?  Given that the principles in question are where the notion 
of information theory comes into this interpretation, answering these questions will 




is this interpretation information- theoretic, or is all the work done by the kinematic 
structure?  These questions warrant further investigation. 
The no cloning principle, as we have seen, does provide a motivation for 
taking the kinematic perspective on quantum mechanics if it is true of the world.  
Together with the no superluminal signaling principle, the no cloning principle 
restricts the correlations between events.  This probabilistic structure can be 
represented by the projective geometry of Hilbert space structure.  That is, we have a 
kinematic framework, a set of pre-dynamic constraints, well represented 
mathematically by Hilbert space. 
But what is doing the work for this interpretation?  Is it the principle, or the 
kinematic structure it motivates?  Previously, I argued that the principle-theory 
approach is not sufficient.  But is it necessary now for this new kinematic approach?  
This is an important question, and to answer it we must look again at the model of 
special relativity.  Here, it would seem that the light postulate and the relativity 
postulate are necessary for the foundational significance of the theory.  The light 
postulate is so important because it is what does the conceptual work.  Without it, the 
important constitutive element of special relativity is lacking, and then special 
relativity and Minkowski spacetime is, as argued by Brown, simply the positing of 
Lorentz-invariance.   
So does the information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics have 
this constitutive character?  It comes back to that.  In Chapter 4, it was argued that, on 
the basis of the three information-theoretic principles given by CBH, includi g the no 




mechanics has a constitutive character.  Perhaps, though, the constitutivity of the 
information-theoretic principles is best understood only in conjunction with the 
switch to a kinematic explanatory framework and thereby the program can be sid to
be successful. 
There are, however, several vital disanalogies with special relativity.  The first 
is that in special relativity, we do not need to look beyond the first principles of the 
theory for further justification.  We have the groundwork for a constitutive theory of 
space and time with the light postulate, because it re-characterizes the very meaning 
of simultaneity and absolute time, and with the principle of relativity, since this partly 
defines the applicability of empirical concepts.  Historically, Einstein did not even 
take to Minkowski’s geometrical model at first.  It is not the ability to characte ize 
special relativity in a kinematic structure such as Minkowski spacetime which makes 
it interpretationally preferable to Lorentz’s theory.  It does, however, follow from the 
conceptual work that was done that some sort of kinematic framework is possible, 
and that it will codify the conceptual analysis in the new physics.  Therefore, if th  
information-theoretic approach is to be justified, we must find in the scheme as a 
whole something similar that might be going on.  This is, I think, the implicit aim for 
Bub and Pitowsky. 
When we look at the Hilbert space kinematic structure proposed by Bub and 
Pitowsky, the most distinct and important difference with special relativity is that 
while the kinematic structure of Minkowski spacetime is indeed the structure doing 
the primary explanatory work, there is a dynamic story to be told about how an 




which it is told, but there is a story.  We are not left with only the kinematic 
framework as an explanatory structure.  This structure gives the translaio  between 
reference frames, which allow us to see that forces observed in different referenc  
frames are in fact the same force simply observed from different frames.  What the 
kinematic structure explains is not the individual results per se, but how they can 
appear to have different explanations from the perspective of different inertial frames,  
and yet be the same.  As noted by Cassirer,  
For [relativity]… true objectivity never lies in empirical determinations, but only in the 
manner and way, in the function, of determination itself.  The space and time measurements 
in each particular system are relative; but the truth and universality, which can be gained 
nevertheless by physical knowledge, consist in the fact that all these measurements 
correspond mutually and are coordinated with each other according to definite rules. 
(Cassirer, 1953, p. 381)    
The kinematic structure of Hilbert space for the information-theoretic 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, on the other hand, is not playing the same role.  
In fact, it blocks the general possibility of any such transformations like those we see 
in special relativity.  The Hilbert space is a kinematic framework, which is a 
probabilistic structure of possible events.  It has nothing to say about which events 
actually occur, but rather places restrictions on the possibility of being able to open 
measurement to full dynamical analysis.  This is a limitation interpreted as arising 
from the kinematic structure of quantum mechanics. 
Returning to the question of what makes a theory realist in a nomological 
sense, there are two cases to consider.  The first is that principles or laws are merely 




presented with laws which under rigorous empirical testing appear to hold, and so in 
that respect we can indeed consider them to be real laws.  But this has really very 
minimal content.  The example of Kepler’s laws is a case in point.  This sort of 
nomological realism is not particularly interpretationally interesting.  The second case 
is where, as we find in Newton’s laws or special relativity, the principles ar  not only 
expressions of strong empirical generalizations but are ones which take those 
generalizations and use them to formulate meaningful concepts without which the 
physics has no coherent basis.  The foundational significance of these principles 
comes from that constitutive character.  They are part of the conceptual apparatus 
necessary for meaningful physics.  In this case, the nomological realism is substantial, 
but it must also be relativized to the framework under which those laws are supposed 
to hold, since they are in fact the defining structure imposed on the empirical relations 
under it. 
So what should we now say regarding special relativity and realism?  I think 
there could be a question about why we should take special relativity to be a 
genuinely realist theory, though I think most would tend to think it is.  On the one 
hand, one might contend that special relativity is an instrumentalist theory – that it 
simply posits, without explanation, certain laws and so we have a minimalist 
nomological realism based on its kinematic perspective akin to Kepler’s laws.  
However, special relativity goes beyond this in justifying those principles du  to their 
constitutive nature.  Therefore, we have nomological realism with foundational 
strength.  That is, in an almost Kantian sense the principles are not simply taken to be 




serve to structure the conceptual apparatus through which physics is carried out.  This 
lends them a kind of necessity beyond being realist in a strictly empirical sense. 
I think, however, that the tendency not to regard special relativity as an 
instrumentalist theory rests on two, perhaps not clearly compatible, but nevertheless 
compelling reasons.  The first is that it is always possible to provide a complete 
dynamical account of an event in any given reference frame, and this allows for the
possibility of causal-mechanical explanation.  This is not due to special relativity’s 
explanatory focus on a kinematic framework in general; rather it is a continge  fact 
about the theory that the particular framework allows for it, albeit with restrictions on 
the causal structure imposed by Minkowski spacetime.  Any particular event can be 
explained dynamically within a given inertial reference frame.  The kinematic 
framework of special relativity then allows us to show how observers in different 
inertial frames might explain the same event differently and how the explanations 
relate according to the appropriate transformations. 
This leads to the second consideration for deeming special relativity realist.  
In the context of general relativity, Einstein locates the realism as coming from those 
things which are invariant from any observational perspective.   
The physically real in the universe of events (in co trast to that which is dependent upon the 
choice of a reference system) consists in patiotemporal coincidences.* [Footnote *: and in 
nothing else!] Real are, e.g., the intersections of tw  different world lines, or the statement 
that they do not intersect. Those statements that refer to the physically real therefore do not 
founder on any univocal coordinate transformation. If two systems of the gµv (or in general the 
variables employed in the description of the world) are so created that one can obtain the 




equivalent. For they have all spatiotemporal point coincidences in common, i.e., everything 
that is observable. (Einstein, Letter to Paul Ehrenfest of 26 December 1915, 1998) 
This is a very sparse relative of entity realism.  Nevertheless, the realism here 
comes from the fact that an event takes place and that fact is agreed upon by all 
observers.  E.g. the string between the rockets breaks.  On Einstein’s view presented 
here, the kinematic structure of special relativity does not come into play.  That 
structure is the theory of how different observers describe the event differently even 
though it is the same event. 
 I do not want to spend too much time determining just why special relativity 
should be taken as a realistic theory.  It is enough to show that 1) the question for 
authors like Janssen and Brown is not that of realism and 2) if we do look at that 
question, any standard notion of special relativity’s realism does not come from the 
kinematic structure of the theory as such.  Realism is not really under suspicion when 
it comes to special relativity, nor is the source of that realism the kinematic nature of 
the theory.  This is not to say that kinematic features of a theory cannot make it a 
realistic theory; it is just that in this case the kinematic structure is superfluous to the 
question of realism in special relativity.   Therefore, analogies focusing on a similar 
kinematic structure are not entirely useful for questions of realism. 
5.4.3. Unification and the Nature of the Problem 
Given the above considerations, I do not think that it is viable to consider the 
information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics as realistic.  It is more 
important to come back to the question of whether or not the principles on which it is 




indicate that the approach has failed.  It was not, after all, Janssen’s aim to show that 
special relativity is a better candidate for a realist theory than Lorentzian dynamics.  It 
was to show that special relativity offers a more unifying theory.  So can that be 
considered the case for the Bub and Pitowsky program? 
I think that Bub and Pitowsky are on the right track in considering the 
constitutive elements of quantum mechanics.  The dogmas or assumptions represent 
precisely the questionable concepts at issue.  One of the concepts underlying the 
problems for quantum mechanics is in the second dogma, that the quantum state has 
some kind of ontological significance.  Rejecting the dogmas of quantum mechanics 
is like rejecting the dogmas of absolute simultaneity or the necessity of Euclidean 
geometry for Einstein.  Perhaps this rejection of the dogmas is possible, but it must be 
replaced or accounted for with more crystallized physical concepts, as was the case in 
special relativity and general relativity.  More work remains to be done in quantum 
mechanics.  The central difficulty for Bub and Pitowsky is that the concept or dogma 
under attack in not absolute simultaneity but realism itself.  That is a significant 
undertaking. 
The strategy is analogous to that of special relativity.  The problematic 
concepts must be analyzed from a broader framework.  In the case of special 
relativity, the implicit dogma taken from Newtonian mechanics was that of absolute 
simultaneity.  By adopting the light postulate, Einstein showed, in conjunction with 
the relativity postulate, that this dogma must be replaced within a broader perspective 
of spacetime.  The issue for the Bub/Pitowsky approach is that since the dogmas 




broader framework is much more difficult.  Indeed, in Einstein’s conceptual analysis 
of simultaneity, the guiding principles were empirical conditions closely associated 
with the realistic ones expressed in the two dogmas.  The notion of simultaneity must 
be empirically meaningful, and this meant that it must be tied to our ability to 
determine when two events occur simultaneously.  The light postulate is that 
epistemic principle.  It defines the limit, and now not simply the empirical limit, but 
the theoretical one, on causal structures, on making measurements, and hence defines 
the very notion of simultaneity.  This is closely related to the dogma that all 
measurements must be open to complete dynamical analysis or else lack clear 
meaning.  When we ask how we know two events are simultaneous, the answer can 
only be verified with a causal signal.  The only universal signal is light.  Therefor , 
the meaning of simultaneity is dependent on this principle.  The principle of relativity 
is a realistic principle postulated as a condition for doing physics.  That the laws of 
physics must be the same in any inertial reference frame is a demand that 
measurement be objective.  In quantum mechanics, the nature of the question is much 
more fundamental. 
The question posed by Bub and Pitowsky concerns how giving up the two 
dogmas of quantum mechanics can result in a realistic interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.  The proposed solution to the question appeals very strongly to the case of 
special relativity.  However, the essential difference is that special rlativity is a 
realist theory, but not in virtue of its principle or kinematic structure.  That structure 
makes it an interpretationally successful theory because of the constitutive and 




Bub and Pitowsky do not solve the problem of realism that way.  But it points to a 
very deep issue.  The program, like special relativity, requires realism.  The concept 
in need of revision is realism itself.  This is much more ambitious than the paper 
suggests.  Following the model of special relativity will not solve the problem in the 
way the authors planned.  That method will not underwrite realism since that is not 
the strength of special relativity.  Realism is a given for special relativity.  The real 
work that relativity does as a principle theory is to define the concept of simultaneity.  
For Bub and Pitowsky, realism is at the heart of the question.  So their interpretation 
must look at how special relativity is a constitutive theory. 
Can we tease the concept of realism from the two dogmas?  Is the concept of 
realism muddled, and unclear and so that is where the problem is coming from?  Do 
we need broader framework to answer these questions and what could that be? 
5.5. Conclusions 
Ultimately the problems are multiple.  Bub and Pitowsky are concerned with a 
realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.  This they do not provide.  One issue is 
that the model, the kinematic explanatory structure of special relativity, is not that 
theory’s source of realism.  That comes from extra features of the theory, dynamical 
features.  There is, however, something which is foundationally important about 
special relativity.  Janssen argues that this is due to its ability to attribute a common 
origin explanation via its kinematic structure.  Even if this were correct, the 
information-theoretic approach lacks any common origin explanation in quite the 
same way.  It does connect phenomena such as interference and entanglement, but 




of wholly different kinds of forces.  They are predicted by standard quantum 
mechanics.  Finally, and most importantly, Janssen’s position is not quite right in my 
view.  It is not the common origin explanation which makes special relativity 
preferable over Lorentzian dynamics.  That special relativity has a particul  
kinematic structure is related to its underlying foundational strength, and so too is its 
common origin explanation.  This underlying strength is the constitutive character of 
the principles involved.  I would not say that this lends it realism, nomological 
realism, but it does provide a deeper sense of necessity in the Kantian sense of a 
priori necessity.  These principles must be in place, and the ones Einstein developed 
are not in need of further interpretation because they are the fundamental interpretive 
principles, establishing a consistent and meaningful conceptual framework. 
We can still ask at this point, is the information-theoretic interpretation as 
presented by Bub and Pitowsky a preferable position to hold over other 
interpretations of quantum mechanics such as Everett, Bohm, or GRW, and on what 
grounds?  It cannot be preferable on entity realist grounds, since it does not make any 
claims for entity realism.  However, I think that it acts as a convincing promiss ry 
note.  Even without the deep constitutive work like that done by special relativity, the 
information-theoretic interpretation relative to some broader framework might be like 
special relativity relative to general relativity, where the light postulate is understood 
in a larger framework. 
To ask why one might take the information-theoretic interpretation as correct 
is to ask why we should think the no cloning principle holds.  This is analogous to 




scope of the theory.  Nevertheless it is a relevant physical and philosophical question.  
The type of answer given gets to the heart of the difference between specialrelativity 
and the information-theoretic interpretation. 
It is not often asked of special relativity, why is the speed of light constant 
from the perspective of special relativity.  Nevertheless, there are two levels at which 
we find answers.  First, consider special relativity without the addition of general 
relativity.  In this case, there is a kinematic framework, but it could just as easily be 
viewed as a mathematical summary of Lorentzian dynamics, as argued by Brown, 
except for the philosophical considerations which emphasize the necessity of the light 
postulate in establishing conceptual clarity regarding the measurability of 
simultaneity.  The primacy of Minkowski spacetime as a kinematic framework is 
thereby established.  From the perspective of general relativity, the light postulate is 
unified within a still larger conceptual framework.  At the end of the day, our reasons 
for accepting this principle, and therefore the switch to a kinematic explanatory 
framework, hinge on the work being done by that kinematic framework in terms of 
conceptual clarification.  The Bub/Pitowsky approach does not provide the 
clarification of concepts such as realism, measurement, and causation, but it may 
pave the way, by analyzing the roles of these concepts and in pursuing a constitutive 
line of theory building. 
To clarify, I am not arguing that there are no other types of acceptable 
physical theories.  There are other types of theories which are common causal,
dynamic, kinematic, principle, constructive, and various combinations of these.  All 




foundational issues, the nature of the task is such that a fundamental theory will very 
likely be as much about our conceptual framework as about empirical modeling.  
How do we know when this is necessary?  In a sense, this is the hard part.  It takes 
recognizing that the current science is in the midst of a crisis and that the crisis stems 
from an inadequate conceptual grounding and not simply empirical inadequacies.  It 
seems more than reasonable to think that quantum mechanics is and has been in just 
such a crisis.  The difficulties involved are fundamentally conceptual in nature; hence, 
the resolution must come from an analysis of our current conceptual structure.  In this
sense, Bub and Pitowsky are on the right track.  What has been achieved is an 
analysis in the negative sense, i.e. an analysis showing that there is a conceptual issue 
at stake and pinpointing the implicit assumptions lying at its source, the two dogmas.  
The Bub and Pitowsky approach is to develop a realist interpretation of quantum 
mechanics by switching to a kinematic explanatory framework.  As this chapter 
shows, this does not succeed.  However, indirectly the outline for a positive analysis 
has also been established.  The resolution must come at the conceptual level with a 
theory of constitutive principles.  But what this resolution is has not been established.  
The no cloning principle, in establishing a kinematic perspective over a dynamic one 
does not succeed in establishing a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.  It is 
not necessarily the role of constitutive principles to establish such a realistic theory.  
However, when it comes to quantum mechanics, the analysis of this chapter has 
shown that the motivation to find such a theory comes from the fact that the 
conceptual issues relate to the concept of realism itself.  The challenge is how to




Chapter 6:  Where do we go from here? 
 
 
DiSalle argues that the functional role of space-time theories as foundational 
theories lies in establishing objectively meaningful physics.  Therefor, they require 
extra-empirical, constitutive principle-based theory construction.  Such principle 
theories are what allow us to define an explanatory structure and therefore th  
empirical meaning of basic physical concepts such as motion, space, time, and 
measurement. 
Quantum mechanics also seems to fall into this class of theories.  It is not (yet, 
in any case) a space-time theory, but it nonetheless is a theory tied to the very 
structure of empirical measurement, observation, and causation. 
The constitutive role of quantum mechanics has not been as clear as it perhaps 
should have been.  Galileo laid down the inherently constitutive nature of space-time 
theories 400 years ago, Kant reified it in the annals of philosophy.  Quantum 
mechanics has only existed less than 100 years.  Approaches to solving the problems 
which quantum phenomena have presented have been more or less constructive 
approaches – that is, approaches which operate within the boundaries established for 
physics by other framework theories such as Newton’s and Einstein’s.  In a sense, this 
history is analogous to the mechanical philosophy in its attempt to understand motion, 
or Lorentzian dynamics within the framework of Newtonian mechanics.  These 




to be fully defined.  Hence no sufficiently clear resolution was found until the 
framework itself was the object of analysis. 
Perhaps quantum mechanics is in such a state.  Quantum mechanics was born 
out of clashes, the need to reconcile alternate conceptual schemes.  Eventually, 
quantum mechanics settled on the appropriate equations and calculus for making 
accurate predictions.  In a technical sense, quantum mechanics relieved the tension 
between the new puzzling phenomena and the existing frameworks, but it never really 
resolved the philosophical puzzles.  That is, the theory’s development managed to 
bypass conceptual problems with predictive adequacy, but ultimately did not 
disentangle the underlying conceptual issues.   
There are a variety of pieces of evidence that quantum mechanics warrants 
this type of conceptual analysis. 
The first is simply the abundance of proposed solutions to the problems 
fundamental to quantum mechanics, where none seems entirely satisfactory, and 
about which there is no consensus among physicists and philosophers.  Given that the 
solution space for the measurement problem is pretty well outlined within the given 
framework, the lack of consensus seems to indicate that something fundamental in the 
conceptual framework itself may be in need of analysis and alteration.  If a problem is 
intractable, yet the space of the potential solutions appears to have been exhausted, it 
suggests the need to expand the solution space. 
The second and third pieces of evidence have to do with where, specifically, 
the problems of quantum mechanics seem to lie.  The standard philosophical concerns 




correlations.  These are essentially problems directly involving the notions of 
measurement and causality.  As such, quantum mechanics is a theory which is 
fundamentally about our concepts of causation and definitions of empirical 
measurement.  These concepts, like those of space and time, are essential to the basic 
understanding of the physical world.  Moreover, as for theories of space and time, itis 
necessary that such concepts be well defined.  The nature of the concepts involved 
and the intractability of the problems suggests that quantum mechanics ought to be 
subject to conceptual analysis, and that the right sort of solution will be found in an 
appropriate constitutive theory.  That means developing a quantum theory as a theory 
not simply of empirical generalization, but as one which partially defines the concepts 
necessary for establishing a coherent causal structure and meaningful picture of 
measurement in the physical world. 
Third, quantum mechanics faces extrinsic difficulties regarding its 
compatibility with relativity theory.  This also has been seen to be a particul ly 
intractable problem, though theoretical advances are being made.  Once again, the 
intractability and the nature of the problem suggest that the problem is a deep and 
fundamental one.  Given that relativity theory, as we have now seen in some depth, is 
a foundational theory regarding the structure of space-time functioning as a 
framework theory, a resolution of this problem will involve a quantum theory 
commensurate with a theory of space and time.  Therefore, not only is quantum 
mechanics, as it stands, a theory involving the causal structure of the world, but this 
lack of unity suggests that quantum mechanics ought to be, at the very least, 




have already seen, theories of space and time are of necessity framework theories 
which serve to define the conceptual notions of causation and measurement. 
For all of these reasons, a reasonable interpretive strategy would be to 
understand quantum mechanics as a theory which needs to be constructed in a fashion 
very much like that which has been demonstrated to be the standard for space-time 
theories.  That is, it needs to be constructed as a framework theory, with due attention 
and analysis paid to the concepts presupposed in its foundations.  The first step in this 
is to analyze those presuppositions and see how they lead to the problems which arise 
in quantum mechanics.  Taking our cue from the historical precedents, we look to 
places of apparent contradiction.  The analysis of Bub and Pitowsky discussed in 
Chapter 5 pursues this course. 
If we look at the issues involved in quantum mechanics – the standard 
problems, or puzzles, and the various solutions to them – it seems that there has been 
an attempt to resolve deep issues in a more or less constructive fashion, following the 
first dogma, after having run into the measurement problem due to adherence in the 
second dogma.  I have argued that, because of the combination of the explanatory 
aims of a constructive theory and the peculiar nature of quantum theory, the success
of this type of approach is doubtful, at least without significant prior conceptual work.  
Looking at the perennial problems and the proposed solutions, it is clear that the 
struggle, at its roots, is one involving the meaning of measurement within the 
quantum framework, and more deeply, the meaning of causality in this physical 




problem.  As we have seen, the two dogmas are also rooted in realist views of 
physical theories. 
The problem here is in fact deeply analogous to that of Einstein prior to his 
formulation of relativity theory.  Einstein saw that clashes between Newtonian 
mechanics and electromagnetism were rooted in ill-defined concepts which precluded 
the possibility of objectively meaningful measurements.  So measurement can play a 
role in the discovery of poorly grounded concepts which have not been analyzed.  
Ultimately, it is measurement which must be defined for empirical investigation to 
take place.  The possibility of the measurement of motion, of force, or of mass were 
the subjects of definition for Galileo, Newton, and Einstein.  In order to provide 
definitions which resulted in conceptually clear notions of measurement, these 
theories constructed principles which provided the conceptual clarity and framework 
to give meaning to the current notions of physical measurement.  Kant thought that 
these principles arose from our own a priori intuition of the world.  The positivists 
thought that, while necessary, these principles were purely conventional.  It has been 
shown by DiSalle that the development of these principles shows that there is 
certainly an element of definition, and therefore a conventional choice.  However, 
there is also serious conceptual analysis of the preceding framework, which brings to 
light those concepts which require further definition in order to meaningfully carr
out empirical science.   This conceptual analysis results in the reconciliation of 
disparate frameworks.  This resolution is a prominent aspect of the conceptual 




This analysis of theory analysis should now, I think, aid us in approaching the 
issues surrounding quantum mechanics.  That is, we might now know what we are 
looking for.  It indicates that there may be the need for conceptual revision in 
quantum mechanics, and physics in general, if we are to make sense of the 
peculiarities of quantum mechanics.  There seems to be at least two ways to see what 
is at issue.  One approaches the analysis as internal to quantum mechanics and the 
other as external.  The first follows more directly from the CBH and Bub and 
Pitowsky program20.  In this case, quantum mechanics, analyzed in information-
theoretic terms sheds light on the nature of measurement and the limitations imposed 
upon it.  This approach takes a somewhat Bohrian view of quantum mechanics.  
Measurement results can only be understood objectively in a classical sense.  That is,
Booleanity is necessary for objectivity.  Informational constraints imposed by the 
quantum structure require that measuring instruments must ultimately be black boxes 
which cannot be analyzed dynamically.  To ask why the world cannot be objective 
“all the way down” is answered by the no cloning principle.  However, as I have 
argued, this is not analogous to special relativity where the analogous question is why 
there is no absolute simultaneity, which is answered by the light postulate.  In the 
case of special relativity, there is the external justification that such a concept of 
simultaneity is required to define the notion of inertial frame, and hence motion, 
space, and time. 
The second possible approach adopts this type of external analysis.  The 
challenge lies not in revising the concepts of quantum mechanics to better bring to 
light the structure that makes it the case that quantum mechanics places limits on 
                                                




objective measurement.  Rather, the challenge is to revise the concepts of objective 
measurement and causation, so that they can encompass quantum mechanics, instead 
of stipulating that some area of physics is in principle unamenable to such analysis.   
It is worth repeating that there are a number of areas in which problems arise 
regarding quantum mechanics.  Some arise from within quantum mechanics which 
appears to conflict with our traditional understanding of the explanatory role that a 
physical theory ought to play.  This conflict is articulated in the measurement 
problem and the EPR thought experiment.  On a separate level, quantum mechanics 
stands in conflict with another fundamental physical theory, general relativity.   
Perhaps these two concerns regarding quantum mechanics, internal and 
external, are not separate from one another.  The first, from within quantum 
mechanics, seems to arise from conflict with the highly successful formalism of 
quantum mechanics with deeply felt intuitions about causation and measurement.  
That is, preconceptions regarding what the physical world must be like from a causal 
or realist perspective.  Einstein denied that the causal structure offered by quantum 
mechanics could even allow the possibility of physics.  On the other hand, the 
conflicting theories of quantum mechanics and relativity both have something to say 
about the causal structure of the world, implicitly and explicitly.  Here are 
frameworks whose apparent incompatibility lies in their causal structure.  Both areas 
of problems, however, come down to issues regarding the same fundamental concepts 





 What this leads one conclude is that what is needed is a conceptual revision, 
much like that carried out in the history of science by Newton and Einstein.  The 
analysis should show where hidden, or overlooked, conflicting conceptual schemes 
exist.  This in turn, might lead to resolutions both between the differences with 
quantum mechanics and relativity theory, but might also shed light on the ever 
present difficulties in quantum mechanics.   Einstein, in analyzing the principle of 
simultaneity brings in conceptual structure from electrodynamics (light) and extends 
it to the notion of simultaneity, space, time and motion in the realm of all physics.  
Electrodynamics conflicted with the contemporary spacetime theory of thetime, 
Newtonian mechanics.  Einstein recognized this conflict as indicating the source of 
conceptual inadequacy and therefore the area in need of revision.  Quantum 
mechanics is in just the same sort of conflict with the current theory of spacetime, 
general relativity. 
It is not within the scope of this document to propose such a resolution.  
However, it does seem that the guiding instinct of CBH and Bub and Pitowsky to 
create a principle theory approach to quantum mechanics was quite inspired, for that 
is exactly what is needed.  However, the approaches of CBH and Bub and Pitowsky 
do not have those characteristics which make a principle theory constitutive in the 
right way.  At least not clearly so.  They are information-theoretic princi les which do 
allow the derivation of quantum-like theories, but this is not sufficient for an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  What appears to be needed is some sort of 
conceptual analysis which will shed light on those concepts which one suspects are at 




But where could this come from?  And can the theoretical framework of 
information theory come to our aid?  As hinted at above, I think that ultimately one 
must look to the conflict between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.  Not only 
is there a struggle between concepts here, but general relativity adheres much more 
closely with our intuitive notion of the causal structure of the world (hence, one might 
add, its much broader acceptance).  What we take to be “measurable” is not a concept 
constant to both theories.  We need to find the conceptual basis of the problem and 
resolve it. 
Where might such a solution come from and what might it look like?  By way 
of example, we might consider an information-theoretic principle such as the 
holographic principle.  The holographic principle is often presented as a bound on the 
information contained within a volume of space such that it is proportional to the area 
of the surface of that volume in Plank units21.  This bound appears in black hole 
thermodynamics, but it has links with general relativity, thermodynamics, and 
quantum gravity.  Some work has been done to show that quantum relations such as 
the uncertainty principle can be derived from the holographic principle. 
This is speculative on several levels.  The first is that the standing of the 
holographic principle itself still remains conjectural in the field of quantum gravity.  
Second, the steps to derive aspects of quantum mechanics from it are still in their 
infancy.  However, my proposition is that an information-theoretic principle such as 
the holographic principle could stand to play a large role in the foundational questions 
of quantum mechanics for all of the reasons argued in the preceding analysis.  If the 
holographic principle does hold, or if there are other principles which are also 
                                                




implicated in relativistic structure, quantum structure and information theory, and 
from which quantum mechanics, perhaps with other constraints, can be derived, at 
least in the appropriate limiting situations, then it seems that it might offer the 
possibility of solving some of the conceptual problems. 
 The primary aim of introducing the holographic principle and what it might 
entail is to explore a concrete example of the type of principle which we might be 
looking for, given the parameters which were set out after much analysis of theory
construction and the state of quantum mechanics.  In the first place, this example 
holds out the hope that there could in fact be such constitutive principles which help 
enlighten the issues surrounding quantum mechanics.  It also shows that information 
theory is in fact a likely place to look – if for no other reason than because it offers a 
framework for providing very general constraints. 
 But how might the holographic principle act as a constitutive principle, 
providing a framework to define the concepts of causation and measurement so that 
physical enquiry in the quantum realm is made meaningful?  Following the analysis 
of DiSalle, we saw a fairly general methodology.  There seems to be a fact which 
holds.  It is not explained, but it seems to hold and is connected with fundamental 
concepts.  Elevate it to a principle, no longer in need of explanation, and see what it 
tells us about concepts in physics.  Light seemed to be constant in all reference 
frames.  Einstein employed is as a defining principle for time and simultaneity, thus 
characterizing inertial frame.  There appeared to be an equivalence between inertia 
and gravitational force.  Einstein elevated this to a principle, thus constituting the 




Elevate it to a constitutive principle.  What does it tell us about the explanatory 
framework, causation, and measurement? 
 It is not clear what constitutive framework this might offer.  What this kind of 
external approach may offer beyond the CBH approach is the promise of unification 
with other conceptually diverse frameworks.  What the holographic principle has over 
this, if it holds and if connections with quantum structure can be derived, is that from 
an information-theoretic point of view, there seems to be a connection between the 
geometry of spacetime and the quantum world, which is tied to the limits placed on 
the amount of information that a region of spacetime can contain and the speed at 
which it can be processed.  In itself, unification is not sufficient to establish a 
constitutive theory.  However, following the model of conceptual analysis discussed 
above, unification often indicates the place to look when it is unification between two 
theoretical structures that appear to be incompatible with one another. 
 If this dissertation has been successful, then what has been shown is that 
quantum information theory may very well have a role to play in the philosophical 
debate over quantum mechanics.  That is, one of the questions the dissertation is 
asking is: is quantum information theory the type of thing that can provide any 
philosophical insight?  We have seen that the most obvious ways that this might be 
the case fail.  The growth of the field of quantum information theory does not 
legitimize the view that the world is made of information.  Nor do the advances in 
quantum information theory justify the conclusion that quantum mechanics is about 
knowledge.   Both of these approaches depend for their motivation on illegitimate 




which the world can be made up.  To think so is to make a category mistake.  Second, 
the use of the word “information” in information theory has given rise to a confusi 
with the concept of information in its standard use.  Such an equivocation is 
unjustifiable given the nature of the concept of information in the technical sense. 
 Though these tantalizing approaches are unjustified, quantum information 
theory may still have a philosophical role to play, only more subtly.  Indeed, if this 
dissertation is successful, then we can say more.  The use of quantum information-
theoretic principles may be the best strategy for moving forward regardin the 
philosophical issues of quantum mechanics.  A look at foundational theories such as 
Newtonian mechanics and relativity theory reveals that such theories are necessary as 
preconditions for the possibility of explanatory structure.  We have seen that this 
structure is not given with a priori certainty, but it does generally arise via a 
particular kind of conceptual analysis, which is motivated by incompatible 
frameworks available at the time.  While not recognized, as has been the case for 
space-time theories, a strong argument can be made that quantum mechanics – 
because of the particular nature of its conceptual puzzles, its fundamental content, a d 
its conflict with the current theory of spacetime – should be considered to be in this 
category of foundational framework theory. 
 If that case can be made, then the resolution to the conceptual problems in 
quantum mechanics requires conceptual analysis in such a way that a theory of the 
appropriate constitutive principles, which resolve the conceptual issues, is defined.  
As such, the argument motivates a move away from other interpretations of quantum 




to their constructive approach, where such an approach is, in this case, not the correct 
explanatory tool for the job.  The argument does not necessitate an information-
theoretic approach.  If constitutive principles are required, they may be found 
elsewhere.  However, the current and potential conceptual scope of quantum 
information theory makes it the most promising area in which to look for future 
directions.  Just as developments in non-Euclidean geometries unknowingly paved 
the way for Einstein’s theory of relativity by introducing novel conceptual structures 
with which to describe the basic concepts of space and time, so might developments 
in quantum information theory open up new conceptual structures with which to 
analyze the basic concepts of causation and measurement. 
The whole of science is nothing more that a refinement of everyday thinking.  It is for this 
reason that the critical thinking of the physicist annot possibly be restricted to the 
examination of the concepts of his own specific field.  He cannot proceed without considering 
critically a much more difficult problem, the problem of analyzing the nature of everyday 




Appendix: The holographic principle - briefly 
 
The holographic principle is closely associated with another bound, the 
Bekenstein bound.  This bound was first articulated by Bekenstein (1973).  
Bekenstein (1981) argues that the entropy of a system is bounded by its mass and 
size.  The arguments for the bound stem from black hole theory and fundamental 
thermodynamic principles.  Following Bekenstein (1973), we begin with the 
observation shown by Hawking (1971) that the horizon area of a black hole never 
decreases.  Bekenstein notes that this is a property shared in general by entrop . 
 A black hole is characterized by only three quantities: mass, angular 
momentum, and charge.  Therefore, the collapse of a large system of matter with 
many degrees of freedom into a black hole appears to violate the second law of 
thermodynamics.  It goes from arbitrarily large entropy to none at all.  This is also the 
case when a system is lost in an existing black hole.  It is argued that a reasonable 
solution to this thermodynamic problem is to connect the entropy loss with the gain in 
area mentioned above, since the area must always increase and it is well defined.  
That is, we take the black hole to have an entropy  equal to its horizon area A,
modified by a number the order of unity.  This is provided by Hawking (1974): 
 
Bekenstein concludes: 
Suppose that a body containing some common entropy g es down the black hole.  The 
entropy of the visible universe decreases in the process.  It would seem that the second law of 




direct measurement that the total entropy of the whole universe does not decrease in the 
process.  However, we know that the black-hole area“compensates” for the disappearance of 
the body by increasing irreversibly.  It is thus natur l to conjecture that the second law is not 
really transcended provided that it is expressed in a general form: The common entropy in the 
black-hole exterior plus the black-hole entropy never decreases.  This statement means that 
we must regard black-hole entropy as a genuine contribution to the entropy content of the 
universe. (Bekenstein, 1973, p. 7) 
This is known as the generalized second law. 
The analogy drawn between black hole entropy and thermodynamic entropy 
by Bekenstein is made far more robust by the discovery of Hawking radiation (1974; 
1975).  That is, if Bekenstein’s argument is to be carried though, then we must take 
seriously the idea that if a black hole has entropy, it must also have a temperature, 
since it has mass.  If this is the case, then a black hole with a temperature must 
radiate.  Hawking confirmed this, thus solidifying the notion of black hole entropy 
beyond a mere analogy. 
Further possible implications of this bound come from recognizing that it is 
not necessarily the case that the generalized second law must hold.  That is, it is not 
thus far established as a law of nature.  It could be violated if systems of fixed mass 
and size, with arbitrarily large entropies, were dropped into black holes.  Black hole 
horizon area is strictly dependent on mass, so this scenario would violate the 
generalized second law since the expansion of the black hole horizon area would not 
compensate for the entropy lost.  What this suggests is that we should demand that the 
generalized second law hold, by stipulation, and this then requires that entropy must 






where E is the total mass-energy of the system contained in the sphere whose radius 
is R.  This holds only for weakly gravitating systems.  So the entropy S of a system of 
known energy is constrained by its surface area.  Note the central role which the 
constraint of the second law of thermodynamics plays for this derivation. 
The Bekenstein bound is a strong motivating factor for the holographic 
principle.  Bekenstein also makes an explicit claim that thermodynamic entropy and 
Shannon entropy are equivalent.   
Thermodynamic entropy and Shannon entropy are conceptually equivalent: the number of 
arrangements that are counted by Boltzmann entropy reflects the amount of Shannon 
information one would need to implement any particular arrangement. The two entropies have 
two salient differences, though. First, the thermodynamic entropy used by a chemist or a 
refrigeration engineer is expressed in units of energy divided by temperature, whereas the 
Shannon entropy used by a communications engineer is in bits, essentially dimensionless. 
That difference is merely a matter of convention. (Bekenstein, 2003) 
Here entropy is taken to be a measure of uncertainty, or lack of information.  This 
claim requires further analysis which this dissertation cannot address.  For discussion 
on the relationship between thermodynamic entropy and Shannon entropy see Leff 
and Rex (2003). 
The holographic principle, according to Bousso, is that “A region with 
boundary of area A is fully described by no more than A/4 degrees of freedom, or 
about 1 bit of information per Planck area” (2002, p. 14).  Bousso (2002, p. 19) also 
argues for a related, but more general Covariant Entropy Bound: the entropy of any 





A light sheet is a 2 + 1 dimensional hypersurface generated by nonexpanding light 
rays orthogonal to B.  There are other variations on the holographic principle, and 
none are confirmed, though it is believed that some version of the bound will turn out 
to be true22. 
 In a non-rigorous way, the derivation for the holographic principle begins with 
black hole physics.  If the energy in a finite region of space surpasses a critical 
density, then that region collapses into a black hole with the entropy we have seen.  
Moreover, the entropy of a given region of space cannot be larger than the entropy of 
the largest black hole the size of that area.  The maximal entropy for a region is 
proportional to its surface area, and, surprisingly, not its volume.  The bound applies 
to statistical entropy, a notion of entropy more general than any specific 
thermodynamic interpretation.  It does not make any assumption about the 
microscopic properties of matter and so places a fundamental limit on the number of 
degrees of freedom in the world (Bousso, 2002, p. 36).  
 There are two broad formulations of the holographic principle23: 1) The strong 
holographic principle – states that the information which an outside observer can 
derive from the surface of a black hole is proportional to the surface area of the event 
horizon.  This allows there to be something behind the horizon, or the “screen”, but 
only that the screen filters the information which the observer can access.  2) The 
weak holographic principle – states that all of the information entering the event
horizon of a black hole is encoded on the surface of the horizon and is proportional to 
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the surface area.  Here, there is nothing behind the “screen”, and the universe can be 
described entirely by the “screens”, hence the “holographic” principle. 
 Apart from what the holographic principle might mean, it is interesting as a 
fundamental principle, or at least a fact which might lead to one.  On the one hand, it 
is a principle which stems from black hole physics, but it also relates to the number of 
quantum states which can occupy space. 
 This is born out in various implications of the holographic principle.  First, in 
a paper by Jacobsen (1995), the Einstein equation is derived from the proportionality 
of entropy and horizon area together with the fundamental thermodynamic relation 
 which relates heat, entropy, and temperature.  If thermodynamic principles 
are not to be violated, then if energy flows through a horizon, so must entropy, 
meaning that the size of the horizon must change in proportion to the energy flux 
across it.  This implies a curvature of spacetime, and the deduction of the Einstein 
equation.  So not only is the holographic principle a very interesting principle arising 
out of spacetime physics, it seems that if it is assumed as a fundamental principle, 
general relativity can be deduced from it. 
 Work done by Bousso and others to show that aspects of quantum mechanics 
also follow from the holographic principle (see Bousso (2004), Per and Segui (2005), 
Chen (2006)).  Bousso begins by assuming the holographic relation 
. 
From this he derives the Bekenstein bound.  Following an earlier paper (Bousso, 




Bekenstein bound.  As an intermediate step, we can see that the Bekenstein bound 
expresses the constraints of the holographic principle on the physics of flat space. 
 Bousso argues that if we imagine a weakly gravitating mass such as earth,  
on the order of GMR, where G is Newton’s gravitational constant, M is the mass, and 




This bound on entropy is then the Bekenstein bound up to an order of one. 
 Then Bousso goes on to show that if the position and momentum uncertainties 
of a particle are too small then the Bekenstein bound would be violated.  This limit 
turns out to be 
 
Planck’s constant emerges as a derived quantity: 
 
A slightly different derivation of this fundamental quantum mechanical 
relation is also offered by Chen (2006). 
Per and Segui (2005), following a method similar to Bousso’s to derive the 
time-energy uncertainty relation from the generalized covariant entropy bound. 
 
The authors take this to mean that the holographic principle not only poses a limit on 





 Although much work still needs to be done, there are promising results which 
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